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INTRODUCTION

In a recent editorial, the San Francisco Examiner observed that,
''The notion that an unmarried relationship is the equivalent of marriage is an attack upon social norms, the destruction of which concerns a great many people in the nation and, we assume, in San
Francisco." 1 Shortly thereafter, San Francisco's Board of Supervisors approved an unprecedented ordinance authorizing the payment
of spousal benefits to unmarried partners who share "the common
necessaries of life" with city employees.2 At the Baltimore session of
the 1980 White House Conference on the Family, one delegate asked
the conference to define the family as "two or more persons who
share resources, responsibility for decisions, values and goals, and
have commitment to one another over time." This proposal lost by
only two votes among 761 delegates.3 As these incidents suggest, in
today's national dialogue on American family life, we are having
increasing difficulty even agreeing about what a "family" is.
The way family relationships are defined has significant legal
consequences because our laws bestow great benefits upon families.
Consider, for example, marital interests in real property; privileged
communications between husband and wife; inheritance rights belonging to family survivors under intestate succession laws; and
wrongful death rights in tort law. The Supreme Court has also established several categories of extraordinary constitutional protection for marriage, child-parent relationships, and related interests.4
These benefits arise from the law's recognition that family relationships are extremely important to individuals. In addition, the law
reflects strong social and even political interests in sustaining formal
family ties. 5
The relationships historically protected by American law are llinited to those that arise from kinship, adoption, or heterosexual marI. San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 21, 1982, at BIO, col. I.
2. And Now, Gay Family Rights?, TIME, Dec. 13, 1982, at 74. Mayor Diane Feinstein vetoed the ordinance. San Francisco Chron., Dec. 10, 1982, at I, col. 4.
3. All in the Family, TIME, June 16, 1980, at 31.
4. See Part II infra.
5. These interests are discussed in Part I i'!fra.
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riage. 6 Thus, unmarried couples are not regarded as families for the
many purposes addressed by state and federal laws.7 American legal
institutions - particularly the judiciary - have begun over the last
several years to recognize a few exceptions that would once have
been denied by a very rigid legal and social policy of reinforcing
formal family relationships.8 Generally, however, the law remains
quite certain about what a family is for the most fundamental
purposes.
There is nonetheless a growing sense of uncertainty about the
place of the formal family in our hierarchy of national values. Some
of this ambiguity has been generated by reading an unwarranted
amount of individualistic sentiment into recent social science research9 and legal literature 10 during a period of some cultural tur6. No state today would knowingly issue a marriage license to a homosexual couple. See
Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United
States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 874-78 (1979). See generally Note, The Legality ofHomosexual
Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973) (discussing the constitutionality of restricting licenses to
heterosexual couples). Isolated reports do exist that some homosexuals have nevertheless married formally. Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L.
REV. 663, 677 (1976).
7. Even the celebrated Marvin case was based on the theory ofan implied contract. Application of California's community property laws and Family Law Act was explicitly rejected in
the case. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977). The
California Court of Appeal subsequently reversed the rehabilitative award to Michelle Marvin
because it was neither consensual in nature nor supported by any recognized obligation in law.
Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981).
8. See Part III C infra.
9. Between 1960 and 1978, the divorce ratio increased 157 percent. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 338,
MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 3 (1979). The number of unmarried couples
increased an estimated 157.4 percent between 1970 and 1980, with the actual number increasing from 523,000 to 1,346,000. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, summarized in The American Family
Bent-hut Nol Broken, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 16, 1980, at 48, 50. The illegitimacy
ratio tripled in the two decades prior to 1975, Carlson, Families, Sex, and the Liberal Agenda,
58 Pua. INT. 62, 66 (1980), so that by 1977, 15.5% of all children - and 51.7% of all black
children - born in the United States were illegitimate. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347,
367 n.14 (1979) (White, J., dissenting). Such statistics have drawn expressions of alarm from
some family sociologists. See, e.g., Bronfenbrenner, The Calamitous .Decline of the American
Family, Wash. Post., Jan. 2, 1977, at Cl, col. 1 (Outlook).
There have also been changes in sexual attitudes and practices. Some regard the changes
as a "sexual revolution." See Carlson,supra. The degree of perceived change in cohabitation
norms was cited in the Marvin case:
The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to cohabitation that
we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that have apparently
been so widely abandoned by so many. Lest we be misunderstood, however, we take this
occasion to point out that the structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution of marriage . . . •
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831 (1977).
Curiously, there seems to be little empirical basis for recent changes in attitudes toward
traditional values. "No new theories or research findings have provoked the current questioning of family life"; rather, "the social upheavals of the past decade" have led to skepticism
concerning all kinds of American institutions, traditions, and authority patterns. A. SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT Preface at i (1973). Some sociologists link increases in
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moil. The emerging uneasiness seems to arise not in spite of the
sexual freedom to the women's movement, in part because recent changes in attitude and
behavior appear to be far greater among women than among men. See, e.g., L. ScANZONI & J.
SCANZONI, MEN, WOMEN AND CHANGE 85-89 (2d ed. 1981). Whatever the causes, the developments of recent years have persuaded some family life scholars that, "The nuclear family is
crumbling - to be replaced, I think, by the free floating couple . . . ." E. SHORTER, THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY 280 (1975); see also J. BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 269-89 (1972).
On the other hand, there is a growing body of social science research showing that many
family commitments are stronger than ever. While recent divorce rates have been unquestionably high, other statistics indicate that remarriage rates have risen equally high, with a greater
proportion of Americans marrying than ever before. See M. BANE, HERE TO STAY 34-36
(1976). The proportion of children living with at least one parent, rather than living in foster
or institutional care, has also increased. Id. at 12. The social significance of the increase in
unmarried cohabitation may be reduced by noting that the percentage of all couples who are
married dropped only from 98.8% to 97.2% between 1970 and 1980. This calculation is based
on U.S. Dept. of Commerce data summarized in The American Family Bent-but Not Broken,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 16, 1980, at 48, SO. Thus, "[t]he number of persons engaged
in pursuing 'alternative life-styles,' although much larger than it used to be, is too small proportionately to be accurately recorded in a national census or in a community survey ...•"
T. CAPLOW, H. BAHR, B. CHADWICK, R. HILL, & M. WILLIAMSON, MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES!
FIFTY YEARS OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 335 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MIDDLETOWN
FAMILIES].
Sociologist Joseph Featherstone has summarized available studies which suggest that even
the changes in structure, function, and roles being accommodated by the contemporary family
deal with such phenomena as working mothers, families where fathers raise the children, and
couples choosing to remain childless, Featherstone, Family Matters, 49 HARV. EDUC. REV. 20,
23 (1979), not with free-floating unmarried couples or communal marriages. The social scientists updating the classic longitudinal study of American family life in the representative city of
Middletown found that the gap between current rhetoric and empirical data demonstrates the
continuing survival of "the myth of the declining family," which took root in the 1930s and
"has flourished mightily ever since and now seems nearly as indestructible as the American
family itself." MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES, supra, at 328. Much of the current strain on family
life that does exist is due primarily to "poverty and inequality," Featherstone, supra, at 38,
suggesting that a national policy debate concerning the relationship of economic programs to
family stability is likely to continue. Compare, e.g., K. KENISTON, ALL OUR CHILDREN (1977),
with Lasch,Reviewof All Our Children, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 24, 1977, at 1518, and Carlson, supra.
As for the sexual revolution, recent empirical data indicate that pornography and information about sexuality are far more widely distributed today than in earlier generations. The
incidence of premarital sex (especially among females) has also increased. However, extramarital sex does not seem to have increased significantly. For a brief summary of recent research
in the context of comparisons with the 1920s, see MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES, supra, at 161-94.
Even the premarital sex that occurs "is brief, infrequent, and limited to one partner (or a few)
whom [adolescents] hope to marry." Id. at 168. Indeed, given such "powerful [contemporary]
inducements . . . to avoid marriage" as welfare programs that provide a "bounty for children
born out of wedlock" and "the promotion of adolescent sexuality" by governmentally sponsored programs on sex education and contraception, "the persistence of marriage • . . in the
United States . . . is as impressive as the large increase in the number of unmarried adults
during the past decade." Id. at 334-35. In seeking to reconcile "the public's current interest in
the subject of extramarital sex with its continuing disapproval of it," sex researcher Morton
Hunt concluded that the contemporary climate has resulted in more "open discussion" and
"an unconcealed appetite for vicarious experience. At the same time most people continue to
disapprove of such behavior because they believe that when it becomes a reality rather than a
fantasy, it undermines and endangers the most important human relationship in their lives."
M. HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970s, at 256 (1974). Thus, the Middletown researchers
concluded, "[S]urely the mass media have exaggerated the scope of the changes [in sexual
norms]. Monogamic heterosexual marriage is still the nearly universal norm, and most
nonmarital sexual behavior involves the possibility of eventual marriage." MIDDLETOWN
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family's legally protected status, but, in part, because of that status.
In this time of fully flowered egalitarianism, the very existence of a
legal preference increases the number who want to qualify for it.
Thus, some legal scholars and a few lower court cases assume that
the constitutional principles are now in place to remove the significant legal distinctions between married and unmarried persons,
along with establishing a right of sexual privacy for consenting unmarried adults.
For example, Kenneth Karst has argued that there should be a
constitutional right that would give any "intimate association" between two persons the same protection as the law now gives to relationships based on marriage and kinship. 11 Also, the New York
Court of Appeals recently extended the constitutional right of privacy to protect the right of unmarried adults to seek "sexual gratification." 12 While sexual privacy may at first seem unrelated to the
issue of family forms, this case was a key factor in the subsequent
decision of a lower New York court to allow one adult male to adopt
another. 13 On a variation of the privacy theory, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has given constitutional protection to sex acts perFAMILIES, supra, at 168. Anthropologist David Schneider concurs: "[S]exual intercourse is
legitimate and proper only between husband and wife and each has the exclusive right to the
sexual activity of the other. These are the tenets of American culture." D. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 38 (2d ed. 1980) (footnote omitted).
10. For summaries of the relevant literature, see Grey, Eros, Civilization, and the Burger
Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, at 83; Developments in the Law- the Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
Grey's piece includes an appendix summarizing all of the law review literature between 1965
and 1979 that addressed the relationship between constitutional privacy and legal prohibitions
of consensual adult sex. Comparing this literature with a review of the Supreme Court's work,
Grey concludes that nearly all the commentators have consistently "read . . . the libertarian
tradition into the privacy cases with almost no encouragement from the Court." Grey, supra,
at 98.
While some commentators have possibly been influenced to interpret the Court in this way
by their own preferences for the resulting outcomes, others have read excessive breadth into
the cases as a way of stressing their disagreement with the results. To infer from the cases that
marriage is now merely "some sort of relationship between two individuals," Clark, The New
Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 441,450 (1976), or that "Equal Protection" now "requires the
equal treatment of the married and the unmarried in all respects," Noonan, The Family and the
Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 255, 273 (1973), is such an overreaction. See Part II
i'!fra. Unfortunately, overreactions can become self-fulfilling prophecies, as the courts may be
influenced as much by commentary on important cases as they are by the cases themselves,
especially given the ambiguity the Court has created with its use of due process substitutes and
individual rights terminology. See note 15 i'!fra.
11. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
12. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
13. In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 106 Misc. 2d 792, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1981). Contra, In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous II, 111 Misc. 2d 320, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1981)
(family court in different New York county from Adult Anonymous I disallows adoption between adult males because no child-parent relationship would be created).
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formed in a public lounge between dancing performers and lounge
patrons. 14 Litigants in such cases, aided by the confusing language
of some Supreme Court decisions, 15 see privacy as an individual
right which is independent of the relationships it may protect.
The use of individual rights analysis, as typically understood, can
be inappropriate and even harmful in the-context of family relationships. For example, contemporary legal writers take for granted that
the "right to marry" is grounded "in respect for freedom of choice in
intimate personal relationships," 16 since "choice of domestic companionship constitutes the kind of intimate personal decision" 17 that
is at the heart of the Court's evolving privacy doctrines. 18 Thus, the
right to marry cases are seen by these writers as part of a constitutional doctrine based essentially on individual autonomy. With that
premise firmly in place, any legal restraint on freely entering or leaving marital relationships is suspect in their eyes. With the scales between individual and social interests thereby tipped heavily toward
the individual side, few, if any, attempts at state regulation would
14. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91,415 A.2d 47 (1980) (statute prohibiting deviate
sex acts between unmarried persons has no rational basis and violates equal protection by
discriminating against the unmarried).
15. In its family privacy cases, the Court has often used individualistic civil rights theories
and rhetoric in stating a rationale for its conclusions, even though a close reading of the cases
reveals an instinctive awareness of the negative impact of full blown individual rights theories
on family relationships. The Court has also sent out mixed signals because of its unfortunate
determination to rationalize important decisions under a bewildering array of individualistic
disguises for substantive due process.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), established the right of married couples to
use contraceptives without threat of criminal prosecution. The challenged statute was, as Justice Stewart conceded in dissent, "an uncommonly silly law," 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting): so silly, in fact, that a majority of the Court could not help reaching the conclusion that the law was unconstitutional, even though the absence of clear textual support forced
the Court to search for a rationale in six different amendments, as well as the metaphysically
tantalizing "penumbras" emanating from explicit guarantees in the Bill of Rights. A few years
later, Justice Stewart, concurring in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), shed some light on the
predicament the Court had faced in Griswold. He explained that the Justices had explicitly
rejected substantive due process in an 8-1 decision only two years before Griswold. 410 U.S. at
167 (Stewart, J., concurring);see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Therefore, he said,
the Griswold Court "understandably did its best to avoid reliance on the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as the ground for decision." 410 U.S. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring).
The Court has continued to do its best to avoid the development of a consistent and understandable test for its family-related cases. As a result, the cases are loaded with references in
dicta to such limitless possibilities as "zones of privacy," "individual autonomy," and "freedom of personal choice." In 1977, Justice Powell bravely declared that substantive due process
based on traditional values had indeed been the basis for virtually all of the Court's family
privacy decisions, but by then the conceptual turf had been so muddied that this flash of candor was not very enlightening. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977).
16. See, e.g., JJevelopments, supra note 10, at 1311.
17. Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection far Personal L!lestyles, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 563, 569 (1977).
18. But see Part II F infra.
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withstand scrutiny. 19
The fundamental error in this method of analysis was identified
many years ago in a valuable article20 by Roscoe Pound: "It is important to distinguish the individual interests in domestic relations
from the social interest in the family and marriage as social institutions."21 He defined "social interest" as:
[O]n the one hand a social interest in the maintenance of the family as
a social institution and on the other hand a social interest in the protection of dependent persons, in securing to all individuals a moral and
social life and in the rearing and training of sound and well-bred citizens for the future. 22

For Pound, it was elementary that individual and social interests
must be compared "on the same plane," lest the very decision to
categorize one claim as "individual" and the other as "social" cause
us to "decide the question in advance in our very way of putting
it."23 Moreover, from Pound's viewpoint:
When the legal system recognizes certain individual rights, it does so
because it has been decided that society as a whole will benefit by satisfying the individual claims in question; for example, when the legal
system guarantees the individual freedom of speech, it advances society's interest in facilitating social, political, and cultural progress. This
interest . . . is more important than society's interest in preserving existing institutions.24

In recent years, however, individual interests, carried on a tidal
wave of constitutional law, have taken on such overpowering significance that it is difficult for the contemporary mind to see any interests other than individual ones. Thus it has been observed that while
the Court's early marriage cases "turned on the importance of marriage to society," its more recent cases "tum on the importance of the
relationship to the individual."25
19. For instance, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that the constitutional right of
privacy requires the allowance of divorce by mutual consent without a waiting period. Ferrer
v. Commonwealth, 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2744 (1978). Even those sympathetic to facilitating
divorce have argued elsewhere that counseling requirements and mandatory separation periods are justified in the interest of preventing "hasty decisions about divorce" if states are to
prevent marriages from being "trivially or inconsequentially undone." Developments, supra
note 10, at 1312 (quoting Wilkinson & White, supra note 17, at 576).
20. Henry Foster called it "perhaps the best known essay in the history of family law."
Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 493, 493.
21. Pound, Individual Interests in Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 177 (1916)
(emphasis added).
22. Id at 182.
23. Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1943).
24. Auerbach, Comment, in Is LAW DEAD? 208 (E. Rostow ed. 1971) (replying to Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in Is LAW DEAD? 168 (E. Rostow ed. 1971)).
25. Developments, supra note 10, at 1248-49.
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Ideas about individual rights derive from the original theory of
the Constitution, which deals with the relationship between the individual and the State. Domestic relations, however, have traditionally been matters of state law, not federal constitutional law,26 in
part because the regulation of those relationships is not simply a
matter of the State vs. the individual. for instance, many people
besides a dissatisfied spouse are affected by the dissolution of a marriage. 27 The most obvious examples are the other spouse, any children of the marriage, and the kinship network affected by the
marriage. Moreover, regulation of marital status has always been a
fundamental element in helping human society induce the behavior
needed for social as well as individual survival. 28 In addition, the
law's ultimate goal in supporting family ties is the sustaining of
ongoing relationships, not merely the crude determining of who is
right and who is wrong, who wins and who loses. 29
All this is not to say that the individual interest in marriage is less
significant than the social interest. It is only to say that the individual and the social interests are so intertwined in family cases that
meaningful analysis of the competing interests is rendered impossi26. [D]omestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive
province of the States. . . . In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878), the Court
said: ''The State . . . has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be
dissolved. . . ."
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
27. A decree of divorce is not a matter in which the only interested parties are the State
as a sort of"grantor," and a divorce petitioner ... in the role of"grantee." Both spouses
are obviously interested in the proceedings, since it will affect their marital status and ve9'
likely their property rights. Where a married couple has minor children, a decree of divorce would usually include provisions for their custody and support.
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1975).
28. The marital commitment has meant, as a cultural construct of our society, that love
and family transcend mere legJI obligations. That commitment thus becomes, paradoxically,
an "uncoercive way to transform individuals ... into voluntary participants in the nurture of
society. . . . The family is effective because it is steeped in the blood, sexuality, flesh, and flow
of our unconscious lives, where true changes in character and commitment can take root." G.
GILDER, SEXUAL SUICIDE 73 (1973). To achieve this result, "Society has had to invest marriage with all the ceremonial sanctity of religion and law. This did not happen as a way to
promote intimacy and companionship. It happened to ensure civilized society." Id. at 73-74.
29. Robert Burt has observed that "direct, prolonged conflict" may at times characterize
intra-family relationships, yet "the contemporary Court's general jurisprudence" fails "to appreciate the importance of such conflict in forging communal bonds." Burt, The Constilutio11 of
tlte Family, 1919 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 394-95. His criticism is directed at "[b]oth the liberal and
conservative blocs on the Court" because of their failure "to see their proper institutional role
in leading fundamentally alienated combatants toward the pursuit of mutual accommodation." Id. at 387. Only a "sense of mutual allegiance" can "legitimate bonds of authority and
community" amid the social alienation of modern society. Id. at 395. The marital commitment is one of the most fruitful sources of that kind of mutual allegiance, not only because of
its power to deal with conflict over time, but because of its larger effect on society's necessary
and legitimate "bonds of authority and community." Id.
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ble by current civil liberties approaches that always give the individ.:
ual interest a procedurally exalted priority over the social interest.
Great need exists for a method of constitutional analysis that will
allow for explicit consideration of the social interest in domestic
relations.
Today's lopsided competition between the individual and social
interests has made the law a party to the contemporary haze that
clouds our vision of what a family is or should be. In that sense,
recent legal developments have contributed to the crisis Stanley
Hauerwas has identified regarding American family life today - our
inability to define "what kind of family should exist" and our inability to articulate ''why we should think of [the family] as our most
basic moral institution."30
In response to those two questions, this Article considers
whether, as a constitutional matter, the courts should recognize
claims by unrelated individuals or groups who seek the same legal
protection as that given to formal relationships based on legal marriage or kinship. Part I sets forth some of the significant functions
performed by formal families. The social and political policies that
encourage the performance of these functions help explain why the
formal family continues to merit constitutional protection not afforded informal relationships. They also illuminate why we have
historically thought of the family as our most fundamental moral
and social institution. I will argue that the failure to distinguish between a formal family and an informal relationship overlooks and
finally undermines the family's ability to perform these functions.
Part II summarizes the Supreme Court's relevant decisions in this
area. This summary will show that marriage and kinship are still the
touchstones of constitutional adjudication in family-related cases, including those dealing with sexual privacy. The Court has limited
some traditional policies, but has done so only in an effort to remedy
exceptional inequities. Even the exceptional cases have been treated
in such a way that constitutional protection has not been extended to
relationships between unmarried adults. These decisions are thus
consistent with the policies that originally gave rise to the protection
of interests in marriage, childrearing, and kinship.
Part III will suggest a method of constitutional analysis that explains why these cases reached appropriate results. This analytical
framework will enable the weighing of individual and social interest
"on the same plane," lest the analytical approach to an apparent
30. Hauerwas, The Moral Meaning ofthe Family, 107

COMMONWEAL

432,432 (1980).
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constitutional problem cause us to "decide the question in advance
in our very way of putting it."31 This model will also clarify the
analysis used in determining which legal interests should be included
within the constitutionally protected categories that require strict judicial scrutiny. An inquiry of this kind helps to determine the theory
on which interests arising from marriage and kinship are entitled to
extraordinary constitutional protection while other interests that appear to have some functional similarity are excluded. One of the
most serious errors made by some lower court judges attempting to
apply a constitutional right of privacy has been to assume, as a first
analytical step, that any "private" conduct is part of due process liberty. These courts have then focused "on what they viewed as the
state's lack of interest in preventing private . . . behavior, rather
than on the nature of the activity involved."32 Whether an affirmative right is at stake, however, depends, in the first instance, on "the
nature of the activity involved."33

I.

MARRIAGE, KINSHIP, AND THE PURPOSES
OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

Perhaps because family life is so much a part of the unspecifiable
bedrock of society, there has been a puzzling inattention in both legal and other literature to the broad social policies underlying the
preference historically given by the law to family relationships. This
contrasts remarkably with the voluminous scholarly work on individual rights. Domestic patterns universally accepted before the
dawn of law and government have hardly seemed to require fulldress justification. Thus, the case law and other commentary on our
traditional assumptions seldom go beyond platitudes and cliches.
The objectives of a democratic society based on established patterns
of marriage and kinship should not be terribly mysterious; serious
scholars, however, have seldom felt a need to document them. For
instance, a stable environment is crucial to the developmental needs
of children. Yet contemporary literature advocating (or, for that
matter, condemning) open marriages and informal cohabitation
rarely treats this issue. The unarticulated policy roots of family law
are also related to the political ends of democracy, because it is primarily through family bonds that both children and parents learn
the attitudes and skills that sustain an open society. A brief exami3 I. Pound, supra note 23, at 2.
32. Note, On Privacy: Conslilulional Prorecrionsfor Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. Re.v.
670, 724 (1973).
33. Id.
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nation of such issues suggests that the cultural patterns of American
family life have contributed enormously to the ultimate purposes of
a democratic society by providing the stability and the structure that
are essential to sustaining individual liberty over the long term.
A. The Needs of Children

In their "Bill of Rights for Children," Henry Foster and Doris
Freed stated that: "A child has a moral right and should have a legal
right ... [t]o receive parental love and affection, discipline.and guidance, and to grow to maturity in a home environment which enables him to develop into a mature and responsible adult." 34 This
declaration was not a new idea. It was at the foundation of the juvenile court movement since the tum of the century. Earlier, Jeremy
Bentham wrote that "[t]he feebleness of infancy demands a continual protection," because "[t]he complete development of its physical
powers takes many years; that of its intellectual faculties is still
slower."35 John Locke believed that parents owed an obligation to
''Nature" to "nourish and educate" their children until their "understanding be fit to take the government of [their] will."36 In this way,
the young were to be prepared to enter the individual tradition as
mature and ratipnal beings. Thus, said Locke, "we see how natural
freedom and subjection to parents may consist together, and are both
founded on the same principle."37
This most basic of children's "rights" - the right to be prepared
by parents for the responsibilities of adult life - has remained essentially a moral, rather than a legal, duty of parents, primarily because the law is powerless to enforce such broad affirmative
obligations. Despite the natural limits on what parents can be
"made" to do, the conditions that optimize "a home environment
which enables [a child] to develop into a mature and responsible
adult" 38 are clearly encouraged by cultural patterns and reinforced
by legal expectations that create a sense of permanency and stable
expectations in child-parent relations. By giving priority to permanent, relational interests within families, the Supreme Court has reinforced the law's insistence on the conditions that maximize
stability.
Empirical studies establish beyond question "the need of every
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 347 (1972).

l J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 248 (Boston 1840).
J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT§§ 56, 59 (1690).

Id § 61.
Foster & Freed,

supra

note 34, at 347.
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child for unbroken continuity of affectionate and stimulating relationships with an adult."39 More broadly, "[c]ontinuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental influence are essential for a
child's normal development." 40 The child's need for these forms of
stability is so great that disruptions of the child-parent relationship
by the state, even when there appears to be inadequate parental care,
frequently do more harm than good. 41 Recent data from a variety of
fields and sources confirm " [i]n study after study" how "vital the
family is in the crucial areas of individual motivation, personality
structure, and creativeness."42
Findings such as these have begun to raise substantial doubts
about the value of the dominant governmental service strategies of
the past twenty years, whose planners have assumed that many family functions could be better performed by outside agencies. The
1977 report of the Carnegie Council on Children, for example, rejected the proposition that education could ensure equal economic
opportunities and argued generally that public policies related to
children should give higher priority to the qualitative influence of
parents and home life.43 The integrated totality of family functions
in a natural family appears somehow to be greater than the sum of
the individual functions. American society, for all its recent experiments, today seems further from finding real substitutes for the performance of the family role than it was in the pre-Great Society
days. The social experiments of other countries seem no more
fruitful. 44
39. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 6
(2d ed. 1979).
40. Id. at 31-32.
41. See generally Wald, State Intervention on Beha!f of "Neglected" Children: A Searcl,for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975).
42. R. NISBET, TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY 84 (1975).
43. See generally K. KENISTON, supra note 9.
44. Legislation in Sweden has attempted to be "as far as possible . . . neutral in its relationship to various forms of cohabitation and different moral ideas," though the law has tried
to ensure that "marriage has ••. a centered place in family law . . . ." To this point, however, it is still not clear "[w]hether the Swedish attempt to free sexual unions from the bonds of
governmental regulation and to treat them purely as affairs of free individual love will be . • .
successful." M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 156-57 (1972).
Russia has retreated considerably from its earlier attempts to implement the Marxist demand that existing family forms be changed because they perpetuated capitalistic property
ideas. For Engels and Marx, marriage and legitimacy were counterproductive; children were
to be brought into collectives rather than parental homes. In 1926, the conclusion and termination of Russian marriages were made purely private transactions. By 1944, however, new
state regulation of marriage, divorce, and illegitimacy was introduced, partly through considerations of population policy, but also because:
The strengthening of the family .•• had become necessary because of the communist
state's interest in the welfare of the nation's offspring as well as its fear that the national
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Yet recent sociological theories have emphasized (as they did in
the 192O's) "marriage to the exclusion of the family. . . . Child
rearing once again presents itself as no more than a by-product of
marriage." 45 This emphasis reflects the general influence of atomistic individualism that ranks personal interaction between marital
partners higher than "socialization, child training, or transmission of
culture . . . ." 46 Such a tendency views "children's rights" in similar terms, stressing children's own individualistic right to "control
their own lives."
This point of view contradicts that fundamental children's right
- "[t]o receive parental love and affection, discipline and guidance"47 in a way that educates the young toward maturity. Homer
Clark has observed that "much of the discussion of the desirability
of contemporary nonmarital unions ignores the interests of the children of such unions,'' who are, among other things, "handicapped in
seeking support.''48 To "abandon children to their rights" 49 not only
ignores the real needs of children, but also creates within adults a
false expectation that they, too, can be - or should be - "liberated"
from the arduous demands of a parental and community commitment to childrearing. The Supreme Court has given high priority to
the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, but
that very liberty has received constitutional protection in no small
part because it also reflects the social responsibility of the parents.
"[T]hose who nurture [the child] and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."50
Not all formal families are stable, nor do all necessarily provide
wholesome continuity for their children, as the prevailing levels of
child abuse and divorce amply demonstrate. But the commitments
inherent in formal families do increase the likelihood of stability and
continuity for children. Those factors are so essential to child <levelstrength and vigor might be sapped by the laxity of morals, sexual and otherwise. The
J)Ublic institutions for child care had been developed vigorously. To a considerable extent
they freed women for work outside the home, but they were far from totally replacing the
home as classical Marxist theory had expected them rapidly to do.
Id at 231.
45. C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD 142 (1977).
46. Id at 150.
47. Foster & Freed, supra note 34, at 347.
48. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note IO, at 451.
49. The phrase is Albert Solnit's. It is discussed within the context of the children's rights
movement in Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations
About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights", 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 605, 651.
50. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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opment that they alone may justify the legal incentives and preferences traditionally given to permanent kinship units based on
marriage. The same factors can justify the denial of legal protection
to unstable social patterns that threaten children's developmental
environment.
B. Socialization and Public Virtue: Obedience to the
Unenforceable

In the historical movement of society from Status to Contract,51
"[t]he individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of
which civil laws take account."52 The individualism of Contract assumes that each person acts primarily in his own interest. Under
Status, however, it was assumed that people would act for the good
of the order in which they held membership and from which they
derived their status. The commitments of close kinship and marriage represent the last modern vestiges of Status as a source of duty.
Much of what family members - especially marital partners "owe" one another cannot be enforced in a court of law;53 yet the
sense of family duty has an uncanny power to produce obedience to
the unenforceable in ways that defy Adam Smith's assumption that
self-interest is man's dominant value. In this way, the family tradition is a prerequisite to a successful individual tradition. Through
the commitments of marriage and kinship both children and parents
experience the need for and the value of authority, responsibility,
and duty in their most pristine forms.
A sense of voluntary duty is the lifeblood of a free society, for
"only with a public-spirited, self-sacrificing people could the authority of a popularly elected ruler be obeyed, but more by the virtue of
the people than by the terror of his power."54 Those who formulated
our constitutional system understood the importance of "public virtue," but they knew it could not be coerced by the State without
51. See text at notes 504-05, infra.
52. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 163 (1st Am. ed. 1870).
53. When a marriage is threatened with collapse, for example, the law directly assists only
the person who wishes to dissolve the marriage. A spouse who wishes to continue it can find
little comfort in the law, not only because divorce lawyers usually have little interest in marital
continuity, but because !he law is generally powerless to enforce affirmative obligations,
Therefore, society upholds the sanctity of the marital commitment primarily as a matter of
cultural norms, supported by a legal, albeit unenforceable, obligation. Such expressions of
societal norms serve primarily to encourage couples to take their marital obligations seriously
and to comply voluntarily with society's expectations.
54. Horwitz, John Locke and the Preservation ofLiberty: A Perennial Problem of Civic Education, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 131 (R. Horwitz ed. 1979)
(quoting G. Wooo, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 68 (1969)),

January 1983]

Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy

477

doing violence to the inalienable individual rights on which the system was premised.55 At a more profound level, John Locke understood that no civic virtue could exist unless it had been individually
learned and voluntarily assumed. Thus, Locke's educational philosophy would not suppress natural passions and instincts in teaching a
child: ''What is wanted is not suppression, but redirection: 'For
where there is no Desire, there will be no Industry.' " 56
Because this essential social - even political - ingredient could
not be a coercive State function, American society has "relied to a
considerable extent on the family not only to nurture the young but
also to instill the habits required by citizenship in a self-governing
community. We have relied on the family to teach us to care for
others, [and] to moderate ... self-interest ... .''57 This connection
between home and society has made it clear since the early days of
the Republic that it was more important to keep pure the headwaters
of humanity than simply to worry about downstream pollution.58
With this perspective, the family in a democratic society not only
provides emotional companionship, but is also a principal source of
moral and civic duty. Citizenship, after all, is also more a matter of
Status than Contract.
Something about the combined permanence, authority, and love
that characterize the formal family uniquely makes possible the performance of this teaching enterprise:
[T]he best argument for the indispensability of the family [is] that
children grow up best under ... conditions of "intense emotional involvement" [with their parents] . . . . Without struggling with the ambivalent emotions aroused by the union of love and discipline in his
parents, the child never masters his inner rage or his fear of authority.
It is for this reason that children need parents, not professional nurses
and counselors.59

Christopher Lasch noted that this process, whereby the child brings
his self-oriented impulses into some kind of harmony with loving,
yet inevitably demanding, parental authority was the focus of
55. See generally Horwitz, supra note 54.
56. Id at 148 (emphasis in original) (quoting J. LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING
EDUCATION§ 126 (London 1705)).
57. W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
222 (1976).
58. This metaphor is Neal A. Maxwell's.
59. C. LASCH,supra note 45, at 123. Consider also the observation of Berger and Neuhaus:
"Our preference for the parents over the experts is more than a matter of democratic conviction - • • . virtually all parents love their children. Very few experts love, or can love, most of
the children in their care. • • • In addition, the parent, unlike the expert, has a long-term,
open-ended commitment to the individual child." P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER
PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PuBLIC POLICY 20-21 (1977).
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Freud's attention. Through analyzing that process, "Freudian theory, wrongly accused of biological determinism, attempts to explain
how the cultural heritage is acquired and internalized by each generation; it analyzed the psychic consequences of this process, showing,
among other things, how these consequences differ in men and women."60 A child who moves successfully through this most essential
of socializing experiences learns to deal with his father figure in ways
that enable him to succeed his "father" rather than to eliminate him.
In other words, the child productively comes to terms with the whole
concept of authority. As a result, the child is able "to internalize
moral standards in the form of a conscience." 61 Without such an
experience, the child never does grow up. "Psychologically he remains in important ways a child, surrounded by authorities with
whom he does not identify and whose authority he does not regard
as legitimate." 62
The process of learning to live in an organized but free society
involves more than merely sustaining a capitalist economy. The basic process of cultural transmission, without which the traditions and
the fundamental values of the society are not passed on, depends
upon the family. Only in the master-apprentice relationship of parent and child, committed to one another by the bonds of kinship, can
the skills, normative standards, and virtues that maintain our cultural bedrock be transmitted.63
60. C. LASCH, supra note 45, at 79.
61. Id at 186.
62. Id at 125. This view of Freud is broader than the interpretation that "we have to
restrict sexual activity in order to get people to work." J. BERNARD, supra note 9, at 276. As a
result, its validity is p.ot disturbed by Herbert Marcuse's contention that "the inevitable decline
in the need for work in modem societies renders Freud's identification of civilization with
sexual repression no longer valid." Id at 277.
63. Some see a disturbing decline in this element of the family's role, quite apart from fears
about changes in family structure or alternative lifestyles. For instance, the thesis of Lasch's
Haven in a Heartless World is that the family has, through the interaction of various social
forces, lost the authority and the integrated set of functions without which there is no basic
socialization process.
[T]he so-called functions of the family form an integrated system. It is inaccurate to speak
of a variety of functions, some of which decline while others take on added importance,
The only function of the family that matters is socialization; and when protection, work,
and instruction in work have all been removed from the home, the child no longer identifies with his parents or internalizes their authority in the same way as before, if indeed he
internalizes their authority at all.
C. LASCH, supra note 45, at 130. As a result,
Society itself has taken over socialization or subjected family socialization to increasingly
effective control. Having thereby weakened the capacity for self-direction and self-control, it has undermined one of the principal sources of social cohesion, only to create new
ones more constricting than the old, and ultimately more devastating in their impact on
personal and political freedom.
Id at 189.
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The Family in the .Democratic Structure

Today's mass society seems very personal, even e:hummy, if
"Good Morning America" is our symbol: all 200-plus million of us
in one big living room, chatting with our talk show hosts. Perhaps
we no longer need Edmund Burke's advice: "To be attached to the
subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the
first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections."64 Yet modem civilization is paradoxically soaked through with a sense of anomie and alienation, heightened by feelings of helplessness against
ever increasing concentrations of power in such "megastructures" as
the business conglomerate, the boundless government bureaucracy,
and the national labor union. 65 In the midst of it all, we long for
identification with some "little platoon" that will create a sense of
personal meaning and personal value for our lives. Thus, increased
attention is being given to both the personal and the public policy
significance of such "mediating" structures as neighborhoods, families, churches, schools, and voluntary associations:
Without institutionally reliable processes of mediation, the political
order becomes detached from the values and realities of individual life.
Deprived of its moral foundation, the political order is "delegitimated." When that happens, the political order must be secured by
coercion rather than by consent. And when that happens, democracy
disappears.
The attractiveness of totalitarianism . . . is that it overcomes the
dichotomy of private and public existence by imposing on life one
comprehensive order of meaning.66
An inherent connection thus links the pattern of domestic regulation
to the structure of political freedom.
Mediating structures are "the value-generating and value-maintaining agencies in society."67 Therefore, when these structures are
inactive, society must look to the megastructures - notably the State
- as a source of values. The totalitarian State gladly and aggressively assumes that role. The democratic State, on the other hand,
makes no claim to be a source of personal meaning and values, nor
would we allow it to. That role contradicts the assumptions on
which our entire political system rests. It might appear that our
membership in such organizations as labor unions and consumer
groups would restore a sense of the Status we have lost as society has
64.
65.
66.
61.

P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, supra note 59, at 4.
See generally id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
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moved from Status to Contract. But those groups are organized primarily around shared economic and political interests. Even when
they succeed, such groups do not claim to provide sources of meaning and values, or even personal identification.
A recent analysis of the concept of mediating structures identifies
the family as "the major institution within the private sphere, and
thus for many people the most valuable thing in their lives. Here
they make their moral commitments, invest their emotions, [and]
plan for the future . . . ."68 The family's role in providing emotional and spiritual comfort, as well as human fulfillment, has long
been a dominant theme in sociological literature.
There is, however, an even more political meaning to the formal
family's place as a mediating structure in our system. Our system is
committed to pluralism and diversity as political values, because
those values maximize the opportunity for individual choice and
control. The pluralism we seek differs from anarchy, because anarchy destroys the order that makes pluralistic choices possible over
the long term. 69 The balance we have struck seeks "to sustain as
many particularities as possible, in the hope that most people will
accept, discover, or devise one that fits." 70 In maintaining that balance, our system presupposes "a social system of family units, not
just of isolated individuals." 71 Those family units do "not simply coexist with our constitutional system"; rather, they are "an integral
part of it," because:
In democratic theory as well as in practice, it is in the family that children are expected to learn the values and beliefs that democratic institutions later draw on to determine group directions. The immensely
important powei: of deciding about matters of early socialization has
been allocated. to the family, not to the govemment.72

Monolithic control of the value transmission system is "a hallmark
of totalitarianism";73 thus, "for obvious reasons, the state nursery is
the paradigm for a totalitarian society." 74 An essential element in
68. Id at 19.
69. See note 464 infra and accompanying text.
70. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, supra note 59, at 44.
71. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U.
L. REV. 765, 772 (1973).
72. Id at 773; see also D. MURPHEY, BURKEAN CONSERVATISM AND CLASSICAL LJBER·
ALISM 270 (1979) (Modem Social and Political Philosophies Series) (As "millions of separate
families . . • raise their • . • children to reflect a variety of experiences and viewpoints," the
family becomes "both a centrifugal and a centripetal force - and both aspects are
necessary.").
73. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, supra note 59, at 44.
74. D. MURPHEY, supra note 72, at 145.
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maintaining a system of limited government is to deny state control
over childrearing, simply because childrearing has such power.
Even if the system remains democratic, massive state involvement
with childrearing would invest the government "with the capacity to
influence powerfully, through socialization, the future outcomes of
democratic political processes." 75 That people "would remain legally free to believe and speak as they wished would not diminish
the immense impact of centralizing the processes through which values and beliefs are instilled in the people who will later participate in
group decision making."7 6
Similarly, diversity and limited government are assured through
a private property system that is often related to family control.77
The familiar family function of providing social services for the sick,
the young, and the disabled not only provides the psychological nurturing of personalized care, but also prevents the state from assuming the economic leverage and political power that would
accompany total state responsibility for welfare functions.
Many informal "welfare" functions are provided by surprisingly
durable kinship networks, even in today's highly mobile society.
The kinship link in Moore v. City of East Cleveland18 justified the
Court's extension of substantive due process to include a household
bound by extended family ties. Justice Powell's definition of "liberty" was obviously influenced by the presence of permanent, relational interests that sustain significant social interests as well as
individual ones:
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
uniting the members of the nuclear family. . . . Out of choice, necessity, or a sense of family responsibility, it has been common for close
relatives to draw together and participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a common home. . . . Especially in times of adversity . . .
the broader family has tended to come together for mutual s~stenance
and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life.79

Empirical data bear out Powell's conclusion. Despite the decline
75. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 71, at 773.
76. Id.
77. While still generally true, this proposition is less significant than it once was. See generally M. GLENDON, THE New FAMILY AND THE New PROPERTY (1981). The effects of the
diminished relationship between family ties and property interests have a way of validating the
larger argument being made in this section of the text, however. For as property-related historical trends have "delivered [the individual] from family constraints and responsibilities,"
the more recent trends "have Jocked him into the cold embrace of public and private bureaucrats." Id. at 139.
78. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
79. 431 U.S. at 504-05 (plurality opinion).
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in the performance of some traditional functions, "the amount of
social care that families provide for their elderly and handicapped
members far exceeds the amount of social care provided by the
state." 80 The sociologists in the recently updated Middletown project found that "most . . . families were linked to clusters of other
families by bonds of kinship obligation and affection which often
were far stronger than the ties connecting them to friends;co-workers, or fellow members of organizations." 81 The researchers concluded, "the single most important fact about the nuclear family in
contemporary Middletown is that it is not isolated" from kinship
networks. 82 From the standpoint of social structuring,
the kin groups organized on the basis of marriage and descent provide
the substance which integrates people into the larger social structure. . . . The moral sentiments established in the interaction of parents and their children are extended and elaborated to produce
consensus and loyalties which bind social groups (and possibly societies) into a cohesive whole. 83

Stable kinship groups thus contribute significantly to the achievement of general social and political stability.
Impermanent relationships that perform some intimate or associational "functions"84 cannot claim the same position as marriage
and kinship in ensuring a political structure that limits government,
stabilizes social patterns, and protects pluralistic liberty through the
power of its own relational permanency. 85 Social scientists may
never succeed in verifying this conclusion empirically; the obstacles
to meaningful comparative research appear insurmountable. 86 But
80. Zimmerman, Reassessing the E:ffect of Public Policy on Family Functioning, 59 Soc.
CASEWORK 451, 452 (1978).
81. MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES, supra note 9, at 355.
82. Id at 340.
83. B. FARBER, FAMILY AND KINSHIP IN MODERN SOCIETY 8-9 (1973) (footnote omitted).
84. Functional equivalency is a concept advanced by some who argue that informal associations may involve precisely the same economic, psychological, and social functions as
formal ones; hence, the concept is a basic premise for those who argue that there should be
"family" style legal protection for an infinite variety of relationships.
85. Informal kinship networks sometimes provide stability, continuity, and pluralistic
value transmission. This is especially true among certain minority groups, where customary
practices not legally formalized can be very influential. See, e.g., C. STACK, ALL OUR KIN
(1974).
86. Some of the methodological problems are obvious. Selecting the same populations
belonging to formal and informal domestic living arrangements, for example, poses an inherent challenge. Are the socioeconomic factors associated with marriage (age, education, income, etc.) independent variables to be controlled, or dependent variables through which the
beneficial effects of formal family structures are mediated? More fundamentally, how are the
informal "families" to be defined and selected in the first place? Social scientists must grapple
with the same problems of clarity and generality that plague the attempt to confer legal status
on informal arrangements. See Part I D i,!fra. These difficulties suggest the problematic nn-
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the structure of formal family relationships both reflects and fosters
the enduring personal commitments essential to social mediation
and political pluralism. 87
Moreover, the structural power of the formal family is not totally
dependent on its key function of value transmission in childrearing.
Marriage alone plays a critical role in the democratic structure by
interposing a significant legal entity between the individual and the
State:
[T]he marriage bond . . . is the fundamental connecting link in Christian society. Break it, and you will have to go back to the overwhelming dominance of the State, which existed before the Christian era.
The Roman State was all-powerful, the Roman Fathers represented
the State, the Roman family was the father's estate, held more or less
in fee for the State itself. It was the same in Greece, with not so much
feeling for the permanence of property, but rather a dazzling splash of
the moment's possessions. . . .
But, in either case, the family was the man, as representing the
State. There are States where the family is the woman: or there have
been. There are States where the family hardly exists, priest States
where the priestly control is everything, even functioning as family
control. Then there is the Soviet State, where again family is not supposed to exist . . . .
Now the question is, do we want to go back, or forward, to any of
these forms of State Control? . . .
. . . [P]erhaps the greatest contribution to the social life of man
made by Christianity is - marriage. . . . Christianity established the
little autonomy of the family within the greater rule of the State.
Christianity made marriage . . . not to be violated by the State. It is
marriage, perhaps, which has given man the best of his freedom, given
him his little kingdom of his own within the big kingdom of the State,
given him his foothold of independence on which to stand and resist an
unjust State. Man and wife, a king and queen with one or two subjects, and a few square yards of territory of their own: this, really, is
marriage. It is a true freedom . . . .88
ture of reliance on empirical studies to confirm or refute the assumptions which must be made,
one way or another, in formulating a legal regime to govern domestic relationships.
87. See text accompanying notes 102-06 iefra.
88. D. LAWRENCE, APROPOS OF LADY CHATIERLY'S LOVER 35-36 (1973) (emphasis in
original).
Sociologist Talcott Parsons has also observed:
[I]n a peculiar sense which is not equally applicable to other systems the marriage bond is,
in our society, the main structural keystone of the kinship system. This results from the
structural isolation of the conjugal family and the fact that the married couple are not
supported by comparably strong kinship ties to other adults . . . In the American kinship
system this kind of institutionalized support of the role of marriage partner through its
interlocking with other kinship roles [as is characteristic of other societies] is, if not entirely lacking, at least very much weaker. A functionally equivalent substitute in motivation to conformity with the expectations of the role is clearly needed. It may hence be
suggested that the institutional [i.e., state] sanction placed on the proper subjective sentiments of spouses . . . has this significance.
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The political implications of social mediation (or its failure) thus offer a powerful justification for the special legal status of formal
families.
D. Marriage and Minority Status as Sources of Objective
Jurisprudence
Legal philosopher Lon Fuller listed "the generality of law" as the
first of the principles he thought were necessary to create a true system of law. For Fuller, "the first and most obvious" route to "disaster" in creating and maintaining a legal system "lies in a failure to
achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc
basis." 89 Justice Rehnquist made a similar point in dissenting from
the Court's use of the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine, which
would require individualized determinations in certain equal protection cases:
Hundreds of years ago in England, before Parliament came to be
thought of as a body having general lawmaking power, controversies
were determined on an individualized basis without benefit of any general law. Most students of government consider the shift from this sort
of determination, made on an ad hoc basis by the King's representative, to a relatively uniform body of rules enacted by a body exercising
legislative authority, to have been a significant step forward in the
achievement of a civilized political society.90

Individualized determinations are necessary in such particularized
litigation as custody determinations or procedural due process hearings. They may also be justified when highly protected constitutional interests are infringed. 91 But the entire concept of
"government by laws rather than government by men" 92 is
threatened if subjective determinations become the rule. There is an
obvious administrative burden inherent in the proliferation of individual adjudication in derogation of legislative or judicial classification. Of perhaps greater significance is the power given the "King's
representative" to make arbitrary judgments. The basis of Herbert
Wechsler's criticism of Supreme Court opinions that "lack . . . reasoned generality" was that generality "will assure the Court's 'neuParsons, The Kinship System ofthe Contemporary United States, 45 AM. ANTHROPOLOOIST 22,
30-31 (1943) (emphasis in original).
89. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (2d ed. 1964),
90. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657-58 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
91. Procedural due process may well perform this function. See also the arguable relation•
ship between intermediate scrutiny and some doctrine or irrebuttable presumptions in L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1092-97 (1978).
92. MAss. CoNsT., pt. l, art. XXX (1780).
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trality . . . ' " 93
Classifications based on marriage and minority status are among
the best examples of the law's use of clear objective categories to
achieve generality and reliable expectations that stabilize not only
the determination of legal rights and duties, but also the entire social, economic, and political structure. Locke and Mill described the
concept of minority status not as an arbitrary discrimination based
on age, but as a rational discrimination based cm capacity, designed
both to protect children and to encourage the development of their
mature capacities.94 The concept has long stood as a key link between the family tradition and the individual tradition, with implications throughout the cultural system. 95 Minority status has been
incorporated into a multitude of laws "seeking to protect minors
from the consequences of decisions they are not yet prepared to
make."96 Objectivity has always been achieved in these laws
through the use of "chronological age . . . even though it is perfectly
obvious that such a yardstick is imprecise and perhaps even unjust in
particular cases." 97
The significant place of marriage in the democratic political
structure98 reflects the extent to which marriage has become "an
enormously important element in the rise of stable political systems
and dynamic economies."99
As Professor Hayek has rightly pointed out, the rise of the West is due
in great part to its ability to define the law with certitude, and to uphold it against all comers - for legal certainty is the basis of investment and capital formation. At the heart of any stable law of property
is a clear and universal legal doctrine of marriage, legitimacy and
inheritance. 100

The development of marriage law throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "created the stable, sure and enlightened legal
structure on which the Industrial Revolution was based, and without
which it could not have taken place." 10 •
The formal commitment of marriage is also the basis of stable
93. L. FULLER, supra note 89, at 48 n.5 (discussing H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961)).
94. See Hafen, supra note 49, at 612-13.
95. See generally id.
96. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 104-05 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. 428 U.S. at 104-05.
98. See Part I C supra.
99. Johnson, The Family as an Emblem efFreedom, 2 (Am. Fam. Inst., 1980) (on file with
the Michigan Law Review).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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expectations in personal relationships. The willingness to marry permits important legal and personal assumptions to arise about one's
intentions. 102 Marriage, like adoption, carries with it a commitment
toward permanence that places it in a different category of relational
interests than if it were temporary. A 'Justifiable expectation . . .
that [the] relationship will continue indefinitely" 103 permits parties to
invest themselves in the relationship with reasonable belief that the
likelihood of future benefits warrants the attendant risks and inconvenience. There is a clear analogy between the motivational factors
that influence human investment and those that influence economic
investments. Jeremy Bentham believed that private ownership of
property is more likely to maximize social utility than is collective
ownership because "the human motivations which result in production are . . . such that they will not operate in the absence of secure
expectations about future enjoyment of product." The will to labor
and the will to invest "depend on rules which assure [people] that
they will indeed be permitted to enjoy a substantial share of the
product as the price of their labor or their risk of savings." 104
Legal marriage is more likely than is unmarried cohabitation to
encourage such personal willingness to labor and "invest" in relationships with other people, whether child or adult. That is perhaps
one reason why marriage has been given constitutional protection
and cohabitation has not. By definition, those who enter into "nonbinding commitments" rather than marriage are registering a noncommittal intention. Christopher Lasch believes the current interest
in these open-ended relationships reflects "the psychic needs of the
late twentieth century," because it "condemns all expectations, standards, and codes of conduct as 'unrealistic.' " While some claim
they must be "equals" to enter satisfactory interpersonal relationships, "equality in this connection means simply an absence of
demands." 105
The absence of demands - even the absence of definition - for
unmarried relationships makes it impossible to identify, much less
enforce, an appropriate set of rights and duties in the relationship
through objective legal rules. One study of cohabiting couples found

a

102. Note, for example, the assumptions made by a unanimous Supreme Court about an
unwed father's willingness to assume responsibility for his child in Qui/loin v. Walcoll, discussed in text at note 149 in.fro.
103. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER), 431
U.S. 816, 860 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring).
104. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1212 (1967).
105. C. LASCH, supra note 45, at 140-41.
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that each couple had a different view of the nature of their relationship, affected by whether they considered it a trial marriage, a substitute marriage, or a temporary involvement. Another key variable
was the "current quality" of the relationship. That people are living
together conveys no reliable assumptions about the nature of their
expectations - economic, social, psychological, or otherwise. Thus,
future researchers were warned against the hazard of treating unmarried cohabitants as a homogeneous group for any research
purpose. 106
The natural boundary created by the objective nature of legal
marriage - the boundary recognized by the Court for purposes of
constitutional protection - is significant for several reasons. Once
these limits are breached, there is no realistic boundary in sight that
will confine constitutional privacy according to any meaningful standards. A boundary based on the degree of commitment to a relationship or individuals' expectations regarding a relationship's
permanence would require intolerable inquiries into the most private
realm of these individuals' lives. Yet without such inquiries, extending protection to any informal relationship would require extending protection to "casual sexual intimacies," which one advocate
of a broad right of intimate association acknowledges as "an American disease" that is "the exact antithesis of the intimacy that involves
caring." 107 Even if inquiries were permitted, the prospect of evaluating the variables in each relationship is so discouraging that no relationships would be likely to receive very broad legal protection,
thereby undercutting both the individual and the social interest in a
constitutional "right to marry."
The claims arising from such an unlimited spectrum of relationships would necessarily be contractual in nature, with no overtones
of Status as a source of obligation. The power of family life to develop public virtue and to promote the ends of a democratic society
would therefore be seriously impaired. 108 In that event, the very justification for granting extraordinary constitutional protection to marriage is also reduced, as "marriage" could essentially be transformed
into an economic partnership. Absent the advantages discussed in
the immediately preceding sections, there would be no more reason
for the Court to give preferred protection to these economic relations
than it does to any other economic interests under its present sub106. Lewis, Spanier, Atkinson & LeHecka, Commitment in Married and Unmarried Cohabi·
talion, 10 Soc. Focus 367, 371 (1977).
107. Karst, supra note 11, at 633 & n.45.
108. See Part I supra.
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stantive due process posture. 109 Thus a contractual basis for personal relationships would likely invite more, not less, state
intervention into the relationship.
The law's traditional (and present) posture toward regulation of
an ongoing marriage is to stay out of it, even when a judge could
obviously resolve the marital differences, because the price for
resolving the immediate problem in court is likely to be the relationship itself.' 10 The "formal law," whether statutory or contractual, is
simply unable to regulate intimate relationships and still serve the
overriding purpose of encouraging and preserving continuity in
those relationships. 111 If a cohabiting couple were seen as a partnership rather than a marriage, enforcement of individual claims could
easily receive greater priority than the continuity of the relationship.
Cohabiting partners would probably experience less judicial intervention in terminating their relationship than is presently true of divorce, but that may be small compensation for the uncertainty they
could experience in not knowing whether their relationship has been
terminated in a way that discharges underlying obligations.
The Court's own work in the family cases provides a sneak preview of what it would be like for judges to determine whether an
individual relationship is "meaningful" enough to be considered the
functional equivalent of marriage. The unwed fathers cases 112 and
the minors' abortion cases 113 illustrate the problems of subjective determinations in family relations, as they require judicial .findings regarding the substantiality of a father-child relationship or the
"maturity" of a pregnant minor. Homer Clark found the Court's
foray into the area of illegitimacy to be a mixed blessing, primarily
because the Court was willing to invalidate discrimination against
illegitimates in some contexts but not in others. This approach raises
more questions than previously existed about the "status" of illegitimate children. "[I]t is . . . ·hardly a sensible policy to limit future
legal responses to social problems by constitutional principles having
109. See notes 403-04 infra and accompanying text.
110. (l]ntervention, rather than preventing or healing a disruption, would quite likely
serve as the spark to a smoldering fire. A mandatory court decree supporting the position
of one parent against the other would hardly be a composing situation for tlie unsuccessful parent to be confronted with daily. One spouse could hardly be expected to entertain
a tender, affectionate regard for the other spouse who brings him or her under restraint,
The judicial mind and conscience is repelled by the thought of disruption of the sacred
marital relationship . . . .
Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 479-80, 107 So. 2d 885, 889 (1959).
111. See generally Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J, JURIS. 1 (1969).
112. See Part II B infra.
113. See notes 235-39 infra and accompanying text.
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the dual disadvantages of rigidity and uncertainty." 114
Watching the Court weave and bob its way through the bewildering thickets of interpersonal relations in these cases gives rise to a
larger question about the jurisprudence of adjudicating the constitutional issues so recently discovered in the family law domain. Family law has always been longer on practice than on theory. With a
fairly simple theoretical framework, judges in family cases have concentrated largely on the intensely practical problems that arise in divorce, custody, neglect, and similar contexts. The introduction of
high-powered constitutional doctrines into this arena does not alter
the basic need in most cases to balance conflicting personal interests
among family members - most of whom are usually entitled to similar "constitutional rights."
Concepts such as marriage and minority status have played a supremely important role over the years in staking out broad, clear
boundaries that give guidance to an arm of the legal system that is
already overwhelmed with subjective determinations. Given the difficulties the Supreme Court has had, even with those concepts basically intact, one can only imagine what would happen from a
jurisprudential perspective if marriage and minority status were to
fall by the wayside in the quest for individual fairness. The understandable, but misguided, quest for individualized determinations of
legally recognizable intimate associations is likely to be encouraged
by excessive zeal for subjective jurisprudence - and vice versa. Up
to this point, marriage and minority status remain fixed stars in the
legal system. To the extent that they begin to drift, both as legal and
as social concepts, to that extent will our jurisprudence drift from a
system that encourages stable expectations to one that discourages
them.
Of course, it would be equally foolish to insist on a system so
stable that no flexibility is possible. The practical adequacy of the
present constitutional boundary has been aided by the reforms of
recent years in the areas of women's rights and divorce. These reforms, together with the Court's recognition of certain exceptional
needs outside married nuclear families, go a long way toward rebutting the criticism that the formal family is too narrow a concept to
serve as a legal paradigm in a pluralistic society. 115 As described by
114. Clark, Constitutional Protection ofthe Illegitimate Child?, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 383, 411
(1979).
115. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
1169, 1238-39 (1974). The author concludes that marriage contracts better provide for flexible
marriages. Id. at 1249-50.
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one family scholar, the historical developments of the past century
have shifted from viewing the family as a rigid, monolithic structure
toward viewing it as a flexible form that assumes "private motivations for forming and maintaining marriages" and presupposes "a
considerable amount of variation in the norms of family which people actually follow." This development is related to the pervasive
democratization of industrial society, which has "extensive marriage
markets, requiring a tolerance for diverse norms." 116 As a result,
"married couples can and do arrange the style of their marital lives
in many different ways," matching the pluralism of contemporary
society. 117 This means in practice that the circle of legally and socially acceptable family patterns includes working mothers, families
headed by women, families in which fathers share housework, and
families without children. In a general way, American families increasingly reflect patterns in which "husband and wife have equal
status and authority[,] major decisions are by consensus[,] and . . .
common interests and activities coexist with division of labor and
individuality of interests." 11s
These social developments have been reflected in changing legal
patterns that maximize individual choice in allowing greater - but
still orderly - access to and exit from legal marriage, both in the
name of the freedom to marry. In addition, the trend of both statutory and case law has been toward equalizing the economic relationship of husband and wife and toward minimizing sex-based
stereotypes in decisions related to child custody and other marital
termination issues. 119 It is therefore inaccurate to regard present domestic relations law as oppressively rigid, imposing on unwilling
couples such unalterable assumptions as nonterminable marriage,
strict divisions of labor between husband and wife, husbands as the
sole source of support, or the assumption that each marriage is a first
marriage that will produce children. 120
Whether the bonds of marriage lead to personal fulfillment or
oppression is a question on which sharp differences exist, obviously
reflecting the variety of marital experiences. Existing law has created outlets that permit the legal system to continue giving prefer116. B. FARBER, supra note 83, at 52.
117. Rheinstein, The Transformation efMarriage and the Law, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 463, 478
(1973).
I 18. E. BURGESS, H. LOCKE & M. THOMES, THE FAMILY, FROM INSTITUTION TO COMPAN·
IONSHIP 4 (1963).
119. See generally Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away efMarriage, 62
VA. L. REV. 663, 706-11 (1976).
120. Bui see Weitzman, supra note 115, at 1170-235.
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ence to formal relationships in ways that do not exact unbearable
sacrifices from those for whom the marriage bonds really are bondage. At the same time, the policy preference for formal commitments acts to create not only more stable expectations and a more
objective system of adjudication, it also offers at least some hope that
Americans may yet discover that the contemporary fascination with
liberation from personal commitments may not be all that it
promises. 121

II.

A CONSTITUTIONAL HOME FOR
FAMILY INTERESTS

KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE:

The Supreme Court has created impressive protections for family
relationships, despite the absence of any mention of the family in the
text of the Constitution. As early as 1888, the Court described marriage as "the most important relation in life" 122 and "the foundation
of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress." 123 In 1923, the Court gave constitutional
status to the right of parents to direct the upbringing ofth~ir children
without undue state interference. 124 The Court first recognized the
constitutional right of privacy in 1965 as an inherent characteristic of
marriage, which the Court called "intimate to the degree of being
sacred." 125
Rather than providing authority for some dramatic reordering of
the intimacies and personal relationships protected by the Constitution, the fifty or so Supreme Court decisions that now touch on fam121. The spirit of emancipation has . . . touched deep nerves of truth [but it also reflects] . . . the blind side of our age, and the cost of the blindness; [and] a perhaps fatal
stupidity intertwined with our enlightenment. The idea of emancipation, after all, has to
do with an escape from bonds, not a strengthening of bonds. Emancipation has to do with
power, not love . . . . I don't think that it's a coincidence . . . that more and more people
are living alone these days . . . .
. . . [There is a] general sense of the transformation of·our society from one that
strengthens the bonds between people to one that is, at best, indifferent to them; a sense of
an inevitable fraying of the net of connections between people at many critical intersections, of which the marital knot is only one. . . . If one examines these points of disintegration separately, one finds they have a common cause - the overriding value placed on
the idea of individual emancipation and fulfillment, in the light of which, more and more,
the old bonds are seen not as enriching but as confining. We are coming to look upon life
as a lone adventure, a great personal odyssey, and there is much in this view which is
exhilarating and strengthening, but we seem to be carrying it to such an extreme that if
each of us is an Odysseus, he is an Odysseus with no Telemachus to pursue him, with no
Ithaca to long for, with no Penelope to return to - an Odysseus on a journey that has
been rendered pointless by becoming limitless.
Talk ofthe Town, NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 1976, at 21-22 (quoting an anonymous letter).
122. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
123. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
124. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
125. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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ily interests effectively define a "family" as persons related by blood,
marriage, or adoption. Thus, the interests protected by the Court's
categories of constitutional protection advance the social policies just
outlined and thereby give principled content to the decisions.
The Court's work in this area has not been without missteps and
theoretical confusion; indeed, much of its guidance seems to have
come more from intuition than from a set of coherent principles.
The court has also made only occasional efforts to articulate the policies underlying its preference for kinship and marriage in a way that
would clearly define the kinds of interests that should be protected.
However, as shown in Part I, the policies can be identified and then
more fully articulated. When they are, a rational distinction emerges
between formal families and unrelated persons. As will be shown in
Part III, the cases can also be reconciled into a pattern of constitutional analysis that will convey more certain signals to lower courts
as well as encouraging more sure footing for the Court's work in the
future. Sure footing is especially important as the Court wanders in
a wilderness of constitutional interpretation where the lack of an explicit text and the inherent subjectivity of all perspectives on the subject matter make the terrain as treacherous as it is significant.
For the purpose of this descriptive summary, I will group the
cases into eight categories: (A) ~he illegitimacy cases; (B) the unwed
fathers' cases; (C) the foster parents case; (D) the right to marry
cases; (E) the minority status cases; (F) the first amendment cases;
(G) the contraception and abortion cases; and (H) sexual privacy.
A.

The Illegitimacy Cases

At the outset, a general observation about relational interests in
family law is in order, pertaining not only to the illegitimacy cases,
but to other cases as well. There always has been tension between
"society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds
of marriage" 126 and society's regard for the child-parent relationship.
That relationship is, after all, one of kinship. Despite the existence
over many centuries of legal measures designed to discourage sex
outside marriage, our society has not been willing to terminate the
parental rights of an unwed mother on the ground that her conduct
has made her, per se, an unfit parent. Our attitudes on this subject
were captured more than a century ago in Nathaniel Hawthorne's
classic story of the unwed mother, The Scarlet Letter:
"Hester Prynne," said [Governor Bellingham] "... there hath
126. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
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been much question concerning thee, of late. The point has been
weightily discussed, whether we, that are of authority and influence, do
well discharge our consciences by trusting an immortal soul, such as
there is in yonder child, to the guidance of one who hath stumbled and
fallen, amid the pitfalls of this world . . . ."
Hester caught hold of Pearl, and drew her forcibly into her arms,
confronting the old puritan magistrate with · almost a fierce expression. . . . She felt that she possessed indefeasible rights against the
world, and was ready to defend them to the death.
"God gave me the child!" cried she. . . . "Ye shall not take her! I
will die first!"
"There is truth in what she says," began [young minister Dimmesdale] . . .. "God gave her the child, and gave her, too, an instinctive
knowledge of its nature and requirements . . . which no other mortal
being can possess. And, moreover, is there not a quality ofawful sacredness in the relation between this mother and this child?" 127

The recognition of parental rights in such a case arises from the law's
respect for kinship, which exists despite the law's preference that kinship arise from marriage.
At the same time, laws discriminating against illegitimate children have existed for many years, expressing what one authority has
called society's "wish to assure that children would be born within
institutional structures capabfe of raising them - stable families." 128
.It has nonetheless become increasingly clear, especially during the
last century, that removal of many of the legal disabilities attaching
to a child's illegitimate status can respond to the demands of equity
without violating the principled framework of blood, marriage, and
adoption.
In a number of cases since 1968, the Supreme Court has boosted
the longstanding illegitimacy reform movement by extending "intermediate scrutiny" equal protection doctrines to cover several major
aspects of an illegitimate child's relational interest with one or both
of his parents. 129 In all of these cases, the Court has recognized only
the relationship between a child and an unwed parent, 130 never the
127. N. HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LE1JER 131-35 (1850) (emphasis added).
128. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY I (1971).
129. It is unnecessary to the purpose of this discussion to pursue the problems raised by
arguably inconsistent outcomes in some of the Court's various illegitimacy cases. A recent
summary of the cases, and an attempt to reconcile their results, is contained in Comment,
Equal Protection far Illegitimate Children: A Consistent Rule Emerges, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV.
142.
130. One of the illegitimacy cases upheld the right of an unwed mother to sue for the
wrongful death of her child. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
That case has been criticized for undermining the "legal commitment" undertaken when a
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relationship between the two parents. 131 Indeed, in one of the cases,
the Court echoed the policy themes of the preceding section by
describing the state's interest in encouraging formal marriage and
the stability of family life as something "no one disputes" because
the family is regarded as "perhaps the most fundamental social institution of our society." 132 Decisions to pr9tect illegitimate children
who live with a parent are not based merely on the "functional
equivalence" of legitimate child-parent relationships. In holding
that the benefits of workmen's compensation laws may not be limited to dependent legitimate children, the Court made clear that its
ruling "will not expand claimants . . . beyond those in a direct
blood and dependency relationship with the deceased . . . ." 133
There is a substantial basis for reliance on the blood tie, because
"biological relationship is the test that has been used - since time
immemorial - in our and other cultures for the fixing of support
and other familial obligations, and it is biological relationship that
underlies and is traced by legal relationship." 134
An enormous rise in both the nation's illegitimacy rate and the
level of related welfare outlays has paralleled the development of the
case law giving economic protection to illegitimate children. As a
result, increased economic assistance has also been given to unmarried parents who receive welfare aid intended to benefit their children. Welfare aid for illegitimate children may have increased not
only the illegitimacy rates, but also the number of families choosing
to function without parental marriages. 135 Thus, while the illegitiman and woman marry. Glendon, supra note 119, at 714-15. However, the relationship recognized by the Court was the mother-child relationship, not the father-mother relationship.
Therefore, the case simply recognized an aspect of the unwed mother's interest in her child
that had long been upheld in other legal contexts.
131. In Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979), the Court upheld a Social Security Act
provision that gave survivors' benefits to widows and divorced wives of wage earners, but not
to the unwed mothers of the survivors' children - even when the illegitimate children qualified for benefits. The use of marital status was held to be an acceptable index for determining
dependency on a wage earner. The indirect effect on the children involved was insufficient to
require the higher level of scrutiny applied when there is discrimination against illegitimate
children. Also, the wrongful death claim of an unmarried cohabitant was rejected by a federal
trial court in Vogel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that she was protected by the theory of the illegitimacy
cases, noting that the relationship between unmarried cohabitants is not permanent as is the
child-parent relationship outside marriage, the relationship is more difficult to document, and
illegitimacy policies directed at adults are more fair than those directed at children.
132. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
133. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 407 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
134. H. KRAUSE, supra note 128, at 69.
135. The problem of how to assist needy children without encouraging their parents to
remain unmarried is therefore a serious one, the implications of which are beyond the scope of
this Article. Welfare programs that have the effect of offering financial incentives for mothers
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macy cases are consistent with traditional "kinship" criteria in defining a constitutionally protected family relationship, the cases have
been seen as contributing to the "withering of marriage," perhaps
because of the exploitation of welfare incentives. 136 The cases also
inevitably disturb, to some extent, "a wide variety of laws designed
to encourage legally recognized and responsible family
relationships." 137
Lest more be made of the cases than they warrant, however, it
may be noted that the constitutional protection they extend is not
based on some revolutionary view of illegitimate children tantamount to the revolution that would be involved in extending constitutional protection to relationships between unmarried adults. The
relationship between the unwed mother and her child has always
created the need for some legal protection. T.l;1e illegitimacy reform
movement traces its beginnings and some of its progress to a time
much .earlier than the Supreme Court's involvement. 138 As for the
fear that imposing legal duties on the parent-child relationship
outside marriage will discourage formal marriage, Harry Krause
observes:
The law's failure to impose a substantial economic burden on the father of an illegitimate child may be more likely to encourage illegitimacy than marriage! In short, it is most doubtful that there is an
effective connection between the legislated stigma of illegitimacy and
the state's ~urpose of encouraging marriage and discouraging
promiscuity. 1 9

The policy favoring formal marriage seeks, among other things,
to maximize the stability of a child's home environment. When a
child is born outside marriage, the interest in stability is less likely to
be realized. 140 But by then, enforcement of the "first choice" preferto remain unmarried have been widely denounced. See, e.g., M. BANE,supra note 9, at 135; G.
GILDER, supra note 28, at 173-74; K. KENISTON, supra note 9, at 99-101.
136. The post-1968 transformation of the law of illegitimacy in the United States has
followed the world-wide pattern of approximating the status of the child born outside
marriage to that of the child born within marriage. The more fully the two statuses are
approximated, the more legal marriage loses one of its most traditional and important
effects - distinguishing the legitimate family from all others. . . . The legal institution is
being drained of some of its content by the increasing number and social acceptance of
births outside legal marriage.
Glendon, supra note 119, at 714-15 (footnotes omitted).
137. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 184 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
138. See generally H. KRAUSE, supra note 128.
139. H. KRAUSE, supra note 128, at 75 (footnote omitted).
140. It has been argued that the real basis for the legitimate/illegitimate distinction is not a
concern for the stability of a child's environment, but is "an effort at social control of female
behavior." Wallach & Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried Mothers and Their
Children: An Analysis ofthe Institution ofI/legitimacy, Equal Protection, and the Unfform Parentage Act, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 23, 25 (1974) (emphasis omitted). The assumption that "the
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ence for marriage by withholding entitlements needed by the child
reduces even further the child's hopes for an adequate environment.
Enforcement of the preference at that stage is also unlikely to result
in marriage, partly because of the timing and partly because the enforcement pressure is directed at the child, who is the wrong party.
Society's long term interest in its children may therefore be better
served, once an illegitimate birth has occurred, by resort to the "second choice" policy of allowing entitlements a child clearly needs,
even though in a less stable environment.
This same relationship between first and second choice policies
does not apply to the claims of unmarried cohabitants. In their case,
enforcement of the preference for marriage is directed at the parties
under whose control the marriage decision rests. Also, there is no
harm comparable to what a child suffers because neither adult is dependent in any sense even approaching the dependency of a child.
Finally, enforcement of the first choice preference for marriage at a
stage when a relationship has not yet produced children increases the
likelihood that children born of the relationship will enter a stable
environment. For reasons such as these, discrimination between
married and unmarried couples is very different from discrimination
between legitimate and illegitimate children.

B. The Unwed Fathers Cases
In the 1972 case of Stanley v. Illinois, 141 the Court sent shock
waves through the world of adoption services by holding that an unwed father had a constitutionally protected parental interest in his
children following the death of their mother. Stanley had fathered
three children during an eighteen-year unmarried relationship with
their mother, but Illinois law did not recognize his claim of a parental interest. The Court found the law a violation of procedural due
institution of illegitimacy implements the principle oflegitimacy by coercing women into marriage, which submerges their identities and limits their freedom" presumably sees in the illegitimacy cases the early steps toward recognizing "the unit composed of a woman and her
offspring" as an alternative "first choice" lifestyle form of family life. Recognition of that kind
of family unit as a matter of"freedom of choice in procreation and personal association," id. at
28, is not far removed from recognizing a considerable variety of forms of "intimate association" as legitimate alternatives to the formal family. See Karst, supra note I I. Advocates for
this point of view have stated: "[T]he real question . . . is whether the state has any valid
interest in promoting nuclear families and deterring illegitimacy." Wallach & Tenoso, supra,
at 62 (emphasis in original). This question may find some response in considering the social
interest in marriage. See Part I supra. Consider also the cases made by Justices Stewart and
Stevens in describing both the state's and children's interest in promoting the welfare of illegitimate children. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,394, (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
441 U.S. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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process because it deprived Stanley of his parental rights without a
hearing and unfairly discriminated between married and unmarried
parents. Expansive dicta in the case 142 implied that the Court might
be adopting a major change in attitude toward informal marriages
and that all unwed fathers might thereafter have all the rights of
married fathers.
The facts of Stanley do not support such a broad interpretation.
Stanley unambiguously acknowledged his children. He had lived
with and supported them all of their lives. 143 The Court seems
merely to have recognized the kinship ties which also bind unwed
mothers to their children. Nothing about Stanley or its progeny implies protection for the father-mother relationship. Still, the general
unavailability of putative fathers when unwed mothers place their
children for adoption made the matter of paternal consent a perplexing prospect after Stanley.
The two cases since Stanley, Qui/loin v. Walcott 144 and Caban v.
Mohammed, 145 make clear that there is no constitutional protection
for the father who does not admit paternity early enough to establish
over time a significant relationship with his child. The present attitude toward fathers during a child's infancy resembles the basis for
the common law's disregard of the putative father - "the fact that
his identity was often uncertain and that he was stereotyped as irresponsible and unconcerned about his child." 146 Only when a father
has admitted his paternity, "established a substantial relationship
with the child," 147 and "shouldered significant responsibility" for his
child, 148 will his parental interests receive constitutional protection.
Fathers willing to take such steps do have substantially greater rights
to withhold consent to adoptions of their children than they enjoyed
prior to Stanley.
The Qui/loin case makes a telling point about the difference between formal marriage and unmarried cohabitation. In that case,
the Court upheld an adoption objected to by an unwed father (Quilloin) who had established a superficial relationship with his child
142. "Nor has lhe law refused to recognize lhose family relationships unlegitimated by a
marriage ceremony." 405 U.S. at 651. Given lhe Stanley context, lhis reference is probably to
lhe kinship tie so long recognized between unwed mothers and lheir children.
143. 405 U.S. at 650 n.4.
144. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
145. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
146. Note, The Putative Father's Parental Rights: A Focus on "Family", 58 NEB. L. Rev.
610, 611 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
147. 441 U.S. at 393.
148. 434 U.S. at 256.
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over several years. Quilloin proved that he had been legally obligated to provide child support, an obligation which he had occasionally honored. He also showed that he had visited the child many
times in the home where the child lived with the mother and the man
she married within a few years after the child's birth. Quilloin argued on equal protection grounds that his relationship was functionally equivalent to that of a married father who is separated or
divorced but still provides child support and has visitation rights.
Speaking through Justice Marshall, the Court unanimously rejected
Quilloin's argument, noting that he had never had legal custody of
his child:
[L]egal custody of children is, of course, a central aspect of the marital
relationship, and even a father whose marriage has broken apart will
have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the
period of the marriage. Under any standard of review, the State was
not foreclosed from recognizing this d!fference in the extent of the commitment to the we!fare of the child. 149

The members of the Court must have known that not every "father
whose marriage has broken apart" will actually "have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period of the
marriage." One could easily find a married father who had done less
for his children than Leon Quilloin did for his child. Yet, regardless
of what the married father might actually do, the State was permitted to maintain "under any standard of review" a presumptive statutory preference for the married father over the unmarried father so
significant that it resulted in permanent termination of the unmarried father's rights.
This harsh difference between the law's treatment of a married
man and an unmarried man was justified because of what Justice
Marshall called a "difference in the extent of the commitment to the
welfare of the child." In other words, a man's unwillingness to
marry (assuming the woman is willing) raises a very believable presumption that he is unwilling to make long-term commitments to his
children - and probably to their mother as well. Under Caban, an
unmarried father can overcome the presumption of his noncommitment, but only by showing he has shouldered significant responsibility in caring for the child on a daily basis over a period of years. 150
This test may suffice as a tool of hindsight, but those concerned
about the welfare of an illegitimate infant cannot keep the child indefinitely in limbo, waiting to see what "functional equivalents" of
149. 434 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added).
150. See 441 U.S. at 393; 441 U.S. at 382.
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marriage the father will demonstrate if he is given plenty of time. It
is not difficult to sense the risks to a child in such circumstances,
knowing as we do how much every child needs a sense of continuity_
and stability in the child-parent relationship. 151 Quilloin's waiting
child is a vivid symbol of the way all persons wait in a noncommittal
relationship, whether child or adult, at risk in a sea of uncertain
expectations.
The marriage commitment enables the courts, as well as those
most personally involved, to make certain assun.iptions - even
knowing they will at times be disappointed - about what to expect.
A man's marriage commitment gives rise to the legitimate presumption that he will make the long-term commitments his children need.
The state acts reasonably in not extending the same assumption to an
unwed father. A unanimous Court saw that readily in Qui/loin. In
circumstances as clear as those suggested by the symbol of the waiting child, the Court did not hesitate to disregard noble phrases associated with individual parental liberty in favor of the pedestrian
presumptions and classifications that have guided legislators and
family law judges for years in comparing married and unmarried
couples. This case illustrates that the Court's instincts will restrain
- more than will its theories - the excesses of having just discovered that dads are people, too.
The Caban case illustrates the complications that may follow in
granting constitutional protection for one individual amid a variety
of family interests and relationships, each of which may claim a preferred status. Caban was essentially a custody dispute between an
unwed father and an unwed mother, both of whom had married
other persons since their two children were born. Both parents
sought to adopt the children. Choosing neither to recognize any relationship between the parents nor to resolve the ·dispute between
them, the Court simply declared unconstitutional on sex discrimination grounds a New York law which permitted an unwed mother,
but not an unwed father, to veto the proposed adoption of her children. The Court thus compared the rights of unwed fathers not with
those of married fathers, but with the rights of unwed mothers. 152
Without telling the state how it should resolve the custody issue, the
Court merely declared that the state could not rely upon a statute
favoring the mother "in all circumstances." 153 The effect of this result, noted by Justice Stevens in dissent, was that both natural par151. See generally J. GOLDSTElN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNlT, supra note 39.
152. See 441 U.S. at 388.
153. 441 U.S. at 394.
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ents "are given a veto," so that "neither may adopt and the children
will remain illegitimate." 154 Perhaps the Court would have regarded
the "well being of legitimate children" 155 differently if it had been
asked to consider the interests of the children in their own right
rather than looking at the state interest in providing for them, especially in light of the Court's strong precedents establishing a relatively preferred constitutional position for illegitimate children. The
broad language of Stanley had been written in support of paternal
interests when there were no countervailing claims from the children
or their mother; therefore, it was possible to view unwed fathers'
rights as protecting "the integrity of the family unit." Because protecting the unwed father's right apparently left the Caban children
illegitimate, it is less clear how family integrity was protected in that
case. To invoke civil rights doctrines in domestic relations cases may
not tell our judges much more than they already know about assessing the relative weight of the individual rights that collide with each
other in so many family conflicts.
The unwed father cases also illustrate the inconsistencies that
arise when legal interests are made to depend on the shifting subjective factors of each individual circumstance rather than deriving
from fixed concepts such as marriage or minority status. Suppose
that just before the Quilloin child was adopted by his stepfather,
Leon Quilloin had died as the result of a tortious injury. Under the
doctrines of the illegitimacy cases, the child would probably be entitled to a wrongful death action, even though, as it turned out, Quilloin had no parental rights in the adoption proceeding. Next,
consider the incongruities of New York law as applied to the facts of
Caban. Shortly before ruling in Caban that the father of an "older"
illegitimate child had enough of a parental right to block his child's
adoption by another man, the Court had also upheld the constitu154. 441 U.S. at 412. The state court denied Caban's petition to adopt the children solely
because he was unable to obtain their mother's consent, as required by the statute. 441 U.S. at
384. Because the statute is no longer valid, the court could find some other basis upon which
to grant the adoption petition of one party or the other. But if the Supreme Court's decision is
construed to give the father the same veto power over the mother's petition that she exercised
over his, the stalemate over adoption leaves the children illegitimate,
155. Justice Powell's majority opinion recognized that "[t]he State's interest in providing
for the well being oflegitimate children is an important one[,]" 411 U.S. at 391, but he did not
believe the gender-based discrimination between fathers and mothers bore a substantial relation to that interest, at least "(w]hen the adoption of an older child is sought." 441 U.S. at 392.
Justice Stewart, dissenting, argued that, "Unlike the children of married parents, illegitimate
children begin life with formidable handicaps. . . . Adoption provides perhaps the most generally available way of removing these handicaps." 441 U.S. at 395. Speaking for the other
three dissenters, Justice Stevens wrote, "The state interest in facilitating adoption in appropriate cases is strong - perhaps even 'compelling.'" 441 U.S. at 402.

January 1983]

Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy

501

tionality of a New York law requiring an illegitimate child to prove
paternity before being permitted any inheritance rights. 156 Thus, the
Caban children had enough of a tie to their father that they could
not be adopted without the father's consent, but not enough of a tie
that they would be permitted to inherit from that same father if he
died without formal proof of paternity. Such inconsistent results are
unlikely when marriage anchors the nature of the relationships.
These cases also raise a serious question concerning the Court's
willingness to make subjective factual judgments.. Justice Powell's
majority opinion in Caban discusses the special status of older children.157 Yet Justice Powell seems unwilling to commit himself on
such factual questions as how older children are to be distinguished
from infants and what is a substantial enough relationship between a
father and child to give rise to a parental right. As the swing man in
many of the illegitimacy cases, Justice Powell has been similarly preoccupied with drawing minute factual distinctions in one case after
another. In still another family law context, the Court has recently
favored individualized judicial assessments of "maturity" as a condition of determining whether an unmarried minor may obtain an
abortion. 158 Such prospects convey - with a sense of deja vu overtones of the courts' dubious role in needing to review endless
numbers of arguably obscene books and movies. With such relatively fixed categories as marriage and minority status, we have already been clever enough to devise objective criteria designed not
only to conserve judicial energy, but also to let society know what
the law expects without asking judges to review the intimate details
of endless questions about motives, relationships, and other subjective imponderables. In other words, there is an important relationship between preserving a system of marriage and a system of
jurisprudence. 159
C. The Foster Parents Case

In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER), 160 the Court addressed the issue of constitutional
standards for the removal of foster children from the care of foster
parents. Without definitely deciding whether foster parents have a
liberty interest sufficient to require the application of procedural due
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
See 441 U.S. at 389, 392.
See notes 235-39 iefra and accompanying text.
See Part ID supra.
431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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process standards, the Court unanimously found New York's removal procedures adequate to satisfy whatever interests the foster
parents may have. The foster parents group had argued that the
state procedures were inadequate because they did not require an
automatic preremoval hearing.
Foster care relationships are yet another unavoidable exception
to traditional family patterns, necessitated when natural families are
unable to provide normal care for a variety of reasons. Present state
policies generally assume that foster care is temporary and that, as a
result, foster parents should avoid deep emotional involvements.
The plaintiffs in OFFER represented a different viewpoint, arguing
that foster relationships lasting more than a year should be characterized by greater emotional involvement because strong psychological ties aid the developmental needs of the foster children.t 6 t
Implicitly acknowledging that the extent of psychological commitment in a foster care relationship could be significant, the Court still
found that the nature of the foster parents' constitutional interest (regardless of the weight of the interest from an emotional viewpoint)
did not rise to the level of natural parents' interests. The Court
pointed out that recognition of rights in the foster parents could affect the rights of the child's natural parents. 162 Moreover, the foster
parents' interest originates in a state contract, while the interests of
natural parents originate in "intrinsic human rights" that are antecedent to the state. 163 The Court also considered the "expectations and
entitlements of the parties" to a foster care arrangement as defined
by state law, but found there only "the most limited constitutional
'liberty' in the foster family": 164 expectations in foster relationships
are by definition temporary. 165 Even so, the Court regarded the foster family as more than "a mere collection of unrelated individuals"
161. [The avoidance of emotional child-parent involvement] defeats the very intentions
of the decision to move from professional institutional care to family care. Where foster
parents heed the warning given and fulfill their task with the reservations implied in a
semi-professional attitude they evoke in the child a reduced response as well, too lukewarm to serve the infant's developmental needs for emotional progress or the older child's
needs for relatedness and identification.
.
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, supra note 39, at 25-26. These authors would also
prefer to see more effort made to maintain contact between the child and his absent natural
parents, where possible; but once the "prior tie has been broken, the foster or other temporary
placements can no longer be considered temporary." Id. at 39. At that point, a relationship
more like adoption should be considered. Id. Representatives of the Goldstein-Freud-Solnit
team joined in filing a brief as amicus curiae supporting the district court opinion that was
overturned by the Supreme Court in OFFER.
162. See 431 U.S. at 846-47.
163. 431 U.S. at 845.
164. 431 U.S. at 846.
165. See notes 174-77 infra and accompanying text.
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such as student roommates. 166
OFFER is a potentially significant case, because it arguably bears
on defining the constitutionally protected "family" in ways that extend beyond marriage and kinship. The case has thus been construed as a takeoff point for considering "which attributes of the
family are essential to the attainment of constitutional protection." 167 In that inquiry, some commentators think OFFER suggests
that "of all the attributes of the family" (along with biological relationships, parent-child relationships, cohabitation, and formal commitment), "psychological support and involvement" is the most
important element in determining the significance of a relationship
for the individual. 168 Others pursuing that logic think "the question
presented" in OFFER was "whether the presence of a psychological
bond between foster parent and foster child creates a 'liberty interest'" requiring due process. 169 The assumption that OFFER lends
theoretical support to a potential right of intimate association outside
marriage and kinship was also encouraged by some of the language
in Justice Brennan's majority opinion. 170 Support has also been inferred from the Goldstein-Freud-Solnit "psychological parent" theory171 on which the OFFER plaintiffs relied. One commentator on
OFFER said this theory "rejects biology as the basis of the parentchild relationship and instead focuses on the daily transactions occurring between the child and the parent figure." 172
These interpretations are seriously flawed. The OFFER case
does not suggest a "functional" analysis of human relationships, trying to identify whether a relationship should enjoy constitutional
protection according to its psychological characteristics. Despite its
superficial appeal to fairness based on individualized determinations, this approach overlooks the fundamental distinction between
the emotional "weight" of an individual interest and the "nature" of
the interest. Quoting a prior case, Justice Brennan wrote:
A weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the
form of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due
166. 431 U.S. at 816 (citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. l (1974)).
167. Developments, supra note 10, at 1273.
168. Id at 1283.
169. 46 TENN. L. REV. 671, 674 (1979).
170. "[B]iological relationships are not exclusive determination [sic] of the existence of a
family," 431 U.S. at 843; "a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult
and a child in his or her care may exist even in the absence of blood relationship," 431 U.S. at
844; "[t]he scope of [parental] rights extends beyond natural parents," 431 U.S. at 843 n.49; and
"[t]he legal status of families has never been regarded as controlling," 431 U.S. at 845 n.53.
171. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 39.
172. 46 TENN. L. REV. 761, 766 (1979).
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process. But, to determine whether due process requirements apply in
the first place, we must look not to the "weight" but to the nature of the
interest at stake. 173

Justice Stewart's concurring opinion amplified this point, implying
that the nature of the foster parents' interest was of a fundamentally
different character from the nature of the_ interest of natural parents,
because foster care laws provide "no basis for a justifiable expectation on the part offoster families that their relationship will continue
indefinitely." 174 Foster care is, by design, "for a planned period either temporary or extended." 175 Adoptive placement, on the other
hand, "implies apermanent substitution of one home for another." 176
Thus, even though adoption is as much a state-created relationship
as is foster placement, it "is recognized as the legal equivalent of
biological parenthood." 177 In moving from foster care to adoption,
the change in the parties' legally sanctioned expectations regarding
the permanency of the relationship fundamentally alters the nature
of their interest in the relationship, enough to raise it to the level of a
constitutionally protected parent-child liberty interest. This is true
regardless of the strength (or "weight") of the psychological ties in
the relationship, despite the state's obvious but unenforceable hope
for the development of nurturing ties.
This analysis of the nature of an interest or a relationship so significant that it warrants extraordinary constitutional protection is
one of the Court's most important contributions to an understanding
of the constitutional test that puts marriage, kinship, and adoption in
a different category from other relationships. 178 The relative permanence of relationships arising from marriage, kinship, or adoption
creates the 'Justifiable expectation . . . that their relationship will
continue indefinitely," 179 which gives such relationships a unique nature in terms of both human and legal expectations. 180
173. 431 U.S. at 841 (emphasis in original) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 570-71 (1972)).
174. 431 U.S. at 860 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
175. 431 U.S. at 824 (emphasis in original) (quoting A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES 355 (1967)).
176. 431 U.S. at 825 (emphasis in original) (quoting A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES 355 (1967)).
177. 431 U.S. at 844 n.51.
178. See Part III infra.
179. 431 U.S. at 860 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
180. Of course, even using permanency as the variable, there is among people living together an obviously wide spectrum of relationships, ranging from child-parent ties on one
extreme to student roommates on the other. Today's divorce rates make clear that marriage is
not likely to be as permanent as a child-parent relationship, especially since the child-parent
tie usually survives divorce. Yet, as the Court recognized in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
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Even though "psychological support and involvement" is among
the most important elements to be hoped for in a family relationship,
its subjective nature renders it the least susceptible of empirical verifi.cation and, therefore, the least satisfactory element for use by a
court (or a society) in establishing meaningful standards. 181 Parties
to a relationship could never know what expectations, including psychological ones, are reasonable in a relationship that is intimate but
otherwise undefined. Thus, for purposes of legal classification, it
makes sense for the Court to rely on expectations of permanence in
evaluating the "nature" of a relationship.
Those who see the search for a psychological bond as the key
element in OFFER misunderstand the case. 182 More accurately, OFFER asked whether an impermanent relationship created by the
state for explicit child care purposes should establish a sufficient
"liberty" interest to warrant a due process hearing once the relationship has existed for one year. The Court made no attempt to prove
the existence in each foster family of a psychological bond as a precondition of recognizing the constitutional interest. The GoldsteinFreud-Solnit "psychological parent" theory is similarly misunderstood when it is thought to "rejec[t] biology as the basis of the parent-child relationship." 183 Those writers have clearly limited their
attention to considerations relating to the psychological relationship
between a child and an adult only when custody is already at issue
because natural parent-child ties have already been disrupted. Their
first choice would also favor child-parent ties established by birth or
adoption, because "it is only through continuous nurture of the child
within the privacy of the family" that primary psychological ties can
be established. 184 Therefore, "[s]o long as a child is a member of a
functioning family, his paramount interest lies in the preservation of
his family." 185 With foster care, we are dealing again with "second
choice" policy factors.
(1978), see text at notes 149-51 supra, the very nature of marriage justifies an expectation of
greater permanence and more serious commitments than would be reasonably inferable from
relationships between unmarried persons. This locates marriage toward the permanent end of
the spectrum. Foster care relationships are somewhere in the middle, since state regulations
make them less permanent than adoption but more permanent than a group of student roommates by virtue of the custodial obligations of foster parents, which continue until altered by
the state.
181. See Part ID supra.
182. See note 169 supra and accompanying texL
183. See note 172 supra.
184. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
11 (1979).
185. Id at 5.
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A careful review of Justice Brennan's choice of language also
supports, rather than weakens, the place of marriage, kinship, and
adoption in legally defining the family. When Justice Brennan wrote
that biology is not the only basis for a family, his example was marriage.186 When he wrote that loving child-adult relationships exist
without a blood tie, his example was adQption. 187 When he wrote
that parental rights may extend beyond natural parents, his examples were the extended kinship family and legal guardians. 188 When
he wrote that the legal status of a family is not controlling, his example was the kinship tie between the unwed parent and his or her
child. 189 The Brennan opinion also described marriage as "[t]he basic foundation of the family in our society." 190
Marriage, by its legal nature, is to the adult male-female relationship what adoption is to the child-parent relationship. Both create a
form of kinship. Both have in common the element of state-sanctioned permanence. The relationships in both cases may be legally
changed by unforeseen contingencies, but the exalted level of constitutional protection given to each relationship arises directly from the
presumption engaged in both by the parties and the state that there is
both a "right" and an "expectancy" in "the continuity of the relationship." For this reason, "informal marriage" is a contradiction in
terms. A relationship between unmarried adults may be characterized by the same deep emotional involvement that may arise in certain foster care relationships. But in both cases, until there is a
quality of permanence, there is neither a marriage nor a family. A
permanent quality can exist in a biological child-parent relationship
outside marriage, both because of legal sanctions and because of the
inherently permanent character of biological kinship - even for the
nonvisiting divorced father. This permanence gives rise to constitutional protection of these relationships. There is, however, no biological equivalent to marriage; that may be one reason why the
Court has never given constitutional protection to a relationship between unmarried adults. Absent a verifiable basis for presuming
permanent commitments, neither the parties involved nor the state
can reasonably assume enough about the nature of the relationship
to warrant the personal investment or the full-blown legal protection
necessary to sustain family relationships.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

431
431
431
431
431

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at
at
at
at
at

843.
844 & n.51.
843 n.49.
845 n.53.
843.
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Foster care has been around a long time. OFFER is a foster care
policy case, not a case suggesting a new definition for the family. By
noting that "a foster family . . . has its source in state law and contractual arrangements," 191 the Court correctly put the nature of the
foster relationship where it belongs - as a matter of state policy. 192
D. The Right To Marry Cases

In marriage there is a profound overlapping of individual and
societal interests of the most significant character. Society's interest
in marriage appeared so obvious that Justice Holmes considered
"some form of permanent association between the sexes" to be one
of the rudimentary characteristics of civilization. 193 Lord Patrick
Devlin considered the social interest so universal that "from time
immemorial ... in every society" marriage has been the subject of
social regulation. 194 In one of its most recent opinions developing a
constitutional "right to marry," the Supreme Court echoed these
sentiments:
[M]arriage involves interests of basic importance in our society. . . . It
is not surprising, then, that the States have seen fit to oversee many
aspects of that institution. Without a prior judicial imprimatur, indi191. 431 U.S. at 845.
192. In foster care, the state as parens patriae is acting as a parent for a child whose family
ties have been - temporarily, it is hoped - disrupted. In that role, the state has created and
defined the nature of the foster parents' interest; without this action by the state, the foster
parents in the case would have had no basis at all for their claim. The claim that a foster child
- as distinguished from the foster parents - may deserve procedural due process protection
before removal from a foster home is another issue, and was probably the basis for the hope
among the foster parents group that constitutional recognition of the children's interest would
force a change in foster care policies. The district court in OFFER decided on the basis of the
children's rights, Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER) v.
Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277,282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), but the Supreme Court did not address the
case in those terms. The Court did briefly mention the district court's theory, but rejected it on
the ground that a foster child's removal, even if a "grievous loss," does not give rise to a
protectable due process interest. 431 U.S. at 840-41.
The objective of those challenging the New York law was not to establish "psychological
parenthood" as some kind of general alternative to biological parenthood; rather, their objective was to force a change in the prevailing assumptions governing foster care policies by
stressing the importance of close emotional involvement in foster relationships lasting more
than a year. Whether a state would wish to change its policy in that way is an important issue,
but it is a child welfare policy problem, not a constitutionally loaded parents' rights issue.
Even if the Court were to have found a "liberty" interest in the foster parents' role, that interest could only have been a procedural one. Foster parents have no true parental rights, not
because the state has no authority to establish them (which it does constantly in adoption
cases), but because the naturalparents' permanent rights have not yet been terminated, as they
are prior to an adoption.
193. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918).
194. "Whether the union should be monogamous or polygamous, whether it should be
dissoluble or not, and what obligations the spouses should undertake towards each other are
not questions which any society has ever left to individuals to settle for themselves." P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 61 (1965).
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viduals may freely enter into and rescind commercial contracts, for example, but we are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens
may covenant for or dissolve marriages without state approval. 195

Established jurisprudence thus clearly recognizes the social - and
legal - importance of marriage.
Despite such assumptions about society's interests, the individual
liberty interest in marriage has emerged most forcefully in recent
years. Building on what Griswold v. Connecticut 196 established about
the constitutional sanctity of marriage, 197 Loving v. Virginia 198 struck
down a state law forbidding interracial marriages. Loving was decided primarily on equal protection grounds in view of the classification based on race, but added the Court's first reference to "the
freedom to marry" as a due process interest. 199 Anticipating the
powerful legal implications of categorizing marriage as a fundamental civil right, one family scholar observed that Loving could well
mean that "the functions of the family for the larger society and the
need for marital restrictions are irrelevant. . . . It follows that what
is done or how things are done in any particular family are matters
of private and not public - or legal - concem."200 The next marriage case, Boddie v. Connecticut, 201 acknowledged the state's interest
in regulating both marriage and divorce, but also established a procedural right of access to the divorce courts as a basic concomitant of
the freedom to marry: one cannot legally marry B until becoming
divorced from A. Boddie thus planted the seeds of a possible constitutional right to a divorce. 202
195. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (citations omitted). Justice Black
added:
It is not by accident that marriage and divorce have always been considered to be under
state control. The institution of marriage is of peculiar importance to the people of the
States. It is within the States that they live and vote and rear their children . . . . The
States provide for the stability of their social order, for the good morals of all their citizens, and for the needs of children from broken homes. The States, therefore, have particular interests in the kinds oflaws regulating their citizens when they enter into, mamtain,
and dissolve marriages.
401 U.S. at 389 (Black, J., dissenting).
196. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
197. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
381 U.S. at 486.
198. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
199. 388 U.S. at 12 (Douglas, J., concurring).
200. B. FARBER, supra note 83, at 37.
201. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
202. The right to a divorce is arguably inferable from the right to marry, even though the
Court ruled in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), using the rational basis test, that a dura-
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The constitutional freedom to marry as a substantive fundamental riglit sprang full blown from the pen of Justice Marshall in
Zablocki v. Redhail in 1978.203 Zablocki invalidated a state law
prohibiting the marriage of persons having unpaid child support obligations. Marshall heavily loaded his opinion with individual liberty language, even though he noted the state's right to impose
"reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship . . . ."204 He spoke also
of the right "to marry and raise" children "in a traditional family
setting" as a corollary to the right to procreate, since the state controls legal procreation.
[I]f appellee's right to procreate means anything at all, it must imply
some right to enter the only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place.I 1
11

Wisconsin punishes fornication as a criminal offense.205

This observation concerning the relationship between the right to
marry and the right to procreate will warrant further inquiry in discussing the matter of sexual privacy.2 06
In attempting to fashion a test for evaluating the acceptability of
state regulation of marriage, the Marshall opinion offers little guidance. Though he used fundamental rights terminology in an equal
protection context, which would normally call for the highest scrutiny of legislation, he also stated that only those regulations that interfere "directly and substantially with the right to marry" 207 would
be subject to "rigorous scrutiny."208 Whether a compelling state interest test would then apply remained uncertain, though the application of Marshall's test to the Zablocki facts suggests a concern only
with direct and substantial interferences. The potential for confusion in this framing of the constitutional theory caused considerable
disturbance to Justices Stewart and Powell, who each concurred septional residency requirement for divorce does not unconstitutionally burden the right to travel.
See notes 213-14 infra and accompanying text On the other hand, of course, a constitutional
right to divorce could completely negate society's interest in the preservation of existing marriages. A major point of this discussion of the right to marry cases (indeed an essential point of
this Article) is that the social interest in marriage is extremely important in the constitutional
scheme. In Murrillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 378 (1982),
the Third Circuit displayed skepticism over a fundamental right to divorce, although it assumed "arguendo" that such a right existed. 681 F.2d at 903 & n.9, 904.
203. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
204. 434 U.S. at 386.
205. 434 U.S. at 386 & n.11.
206. See also note 334 infra and accompanying text.
207. 434 U.S. at 386.
208. 434 U.S. at 387.
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arately, and to Justice Rehnquist, who dissented. All three seemed
concerned that the majority opinion would undermine not only state
regulation of marriage in a routine sense, but also the "importance of
the marriage relationship to the maintenance of values essential to
organized society." 209 Some of the confusion created by Zablocki
can be resolved by comparing it to Cal!fano v. Jobst ,210 decided the
same term. Marshall seemed to concentrate more on distinguishing
Zablocki from Jobst than on defining the right to marry. 211
The implications of classifying the right to marry on the extreme
individual rights end of the spectrum of constitutional protections do
not bode well for permitting careful analysis of the relationship between individual and social interests in this most basic of social institutions - unless, of course, the Court adopts a test that weighs those
two interests as part of the process of determining whether a "liberty" interest is present in the first place.212 In the Illeantime,
Zablocki's rationale has already been applauded as providing individual protection not only against "a wide range of state laws limiting the right to marry," but also against laws "restricting other
nonmarital forms of intimate association."213 Taken still further,
Zablocki can appear to limit the degree of social interest the state
can express through its regulation not only of entering marriage, but
also ofleaving it. Under this reasoning, anything a state might do in
its traditional role of defining the terms of entering and leaving the
marital status may constitute an infringement on the terms on which
one is married. Therefore, ultimately, any distinctions between the
rights of married and unmarried persons - especially in their choice
of how to associate intimately with other individuals - might be
impermissible; the freedom to marry arguably implies the freedom
not to marry. 214
209. 434 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
210. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
211. In Jobst, a unanimous Court had upheld a provision of the Social Security Act which
terminated the benefits of a disabled dependent child when the child married someone not
covered by the Act. Although Jobst arguably involved the freedom to marry, the loss of bene•
fits was held, under a minimal scrutiny test, to be an indirect hardship resulting from rational
congressional assumptions about the effect of marriage on dependency. This differs from the
Zablocki statute which totally prevented marriage by an indigent person who was subject to
outstanding child support obligations. The Jobst statute only forced a choice between social
security benefits and marriage. In addition, Jobst was simply a classification based on marital
status, while Zablocki created an impervious obstacle to entering into marriage. This was the
view of Justice Stevens in Zablocki. 434 U.S. at 403 (Stevens, J., concurring). Neither case
involved the kind of serious state regulation of marriage that would call for a thorough analysis of society's interests in maintaining the marital institution.
212. This Article proposes such a test. See Part III infra.
213. Karst, supra note 11, at 671.
214. This is Professor Karst's position. For example:
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Despite the individualistic overtones of the Zablocki majority,
the "right to marry" cases do not disturb the hypothesis that constitutional protection of familial liberties is thus far reserved for interests involving blood, marriage, and adoption. In removing obstacles
to marriage, the cases arguably advance the social interest in encouraging long-term commitments to the formal family. Their method of
analysis nevertheless gives some cause for concern, primarily because it runs a serious risk of distorting the Court's historical recognition of both the social and the individual interests in marriage.
E. The Children's Rights Cases·
I have discussed elsewhere215 the historical justification for the
concept of minority status and the recent children's rights movement
which challenges that justification. A brief update is in order here,
in part because these cases illustrate the Court's tendency to retreat
over time from unnecessarily broad generalizations in its early cases
affecting family relationships. The children's rights cases also reflect
the Court's response to the current movement of individualistic egalitarianism, which would redefine the family as an assortment of isolated individuals rather than persons bound together by the bonds of
kinship.
Most of the Court's children's rights cases have dealt with what
might be termed "protection rights" rather than "choice riglits" for
minors. Protection rights include the right not to be imprisoned
without due process, rights to property, and rights to physical protection. No minimum intellectual or other capacity is necessary to justify a claim to those rights. The legal doctrines developed for the
benefit of children throughout the history of American jurisprudence, including the juvenile court movement, primarily fit this category. For example, In re Gault, 216 the Court's first significant
[E]asing exit from marriage may reduce the import of the act of marriage as an initial
statement. But once the act of marriage recedes into the past, the freedom to leave gives
added meaning to the decision to stay.73
The freedom of nonassociation, it is often noted, is itself an associational freedom.
73 . • • Should the wife, then, be able simply to walk away from her expressed commitment to her husband? The freedom of intimate association speaks to such questions not
by offering answers, but by identifying them as questions of moral rather than legal
obligation.
Id. at 638 & n.73 (footnote omitted). Karst's discussion of Zablocki, which does acknowledge
that minimal age and incest restrictions may still be permissible in marriage regulation, applies
Zahfocki's "substantive values" to unmarried relationships and concludes: "The extension of
the freedom of intimate association beyond marriage to associations such as a couple's living
together can be seen in a similar egalitarian light." Id. at 676.
215. Hafen, supra note 49.
216. 387 U.S. I (1967).
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minors' rights case, found the careless procedures of an Arizona juvenile court to violate procedural due process not because the Court
thought juveniles should always be treated as adults; rather, the
Court held that minority status alone does not justify disregarding
due process safeguards. Later cases made it clear that some of the
characteristics of adult criminal trials are not suitable to the special
protective needs of juveniles. 217
"Choice rights," on the other hand, represent the legal authority
to make affirmative binding decisions oflasting consequence - marrying, contracting, exercising religious preferences, or seeking education. The right to vote, for instance, which may be the most
fundamental of citizenship choice rights, has always been subject to
an age limitation. The right to marry prior to statutory age limits is
another basic choice right denied to minors. 218
The cases recognizing a choice right for minors are essentially
limited to those dealing with abortion. Tinker v. Des Moines School
District 219 might possibly be regarded as a choice rights case; it did
acknowledge that public school students had enough of a first
amendment right to wear armbands in protest against the government's Vietnam policy. However, both the childrearing and the free
speech rights of the Tinker parents were arguably implicated in the
case. Also, the Court had decided the year before Tinker that minors
did not have first amendment rights equal to adults under obscenity
laws.220
The teenage contraception case, Carey v. Population Services Jnternational,221 granted minors the right to choose to prevent conception in the name of the right of privacy, which had been established
as a minor's right the previous term in an abortion case. 222 However,
the Court's primary concern in Carey was not really with granting
teenagers a true "right of procreation;" rather, the justices simply did
not believe that denying access to contraceptives would reduce the
incidence of premarital sexual activity. Their real fear was that de217. E.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (right to jury trial would not aid
juvenile court's factfinding function and might impair need for flexibility and confidentiality).
218. The right to marry before the age of majority was distinguished from the right to
obtain an abortion before majority in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979)
(plurality opinion).
219. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
220. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) ("I think a State may permissibly determine that ... a child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is
the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." 390 U.S. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment)).
221. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
222. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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nial of access to contraceptives would seriously aggravate the
problems of "unwanted pregnancy and venereal disease." 223 They
sought to protect minors against such damaging risks. 224 The absence of any attention in Carey to the issue of maturity, which has
become a major factor in determining which pregnant minors are
entitled to make their own choice about having an abortion, 225 confirms the interpretation of Carey as a protection rights case.
An important relationship exists between the protection-choice
distinction and the concept of minority status. The denial of choice
rights during minority is a form of protection against a minor's own
immaturity and vulnerability to exploitation by those having no responsibility for the child's welfare. The conferring of the full range
of choice rights - essentially, adult legal status - requires a dissolution of the protection rights of childhood. One cannot have the freedom to live where and as one chooses and still demand parental
support; one may not deliberately enter into contracts and yet insist
that they be voidable. The lifelong effects of binding, childish
choices can cause permanent damage far more detrimental than the
temporary limitations on personal freedom inherent in minority status. To be protected against that risk requires a restriction on the
range of choice rights.
In some of its early cases, the Court spoke in language broad
enough to create the impression that all of the rights of minors
should be regarded as "coextensive with those of adults," 226 and that
"children are autonomous individuals, entitled to the same rights
and privileges before the law as adults." 227 When the Court rendered its first opinion involving a confrontation between the alleged
constitutional rights of parents and the constitutional rights of their
minor child, Justice Blackmun tossed off the Court's first, confusing
mention of a "right of privacy" for minors as if it deserved no com223. 431 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
224. Carey is a classic case of deregulation - in this instance given constitutional recognition - to avoid harming kids in the name of helping them. . . .
. . . . The sexually active 15-year-old is given access to birth control not out of recognition of his or her mature judgment. Indeed, the fess equipped a particular individual is
for the burdens of parenthood, the stronger the argument against denying access to contraception when we cannot deny access to sex. . . . The civil right being vindicated is the
right not to be gratuitously harmed.
F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 62-63 (1982).
225. See notes 235-39 i'!fra.
226. State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 904, 530 P.2d 260, 263 (1975).
227. Brief for State Respondent at 23, In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182,532 P.2d 278 (1975),
discussed in Hafen, supra note 49, at 609.
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ment, let alone an explanation. 228
In the next child's rights vs. parents' rights case, however, Justice
Powell wrote the most comprehensive statement the Court has yet
provided on the difference between the constitutional status of minors and adults. InBellottiv. Baird (Bellotti Il}, 229 Powell stated that
"the peculiar vulnerability of children[,] their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner[,] and the importance
of the parental role in child rearing" together justified "the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
those of adults . . . ."230 Powell's opinion also shed some light on
the question whether the children's rights cases should be read as
assimilating children into the tradition of individual liberty, thereby
removing them from the family tradition which historically placed
parents between children and the state:231
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not
inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former
is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on
minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 232

This analysis, together with the limited range of choice rights conferred in the Court's cases to date, supports traditional assumptions
about the child-parent relationship. Supervision of the choice rights
of minors lies at the very heart of the custodial rights of parenthood,
and forms the rationale for minority status. Without that supervisory role, serious doubt would have been cast on the primary role of
value transmission ascribed by our culture to parents. The Court has
also buttressed the parental role in a series of parents' rights cases
that are summarized elsewhere.233
Giving constitutional protection to the right of minors to obtain
abortions without parental consent has become the major exception
to the Court's overall posture toward granting choice rights to minors. The Court's willingness to make this exception seems attribu228. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) ("Any independent interest
the parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty
than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.").
229. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
230. 443 U.S. at 634 (plurality opinion).
231. The individual tradition and the family tradition are compared in Hafen, supra note
49.
232. 443 U.S. at 638-39.
233. Hafen, supra note 49, at 613-29; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). For a
helpful perspective on the value of adapting legal reasoning to the peculiar needs of adolescents, including their need for parental guidance, see generally F. ZIMRING, Sllpra note 224.
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table to two factors. First, Justice Powell described the abortion
decision for a plurality·of the Court in Bellotti II as being in a class
by itself. He never once used the term "right of privacy," preferring
instead the very specific "constitutional right to seek an abortion."
Abortion differs "in important ways from other decisions that may
be made during minority." 234 Abortions for minors are made
unique primarily because the pregnant minor is herself a prospective
parent, which pits her own inchoate parental right against the parental rights of her parents. If she completes her pregnancy, she will
then be a mother having full responsibility for her child. Her parents will legally have nothing to say about her decision to place the
child for adoption or to keep it. If she were carrying a tumor rather
than a child, well established common law rules - with or without a
parental consent statute - would require parental consent as a con:.
dition of surgery. The decision to abort a child is fundamentally
different. Moreover, forcing the creation of an unwanted family undermines the reasons we value family ties in the first instance. Thus,
the minors' abortion cases actually contribute toward an interpretation of either due process "liberty" or "privacy" that is narrowly limited to childrearing decisions.
Second, the court has also been influenced by its development of
a "mature minor" rule in the abortion context, which restricts the
class of minors who may make an unrestricted choice about abortion
to those found "mature" by a judge. Reliance on individualized determinations of maturity departs from an entire system of age-based
classifications in the laws relating to minors. 235 The Court may have
been influenced by the now discredited doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions,236 or it may have taken with unwarranted seriousness the
erroneous claim of one of the attorneys in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti
I) 237 that there is a recognized "mature minor" exception to the
common law doctrine requiring parental consent as a condition to
medical treatment ofminors.238 Whatever the Court's reasoning, de234. 443 U.S. at 642.
235. In "all state legislation seeking to protect minors from the consequences of decisions
they are not yet prepared to make . . . chronological age has been the basis for imposition of a
restraint on the minor's freedom of choice even though it is perfectly obvious that such a
yardstick is imprecise and perhaps even unjust in particular cases." Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 104-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
236. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 970 (10th ed. 1980).
237. 428 U.S. 132, 144 (1976).
238. The sources cited in the brief of the Massachusetts Attorney General discuss circumstances permitting a court to waive the normal requirement of parental consent to medical
treatment, but the circumstances are limited to an "emergency" exception, a parental conflict
of interest exception, and parental unwillingness to consent when therapeutic abortion is nee-

516

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:463

terminations of maturity are hopelessly subjective, which means that
a judge - rather than a minor or her parents - is the real decisionmaker. This is especially true under Justice Powell's approach,
which would have a judge first determine maturity, then, if the minor is deemed immature, decide if the abortion serves her best
interests.
The court's inclination toward subjective, case-by-case determinations has also shown up in the unwed fathers cases and the illegitimacy cases, where Justice Powell has again taken the lead. He has
seemed unusually preoccupied with wanting the Court to draw unmanageable numbers of minute factual distinctions. Giving him,
and the Court, the benefit of the doubt, their determination to encourage individualized determinations must stem from a desire to be
supremely fair - and perhaps from a desire to seek for compromise
grounds in difficult cases. The family law context is a tantalizingly
inviting scene for a judge bent on individualized assessments of fairness, for no matter whether the rules are described in constitutional
or other terms, the rules will often have less to say about the outcome
than the weighing of each factual circumstance. What such a legal
environment calls for, of course, is not a system of laws, but a king
- or a weatherbeaten domestic relations judge.239
The Court has generally left the concept of minority status and even the notion of state support for parental authority - in its
traditional place, except, for unique reasons, in the aJ:>ortion cases.
Nonetheless, some, including the chairman of the ABA's Section on
Individual Rights and Responsibilities, would "liberate" children
from the ''captivity" of the family tradition. He has proposed "that
we consider the logical and ultimate step - that all legal distinctions
essary. See Baron, Botsford & Cole, Live Organ and Tissue Transplantsfrom Minor J)onors in
Massachusetts, 55 B.U. L. REV. 159, 166 (1975); Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age
of Con.s;ent, 11 OsGOODE HALL LJ. 115, 116, 121-22 (1973); see also Ballard v. Anderson, 4
Cal. 3d 873,484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. I (1971). In fact, there is no "mature minor rule" in
common law cases. The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 59 comment a, at 111 (1934), advanced
the idea of a subjective standard of competence in considering the legal sufficiency of consent
to intentional invasions of personal interest. The widespread rejection of this approach led to
the adoption of an objective age limit standard in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§§ 59, 892A(2) comment b (1977). On the general subject of exceptions to parental consent
requirements, see R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 350-79 (1978), which summarizes
other statutory exceptions where parental consent is not required for treatment of such
problems as venereal disease and drug abuse. The interest of the state in facilitating needed
care in these exceptional cases is obviously undermined when minors are deterred from ob•
taining treatment by fear of disclosure to parents when seeking consent to treatment. This
interest may also be involved when therapeutic abortions are necessary, but not in other
abortions.
239. On the general issue of marriage and minority status as sources of objective jurispru•
dence, see Part I D supra.
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between children and adults be abolished." 240 Others have issued
similar calls, perhaps drawing support from reading more than is
warranted into the Court's children's rights cases.241 The Court's decisions, however, fall a good deal short of supporting such a dismantling of our assumptions about the purposes of family life and
minority status. The Court is willing to employ constitutional doctrines to extend protection to minors for the reasons the law has always given them special protection - indeed, discriminating in their
favor. Beyond that, the choice rights cases have developed in a limited way that recognizes some liberty interests peculiarly related to
parenthood and childbearing, but not a general right of autonomy
for minors.

F. The Broad Right of Privacy -

The Intimate Association and
Free Expression Cases

This line of cases originally hinted that a wide-ranging right of
personal privacy might emerge under the heading of the first amendment's interest in association and expression. As the Court has responded to a variety of claims over the years, however, no such right
has developed.
In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 242 the Court invalidated a state law regulating the use of contraceptives by married
couples. Griswold thus became a leading case both in developing a
constitutional right to marry and in developing constitutional protection for decisions related to childbearing. In addition, Justice Douglas seized the Griswold opportunity to introduce his unique theory of
privacy, grounded not in the text of the Constitution, but in the
"penumbras" emanating from a variety of explicitly guaranteed
rights. Douglas' biographer described his Griswold opinion as "one
of the most important constitutional decisions of the twentieth century," because the right of privacy identifies "the most critical constitutional battleground for human dignity in the modem age." 243
Douglas' concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade 244 revealed the breadth
of his view of privacy. In Roe, he wrote with sweeping strokes of
240. Manahan, Editorial: Children's Lib, 3 A.B.A. Sec. on lndiv. Rts. & Resps. (Spring
1976).
241. Some of this literature is summarized in Hafen, supra note 49, at 631~32.
242. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
243. J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY 348-49 (1980). Douglas began developing his view
of privacy as early as 1952. "His beliefin the right to be let alone, nowhere expressly guaranteed in the Constitution, became . . . the overriding theme of Douglas's libertarian philosophy
and represented his most significant contribution to constitutional law." Id. at 346.
244. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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"the Blessings of Liberty," which included "autonomous control
over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests,
tastes, and personality," as absolute first amendment rights. 245 The
philosophical premises for this view are very simple - every person
has a capacity for autonomy and the right to equal concern and respect in pursuit of his autonomy. 246 Within a constitutional framework, these premises lead to the "most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men": the right to be let alone. 247
The right of privacy has been a confusing, but lively, subject of debate since the day it was born in 1965.248 Whether it has developed
since then as a dwarf, totally changed its form, or died of malnutrition remains unclear, though the number of post-Griswold cases does
allow a better perspective now than was possible a few years ago.
In Stanley v. Georgia,249 the Court overturned a criminal conviction for possession of obscene films on the ground that the possession
of admittedly obscene material in one's own home is protected by
the first amendment, with supporting protection from Griswold's
right of privacy. The Stanley Court's rejection of state attempts to
"control the moral content of a person's thoughts" 250 seemed to
question the basis for any obscenity and other morals legislation affecting only consenting adults. However, later cases narrowed Stanley by strictly limiting the right to acquire obscene materials outside
the home. 251 Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton ,252 which refused to protect a theatre owner who showed obscene movies to consenting
adults, also substantially curtailed Stanley's general freedom of expression overtones.253
245. 410 U.S. at 210-22 (Douglas, J., concurring).
246. See Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. I, 8, 34 n.160 (1980).
247. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study In
Human Rights and the lJnwrillen Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 974 (1979). The "right to
be let alone" comes from Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928), a fourth amendment search and seizure case. See also R. Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously, in Is LAW DEAD? 168 (E. Rostow ed. 1971).
248. For an analysis of the Griswold opinions, see Note, supra note 32, at 673-86.
249. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
250. 394 U.S. at 565.
251. See, e.g., United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
252. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
253. "If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment in itself carried with it a
'penumbra' of constitutionally protected privacy, this Court would not have found it necessary
to decide Stanley on the narrow basis of the 'privacy of the home,' which was hardly more than
a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his castle.'" 413 U.S. at 66. Even the privacy of "the
home" had previously been questioned in a fourth amendment context, since that amendment
"protects people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). In addition,
Justice Harlan made this telling distinction between "home" and "family": "Certainly the
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Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Paris strongly repudiated the premise from which much of the reasoning about individual
autonomy254 and free expression of lifestyle preferences proceeds:
namely, John Stuart Mill's libertarian principle that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community . . . is to prevent harm to others."255 Mill's
position would require proof of actual harm before restrictions on
personal autonomy would be allowed. But the Court, responding to
the theatre owner's argument that "there are no specific data which
conclusively demonstrate that exposure to obscene material adversely affects men or women or their society," 256 vigorously upheld
the right of legislatures to act on "various unprovable assumptions"257 in concluding that public exhibition of obscenity "has a tendency to injure the community as a whole." 258 In other words, in
regulating obscenity (and in other morals legislation), the state may
presume the existence of harm in the absence of verifiable evidence.
This view is very similar to the position taken by Lord Devlin in the
famous debates arising over homosexuality in England.259
The question of where to place the burden of proof is the key
legal issue in cases involving regulations such as those that deal with
obscenity and sexual relations between consenting adults, because
unequivocal proof of either the presence or absence of individual or
social harm is so difficult to adduce. 260 In the Paris case, as in its
sexual privacy cases,261 the Supreme Court left that burden on those
challenging traditional norms.
The cases dealing with contraceptives for single persons and
safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property rights. The
home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
254. Justice Brennan's dissent in Paris toyed with the idea of advancing Stanley, along
with Griswold, as authority for the proposition that obscenity should be available to consenting
adults on the basis of a general individual autonomy principle. He rejected this approach in
favor of the "narrower basis" that obscenity is incapable of definition ''with sufficient clarity
to withstand attack on vagueness grounds." 413 U.S. 49, 85-86 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 1 (London 1859), reprinted in J. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 8 (R. Mccallum ed. 1946). "[S]urely
the United States Constitution no more enacts On Liberty than it enacts Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics." Perry, Substantive JJue Process Revisited· Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent
Cases, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 417, 434 (1976).
256. 413 U.S. at 60.
257. 413 U.S. at 61.
258. 413 U.S. at 69.
259. See generally Reynolds, The Enforcement ofMorals and the Rule ofthe Law, 11 GA. L.
REV. 1325, 1329 (1977).
260. See notes 418-22 infra and accompanying text.
261. For a more detailed discussion of the sexual privacy cases, see Part II H i,!fra.
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abortions are treated separately,262 but deserve some mention here;
these cases use the term "right of privacy," but restrict its meaning to
decisions regarding childbearing. Roe v. Wade, 263 for example, located the privacy right within the meaning of due process "liberty,"
which implicitly rejected the broad Douglas view in favor of Justice
Harlan's narrower approach to Griswold. 264 Moreover, the Roe majority directly repudiated an "unlimited right" of privacy that would
allow one "to do with one's body as one pleases."265
The Court has consistently refused in recent cases to accept
broadly based lifestyle and autonomy arguments, confirming Justice
Blackmun's observation in Roe that, "The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind . . . ." 266 The Court has twice
upheld state sodomy statutes against vagueness challenges. 267 In
1976, the Court summarily affirmed a federal district court's ruling
that upheld the constitutionality of a state sodomy statute as it applied to consenting adult male homosexuals. 268 Two years later, the
Court declined to review another district court decision allowing the
discharge of two employees of a public library for "living together in
a state of 'open adultery.' " 269 In these two summary actions, the
Court acted despite vocal dissents. Justice Marshall's dissent in both
cases echoed Justice Douglas' earlier choice-of-lifestyle theme as a
matter of both personal privacy and intimate association.
Cases in other contexts reflect the same pattern. One case rejected the argument that the "liberty" interest of the privacy cases
protected a policeman's right to challenge a local hair length regulation.270 Another case rejected the federal civil rights claim of a
newspaper photographer whose name and photograph were included in a police flyer listing active shoplifters. 271 The photographer argued that his interest in reputation was protected by his right
262. See Part II G infra.
263. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
264. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), That may be one
reason Justice Douglas felt obliged to enter the concurring opinion in Roe that contained his
wide-ranging view of privacy.
·
265. 410 U.S. at 154.
266. 410 U.S. at 154.
267. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975). In Rose,
the Court indicated that no fundamental right was involved in the case. 423 U.S. at 50 n.3,
268. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), qjfg. mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975).
269. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978), denying cert. lo 578 F.2d
1374 (3d Cir. 1978).
270. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
271. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
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to privacy and liberty. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion expressed concern about those who want to read the fourteenth amendment as "a font of tort law to be superimposed" on existing legal
remedies. 272 In Whalen v. Roe,273 a group of patients and physicians
unsuccessfully invoked the privacy right in attacking a state law creating a computer file listing the names and addresses of patients who
obtained certain prescription drugs. Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Stevens placed the Court's prior privacy cases into three categories: (1) freedom from government surveillance as protected by
the fourth amendment; (2) the interest in avoiding public disclosure
of personal matters; and (3) the interest in making independent personal decisions in matters relating to marriage, procreation, and
childrea~g.274 He also confirmed that the Court in Roe, "after
carefully reviewing" the prior privacy cases, had determined to recognize the right of privacy as part of due process liberty rather than
as "an independent source of constitutional protection" in the
"shadows" or "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. 275 The thrust of
this language and the recent cases is that no general right of privacy
exists, and such privacy interests as do exist must meet the standards
for inclusion within the meaning of due process liberty. The omission of any reference to an interest in sexual or lifestyle preferences
in these categories was both conspicuous and significant. The Court
has had numerous opportunities by now to give constitutional protection to that interest, but has refused to do so.
In the related area of associational privacy, the Court has followed a similar pattern of appearing to start on a broad base, then
narrowing its position over time. In United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno, 276 the Court struck down an amendment to the
federal food stamp program that excluded from the program's coverage households containing any person who was unrelated to another
household member. The plaintiffs in the case were three different
indigent households, each of which consisted of a family plus one
unrelated individual who lived with the family for various common- place reasons. The Court saw no rational connection between the
household exclusion provision and the law's purpose in alleviating
hunger among the poverty class. Justice Douglas, concurring,
thought the case implicated associational rights protected by the first
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
429 U.S. at 599-90 & nn.24-26.
429 U.S. at 598 n.23.
413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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amendment. 277 The Court's use of the rational basis test and the
nature of the households involved278 made it doubtful that Moreno
intended to extend the concept of familial privacy to associations of
unrelated persons. In fact, the statute interfered with family privacy,
because of its effect on families who merely invited another single
person to share their home. Moreno also reflected an underlying desire to aid economically disadvantaged classes - a concern that
could well have motivated the Court in such other cases as Roe, Boddie v. Connecticut, 279 and Zablocki v. Redhail.280
A year later, Justice Douglas had nothing to say about associational rights in writing the majority opinion in Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas. 281 In Belle Terre, six college students unsuccessfully challenged the definition of "family" in a single-family dwelling ordinance. Justice Brennan later described the Belle Terre plaintiffs as
"a mere collection of unrelated individuals" whose ties did not rise
to the level of the temporary relationships in a foster family. 282 In
dissent, Justice Marshall thought the ordinance violated the rights of
associational freedom and privacy.283 Some factual distinctions
between Moreno and Belle Terre may explain the difference in outcome between the two cases,284 but more important than the differences may be what the cases have in common: neither was
considered by the Court as an associational freedom or right of pri277. 413 U.S. at 543 (Douglas, J., concurring).
278. None of the households involved intimate relationships. One of the unrelated persons
was a "20-year-old girl" taken in by a couple and their three children because they "felt she
had emotional problems." 413 U.S. at 532. Another involved a mother sharing an apartment
with another woman in order to live in a more expensive area of town near a special school for
her deaf daughter. 413 U.S. at 532. A third case involved an older diabetic woman who lived
with a mother and three children. The mother helped care for the woman and shared expenses
with her. 413 U.S. at 531.
279. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
280. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
281. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
282. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER), 431
U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977).
283. "The choice of household companions ... involves deeply personal considerations as
to the kind and quality of intimate relationships within die home." 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall,
J ., dissenting).
284. Justice Douglas distinguished the cases by saying that in Moreno, "a household containing anyone unrelated to the rest was denied food stamps." 416 U.S. at 8 n.6. That is a less
than comprehensive distinction, except as it reflects on the seriousness of the economic loss,
The economic factor is also noted in the Moreno Court's comment that the food stamp law
excluded "only those . . . so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter
their living arrangements so as to retain eligibility." 413 U.S. at 538 (Douglas, J,, concurring)
(emphasis in original). Presumably, the students in Belle Terre would have found it easier to
relocate. Further, the inherently transient nature of the Belle Terre students may have been a
factor, as theirs was not an "enduring relationship," L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 990 n.30, or
perhaps not really a "home."
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vacy case justifying heightened scrutiny of the legislation. Some of
the commentary about Belle Terre has nevertheless assumed the
presence of significant associational interests.285
The Court's most recent household zoning case, Moore v. City of
East Cleveland,286 drew a very sharp distinction between unrelated
persons and persons related by kinship. In Moore, the Court invalidated a single-family dwelling ordinance drawn in a way that excluded from its definition of "family" a household consisting of a
grandmother, her son, his son, and another grandson. In the most
explicit recognition of substantive due process the Court has undertaken in its modem cases, Justice Powell's plurality opinion relied on
a "tradition" test to find that due process liberty protects extended
family ties. 287 Justice Powell ignored doctrines concerning intimate
association and individual expression protected by the first amendment or the "penumbras" of other explicit guarantees. Instead, he
traced the chain of title giving preferred recognition to family relationships back to Meyer v. Nebraska 288 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters .289 These were the earliest cases establishing the constitutional
right of parents to direct the education of their children. Because of
this long lineage in a tradition of preference for family values, Powell described the place of family relationships in the world of substantive due process as simply outlasting the post-Lochner decline in
cases involving economic interests.290 This perspective places Griswold in the chronological middle of an established substantive due
process tradition based on the liberty interest inherent in marriage
and kinship, rather than seeing Griswold as the beginning of a stirring new privacy philosophy laden with first amendment
overtones.291
The dissenters in Moore further underscored the absence of a
constitutional principle that would justify protection for intimate associations without family ties. Justice Stewart wrote that the first
amendment's freedom of association was designed to protect such
"ideological freedom" as "the promotion of speech, assembly, the
press, or religion." It was never intended to protect associations
based on "no interest other than the gratification, convenience, and
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

E.g., L.
431
431
262
268
431
431

supra note 91, at 974-90.
494 (1977).
at 504 (plurality opinion).
390 (1923).
510 (1925).
at 502-03.
at 503 n.11.

TRIBE,

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
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economy of sharing the same residence." 292 Stewart found Mrs.
Moore "closer to the constitutional mark" in seeking protection
within the realm of family life, but disagreed with the plurality that
the interest in sharing the same home with blood relatives was a signifi.cant enough family interest to invoke the guarantees given to decisions about childrearing.293
The absence of decisions developing the broad overtones of the
Douglas right of privacy, whether in freedom of association, expression, or personal autonomy, makes it clear that contemporary attempts to link unconventional lifestyle preferences and associations
to the family liberty cases are misplaced. Justice Marshall's lonely
dissents in the recent cases, which seek to include a range of selfexpression and associational interests outside the family circle, have
remained both lonely and dissenting because his views require doctrinal support beyond traditional due process liberty and such support has simply not developed.
Laurence Tribe is disturbed that the Court has not recognized
associational freedoms among unrelated persons.294 He foresees a
coming liberation by the State of "the child - and the adult - from
the shackles of such intermediate groups as family." Being "liberated from domination by those closest to them" raises an urgent
need for legal recognition of alternative relationships that "meet the
human need for closeness, trust, and love" in the midst of "cultural
disintegration and social transformation." 295 Others express similar
concerns. 296 Their disappointment seems to stem primarily from
their conviction that a broadly based right of individual autonomy is
the core value of the Constitution, a value which the Court has failed
to accept, let alone build upon. Still they write, hopefully, as if constitutional principles already in place make inevitable the ultimate
movement of autonomy to the center of the constitutional stage.
There are serious problems inherent in making autonomy the
292. 431 U.S. at 535-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
293. 431 U.S. at 536-37 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Stewart's view was shared by Justice
Rehnquist and, in a separate dissent, by Justice White. 431 U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
294. L. TRIBE, Sllpra note 91, at 974-80, 987-90.
295. Id at 988-89. There has indeed been a gradual loosening of family bonds over the
recent historical period, not because the "State" has consciously sought to "liberate" family
members from one another, but because of far-reaching cultural and economic developments,
Through this process "the rise in importance of status and security of an individual's own work
and government-derived benefits, relative to traditional forms of property and relative to family relationships" have acted as "a powerful solvent of the legal bonding that once formed part
of the cultural reinforcement of [family] relationships. . . ." M. GLENDON, Sllpra note 77, at
139.
296. E.g., Karst, S11pra note I I; Richards, S11pra note 246.

January 1983]

Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy

525

core constitutional value, whether in the name of "privacy" or in
some other way. The Court has sensed these problems, though its
opinions may not yet have articulated a comprehensive response.
For one thing, an unenumerated right as expansive as the "Blessings
of Liberty" in the Preamble to the Constitution297 is so broad that
nearly any phase of human conduct can logically claim to be within
its protective scope. 298 If the Court had really adopted the Douglas
view of privacy, the Bill of Rights might well have become redundant. Even advocates of an expanded right of privacy recognize that
if the right "is to be a viable doctrine, there must be limits to its
application . . . ." 299 Without understandable limits, privacy sim-.
ply becomes "the harbinger of another Lochner era."300 Moreover,
true autonomy as a guiding principle is simply unrealistic about the
need for law in an organized society. As Justice Holmes put it,
"pretty much all law consists in forbidding men to do some things
that they want to do . . . ."301
More seriously and perhaps less obviously, the very term "privacy" as a description for substantive rights is an unfortunate source
of confusion. The real source of this society's concern with the protection of personal privacy has been the explosion of electronic-age
methodology that creates the capability of massive physical and psychological intrusion and surveillance.302 This latest scientific revolution has come pouring in on a mega-society already quaking from
deep-seated fears of everything from the Bomb to existential alienation. The political implications of this electronic revolution exacerbate our fears. We know all too well that "surveillance over privacy
is a functional necessity for totalitarian systems . . . ."303 Thus we
yearn for an environment that "ensures strong citadels of individual
and group privacy and limits both disclosure and surveillance," for
"the democratic society relies on publicity as a control over govern297. See notes 244-45 supra and accompanying text.
298. Professor Schauer has found a similar problem when First Amendment "speech" is
viewed so broadly that it encompasses every other form of individual expression in addition to
speech, from choice of hair length to choice of automobile. "A theory that does not functionally distinguish speech from this vast range of other conduct reduces free speech to a general
principle of liberty," which is "little more than a platitude." Schauer, Speech and "Speech" Obscenity and "Obscenity'!· An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67
GEO. L.J. 899, 912-13 (1979).
299. Note, supra note 32, at 673.
300. Id at 773.
301. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
302. See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
303. Id at 24.
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ment, and on privacy as a shield for group and individual life." 304
With such a pervasive foundation, it is no wonder that a constitutional right ofPrivacy could be perceived to touch so many interests,
especially those that seem, well, private.
Even though "privacy" would normally convey a concern with
intrusive methods that let the State make ~nything very personal into
its business, it has been all too easy to transfer the procedural fear
into a substantive one. As a result, a number of lower court judges
attempting to apply the privacy right in a variety of circumstances
have begun their constitutional analysis by assessing the justification
for state interest in regulating private behavior, regardless of the nature of the .behavior a_nd whether it deserves extraordinary protection. If it is private conduct, they assume, the state carries the
burden of justifying its interest.305 The difficulty with this approach,
of course, is that criminal activity, for instance, flourishes in privacy
just as does the most sacred and intimate personal activity. 306 That
an activity may be carried on in private tells us nothing about the
nature of the activity, let alone whether it is of such a nature that
substantive constitutional interests are implicated.
It has been accurately noted that "what the Court has been talking about is not at all what most people mean by privacy." 307 Except
for the fourth amendment cases, the Court has looked not for official
intrusion, but for certain kinds of official regulation. "Liberty"
would have been a far better term than "privacy" to describe freedom from regulation, both because "privacy" had already taken on a
secondary meaning in the context of surveillance and intrusion, and
because "liberty" already had an established meaning as a legal term
304. Id.
305. One study oflower court privacy opinions found that "virtually all" of the judges who

believed the right of privacy should protect the right of all adults to engage in private, consensual sexual behavior "focused on what they viewed as the state's lack of interest in preventing
private sexual behavior, rather than on the nature of the activity involved. The state's interest,
or lack of interest, should not compel any conclusions about whether or not an affirmative
constitutional right is at stake." Note, supra note 32, at 724. The dissenting opinion at the
district court level in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (W.D. Va.
1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting}, for example, took Griswold and Roe v. Wade to stand "for the
principle that every individual has a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into one's decisions on private matters of intimate concern." 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J.,
dissenting}. Because this beginning premise shifted the burden of proving social harm to the
state, the judge concluded that "[p]rivate consensual sex acts between adults are matters, absent evidence that they are harmful, in which the state has no legitimate interest." 403 F. Supp.
at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting} (footnote omitted}.
306. "[S]exual relations, to be sure, are usually conducted 'in private,' even today; but
other activities are also generally secreted, done 'in private,' from burglary to espionage and
conspiracies to overthrow governments." Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. Rev.
1410, 1429 (1974).
307. Id. at 1424.
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of art within the historical context of the due process clause. As it
turns out, ever since Roe the "privacy" cases really belong within the
framework of substantive due process liberty. If the scaffolding of
"privacy" was necessary to erect a structure of "liberty," the scaffolding should now be removed. Perhaps Justice Douglas intentionally
wanted to fashion a right of privacy in which the boundaries of the
substantive legal interests were coterminous with the boundaries of
the state's physical ability to intrude. But as the cases have developed, the instincts (more than the analytical tools) of most of the
other justices yielded greater caution.
The realization that the Court means "liberty" when it says "privacy" offers a ray of conceptual clarity heretofore unclear in some of
the opinions. Knowing that the Court has been talking all along
about protecting extraordinary aspects of personal "liberty" that
should be shielded from official regulation because they are "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental," 308 the first question should be, what is the nature of
the liberty interest at stake, and does it meet the established test for
preferred constitutional status. The weight of the interest would not
be relevant at that stage of analysis,309 even if the interest appeared
weighty in terms of the degree of seclusion involved. A broad view
of either privacy or autonomy escapes this absolutely essential first
step of analysis. Without this methodology, autonomy or privacy,
even in the best sense, stands to become meaningless by becoming
limitless. Moreover, by first assessing the nature of the substantive
interest involved, it is possible to weigh both the individual and social interests at stake (''the public goods that compete with 'privacy' ") before concluding that the nature of the interest calls for
heightened scrutiny.310 If the activity, regardless of what it is, is presumed to be within the "right of privacy" simply because it was carried out in seclusion or in "intimate" circumstances, a strong
presumption against any social or state interest is created before any
real analysis ever takes place.
G. The Contraception and Abortion Cases

The abortion and contraception cases come closer than do the
Court's other cases to departing from the traditional blood-marriageadoption criteria, because these cases give constitutional protection
308. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
309. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform {OFFER), 431
U.S. 816, 841 (1977).
310. See Part III A iefra.
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to unmarried persons whose prospective children are unborn. The
task of reconciling these cases with the others is aided by the preceding sections, however, for the massive weight of the Court's other
family-related decisions indicates no necessary implication that the
Court will protect unmarried sexual privacy or the relational interest
between unmarried persons.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 311 the Court struck down on equal protection grounds a state law providing for the sterilization of "habitual criminals." Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas
described the legislation as involving "one of the basic civil rights of
man. Marriage and procreation," he wrote, "are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race." 312 Some twenty-three years
later, Douglas again spoke about marriage as well as privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 313 in which Connecticut's prohibition against
the use of contraceptives by married persons was held
unconstitutional.
Up to this point, procreation and marriage were obviously
linked. But in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 314 the Court extended the Griswold rule on contraception to unmarried persons on an equal protection theory. Justice Brennan's opinion in Eisenstadt probably
generated more confusion about sexual privacy for the unmarried
than any other Supreme Court opinion,315 largely because he did not
make it clear whether Eisenstadt extended to single persons the associational intimacy implicit in Griswold's recognition of the marriage
relationship, or merely the right of access to contraceptives.
The central issue (for our purposes) in analyzing the contraception and abortion cases is whether they are based on definitions of
privacy or liberty broad enough to include sexual relations - as distinguished from decisions to prevent or terminate pregnancies outside marriage. The Court's attitude toward sex outside marriage
is not that difficult to detect, even in the language and reasoning employed in Eisenstadt and Griswold. In his concurring opinion in Griswold, for example, Justice Goldberg wrote that the constitutionality
of Connecticut's laws against adultery and fornication was "beyond
doubt," and that the Griswold holding "in no way interferes with a
311. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
312. 316 U.S. at 541.
313. 381 U.S. 497 (1961); see note 242 supra and accompanying text.
314. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
315. See Morse, Family Law in Transition: From Traditional Families to Individual Liberties, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 327 (V. Tufte & B. Myerholfeds. 1979) (In Eisenstadt, the Court reflected "a profound shift in public attitudes toward sexual behavior" among
the unmarried); see also note 382 iefra and accompanying text.
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State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct."316
The opinion that has emerged over time as the most respected treatment of the Griswold case (especially as the Court has relocated the
right of privacy in due process liberty)317 is Justice Harlan's dissent
in Poe v. Ullman ,318 a predecessor to Griswold. On the issue of extramarital sex, Harlan wrote:
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal context in which children
are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication, and homosexual practices ... [confine] sexuality to lawful marriage, [and] form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our
social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon
that basis.319

Even in Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan's opinion conceded the legislature "a full measure of discretion in fashioning means to prevent
fornication," 320 but he did not believe it was the purpose of the contraception statute at issue to regulate sexual relations. 321 Rather, he
saw the law only as prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives.
The relationship between sexual privacy and contraception became even more focused in Carey v. Population Services International.322 In Carey the Court found unconstitutional a New York
statute forbidding the sale of contraceptives to married or unmarried
persons under age sixteen. Though based on the right of privacy,
Carey conveyed an unmistakable concern with protecting teenagers
against venereal disease and unwanted pregnancies.323 The Court
had no objection to the state's policy of reducing the incidence of
premarital sex, but could see no evidence that withholding the availability of contraceptives accomplished that goal. Several of the Justices went out of their way to explain that they did not see Carey as
establishing a constitutional right of sexual privacy for minors. In316. 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
317. See note 263 supra and accompanying text.
318. 367 U.S. at 497 (1961).
319. 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
320. 405 U.S. at 449.
321. 405 U.S. at 448. In Justice Brennan's subsequent opinion in Carey v. Population
Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977), he wrote (quoting, in part, from Justice Blackmun's opinion in
Roe v. Wade) that "no court or commentator has taken the argument seriously" that laws
limiting contraceptives and abortions were passed for the primary purpose of discouraging
illicit sex. "The reason for this unanimous rejection was stated in Eisenstadt v. Baird: 'It
would be plainly unreasonable to assume that [the State] has prescribed pregnancy and the
birth of an unwanted child [or the physical and psychological dangers of an abortion] as punishment for fornication.' ... We remain reluctant to attribute any such 'scheme of values' to
the State.'' 431 U.S. at 694-95 (citations omitted).
322. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
323. See notes 221-25 supra and accompanying text.
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deed, Justices White and Stevens both regarded that inference as
"frivolous."324 Justice Rehnquist cited Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney325 for the proposition that, "[w]hile we have not ruled on
every conceivable regulation affecting [sexual] conduct[,] the facial
constitutional validity of criminal statutes prohibiting certain consensual acts has been 'definitively' established."326 In the majority
opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that "the Court has not definitively
answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [sexual] behavior among
adults." 327 This difference of opinion about the "definitive" status of
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney between Justices Rehnquist and
Brennan is attributable to the ambiguous status of a summary affirmance. 328 Yet neither interpretation grants authority to conclude
that the Court has protected sex outside marriage. The Court later
denied certiorari from a decision upholding the discharge of two employees of a public library for adulterous cohabitation, which has no
significance as a precedent; something about the Court's attitudes,
however, is revealed by noting that the decision not to hear the case
was made over the recorded - and, in one case, vigorous - dissents
of Justices Marshall and Brennan.329 It appears that most of the Justices have consciously been unwilling to extend a right of sexual privacy to unmarried persons.
Some people nevertheless assume there is no material distinction
between the decision to have sexual relations and the decision to use
a contraceptive. They assume that if there is a constitutional right to
prevent conception, there must be a right to cause conception; and
324. 431 U.S. at 703 (White, J., concurring); 431 U.S. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Powell added, "Neither our precedents nor sound principles of constitutional analysis require state legislation to meet the exacting 'compelling state interest' standard whenever it
implicates sexual freedom." 431 U.S. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring).
325. 425 U.S. 901 (1976); see note 268 supra and accompanying text.
326. 431 U.S. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
327. 431 U.S. at 694 n.17.
328. In .Doe the Court had summarily affirmed a three-judge federal district court. 425
U.S. 901 (1976). Justice Rehnquist's citation of .Doe in Carey was followed by a citation to
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975), which discussed a number of authorities holding
that a summary affirmance by the Court is to be considered a disposition on the merits. The
academic community had also taken .Doe seriously enough that it caused "surprise and dis•
may" among those who had read "Griswold and its progeny . . . as leading toward a constitutional right of sexual freedom." Grey, supra note 10, at 85. Some of that reaction may have
stemmed from criticism of the Court for disposing of .Doe without hearing arguments or writing an opinion, even if affirmance of the result was on the merits. See G. GUNTHER, supra
note 236, at 641.
329. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1052-58 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); see notes 268-69 supra and accompanying text; see also
text following note 293 supra.
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hence, the freedom to have sexual relations must be implied, since
otherwise no conception is possible. However, these steps in reasoning do not logically flow from the premises of the contraception
cases. Justice Brennan did cloud the issue somewhat when he said in
Eisenstadt that the right of privacy protects "the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."330 This broad language has led some to characterize the Skinner-Griswold-Eisenstadt line of cases as protecting a
"right of procreative autonomy."331
The contraception cases do not stretch that far. Justice Brennan
later spoke more precisely of the "individual's right to decide to prevent conception."332 The actual holding of the contraceptive cases
can hardly mean otherwise, since the only laws addressed by the
Court have been those that interfered with one's right to prevent conception. Skinner earlier dealt with the ability to cause conception,
but only in the context of state action that would have resulted in
permanent sterilization. Thus, the Court's decision preserved Skinner's reproductive capacity 333 until such time as he could exercise it
according to the laws that specify, in Justice Harlan's phrase, "when
the sexual powers may be used."3 34
Contraception and sexual relations are simply two different
things, one of which can be given legal protection without protecting
the other. The teenage promiscuity problem reflected in Carey
makes the distinction clear:
Common sense indicates that many young people will engage in sexual
activity regardless of what the New York Legislature does . . . .

. . . It is as though a State decided to dramatize its disapproval of
motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets. One need not
posit a constitutional right to ride a motorcycle to characterize such a
330. 405 U.S. at 453.
331. L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 944; IJevelopments, supra note 10, at 1184.
332. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688.
333. 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting). One federal appellate court has observed that
it may seem logical to infer a right of sexual privacy from the Court's decisions protecting
procreative liberty, since "the [procreative] right becomes meaningless in the absence of a willmg partner." Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 797 (5th Cir. 1975). However, a case like Skinner
does "not guarantee the individual a procreative opportunity," it merely safeguards "his procreative potential from state infringement." 517 F.2d at 797.
334. 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This language echoes Justice Marshall's observation in Zablocki, that since marriage is "the only relationship in which the State . . .
allows sexual relations to take place," one's ability to marry should not be unduly restricted.
The Court's language is fully quoted at note 205 supra. Yet, laws specifying age limits as a
condition of marriage do not interfere with the constitutional right to marry. "A minor not
permitted to marry before the age of majority is required simply to postpone her decision. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for later marriage should they continue
to desire it." Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (plurality opinion).
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restriction as irrational and perverse.335

Pursuing an analogy to this reasoning, it is quite possible that the
availability of procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights creates a
greater incidence of criminal activity than if there were no such
guarantees. This does not mean that allowing criminals constitutional rights makes their crimes lawful.336
The separate nature of contraception and sexual relations appears in other contexts, as well. For example, some groups in society
have long regarded contraception, within or outside marriage, as an
evil totally separate from the act of sexual relations. Some who hold
this view would compare the use of certain contraceptives more to
abortion than to anything else, because they see in such contraception a violation of natural processes or a self-induced abortion. Additionally, were a state to enact a law requiring contraception by
women who had borne, say, two children, the Court's contraception
cases would probably prohibit such regulation, as noted in Justice
Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold. 331 These instances illustrate
that the subject of contraception does raise serious issues of its own,
quite without regard to sexual privacy.
The abortion cases provide no greater recognition of a general
right of sexual liberty outside marriage. Roe v. Wade 338 applied to
single as well as married women, and most of the abortion decisions,
including those involving minors, have relied explicitly on the right
of privacy. However,Roe rejected a broad right of individual autonomy allowing one to "do with one's body as one pleases."339 Moreover, since Roe, the Court has clearly placed abortion and
contraception together as decisions "whether or not to beget or bear
a child," which are "at the very heart of [the] cluster of constitutionally protected choices" involved in "marriage," "family relationships," and "child rearing." 340 It should also be noted that the
constitutional right developed in the contraception cases (which preceded the abortion cases) did not necessarily require the results
335. 431 U.S. 714-15 (Stevens, J., concurring).
336. See Grey, supra note 10, at 88 n.31.
337. While it may shock some ofmy Brethren that the Court today holds that the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe
that the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection
against such totalitarian limitation of family size, which is at complete variance with our
constitutional concepts.
381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
338. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
339. See notes 263-65 supra and accompanying text.
340. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
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achieved in the abortion cases.341
The minors' abortion cases have also developed in a way that
suggests that the right of privacy developed by the Court is intended
to protect specific liberty interests related to marriage and childbearing more than it is to authorize a general right of personal autonomy.
These cases brought to the Supreme Court, for the first time, a confrontation between the alleged constitutional rights of parents and
the rights of their child, with both claims arising from the same line
of cases. The assumptions one makes about the cast of characters
involved in these cases are crucial. When the minor is seen as herself
a potential parent, the situation becomes unique - which is how the
Court has treated minors' rights to abortions as distinguished from
other choice rights to which minors might arguably be entitled.342
The Court's contraception and abortion cases do not depart from
the touchstones of marriage and kinship as the criteria for determining the relational and sexual interests protected by the Constitution,
even though the cases include single, unmarried persons. In a broad
sense, these are "simply family planning cases" which represent "two
standard conservative views":
that social stability is threatened by excessive population growth; and
that family stability is threatened by unwanted pregnancies, with their
accompanying fragile marriages, single-parent families, irresponsible
youthful parents, and abandoned or neglected children.343

The cases speak in terms of individual privacy because "[t]he conventions of constitutional adjudication of course demanded that the
decisions be justified, not on the basis of social stability, but in the
language of individual rights." 344 In addition, the interests given
protection in these cases really are different from sexual activity per
341. The arguably countervailing interest of the fetus in an abortion case poses an obstacle
to a negative decision about childbearing not present in the case of contraception. Indeed, the
Roe Court could logically have concluded that the state interest in protecting the unborn was
strong enough to override a pregnant woman's right of privacy, without seriously challenging
the parental and other family rights established in the line of cases stretching from Meyer v.
Nebraska to Eisenstadt. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 71, at 775. In a sense, a pregnant
woman and an unborn child each has her own kind of claim on the interests of life and liberty
in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The proposition that a pregnant woman
may unilaterally determine the fate of an unborn child is no easier to defend than the proposition that a state may unilaterally require a pregnant woman to carry an unborn child to its
birth, especially when doing so poses no serious risk to her. How the matter is determined
turns entirely on the choice one makes, a priori, about the nature of an unborn child. Given
the Court's implicit assumption that a fetus is not close enough to being either "life" or a
"person" to warrant its own constitutional protection, Roe is consistent with the constitutional
interest in advancing the private sanctity of childbearing decisions. Without that assumption,
Roe must simply be rejected.
342. See note 234 supra and accompanying text.
343. Grey, supra note 10, at 88.
344. Id
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se, because sex unrelated to childbearing "does not produce the same
kind of nearly irrevocable effects, nor spring from the same deep
well of cultural values as do decisions about marriage, procreation,
or child rearing." 345
These cases can also be seen as arising from kinship interests.
The decision whether to use a contraceptive may be seen as the earliest manifestation of a potential child-parent relationship. 346 If the
contraceptive is not used and conception occurs, a very serious commitment arises. The abortion right allows one more opportunity to
make the childbearing choice. For unmarried persons, contraception and abortion are not decisions concerning long-term commitments to one's sexual partner; they are decisions concerning longterm commitments to one's own potential offspring. Similarly, a single woman's relational interest with her sexual partner does not give
rise to constitutional protection for her decision; rather, it is her potential relational interest with her child. In this sense, her decision
involves, in Hawthorne's words, "a quality of awful sacredness in the
relation between this mother and this child."347 Such decisions affect
the earliest possible creation of kinship. This aspect of contraception
and abortion reflects the overtones of relational - as distinguished
from individual - interests in the family privacy cases. To see the
cases totally as reflections of individual privacy is to miss that point.
Family means relationships, permanent relationships; and permanent relationships are established by marriage and kinship. 348
345. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 71, at 774.
346. Marriage, contraception, and abortion "clearly delineate a sphere of interests. • • .
At the core of this sphere is the right of the individual to make for himself . . . the fundamental decisions that shape family life: whom to marry; whether and when to have children; and
with what values to rear those children." Id at 772.
341. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
348. Marriage and kinship are relational interests. They are not individual interests that
exist separate and apart from a relationship with another person. In Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), the Court said "the constitutionally protected privacy of family,
marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing is not just concerned with a particular
place, but with a protected intimate relationship." 413 U.S. at 66 n.13 (emphasis added). The
categorizing of relational interests as a distinct category from interests in property and personal•
ity is largely attributable to the work of Dean Leon Green in the field of tort law. See generally L. GREEN, W. PEDRICK, J. RAHL, E. THODE, C. HAWKINS, A. SMITH & J. TREECE,
ADVANCED TORTS: INJURIES TO BUSINESS, POLITICAL AND FAMILY INTERESTS (1977); L.
GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 413-507 (1965). This category recognizes
family, trade, political, professional, and general social relationships. Injuries to these relationships may result in damage actions for such torts as wrongful death, loss of consortium,
interference with contractual relations, and defamation. In each case, the injury is to the relational interest between two or more parties, as distinguished from an injury to one's person or
one's property. It is, by definition, not possible for a compensable injury to occur in the absence of a legally protected relationship. Roscoe Pound had written earlier about "interests in
domestic relations." See Pound, supra note 21, at 177. With relational interests of the family
in mind, Henry Foster has observed that "there has been a historical evolution from the group
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It is not my purpose to defend the results of the abortion and
contraception cases, especially since many of the results were not
compelled by the principles on which the Court relied. I have only
sought to show that these cases are consistent with those previously
discussed in not protecting sexual privacy for the unmarried and in
not disturbing the preferred legal status given to formal marriage
and kinship. At the same time, it is only fair to observe that Eisenstadt, Roe, Carey, and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 349 - even
though they do not pierce the veil of marriage and kinship - may
not seriously further the purposes of giving extraordinary legal preference to the family. It is arguably a complete perversion of the liberty of parenthood to believe that a woman may terminate a
pregnancy because of some variation on the theme of a "parental"
right. If the fetus she carries is significant enough to give rise to such
a lofty claim, it is significant enough to bar an abortion as the earliest
form of child abuse. And if these really are rights pertaining to kinship, why does the father of an unborn child have nothing to say
about the decision to continue or terminate the pregnancy?350 Surely
it is not because the state "cannot 'delegate to a spouse a veto power
interests of the family presided over by the paterfamilias, to an increased recognition of individual interests of family members and the social interest in both individuals and the family
group." Foster, supra note 20, at 494. Thus, the interests of family members in their relationships with one another are individual, not group, interests; however, the individual interest
involved is best understood as a relational interest with one or more other persons. Furthermore, the permanent character and the inherent obligations of the relational family interest
make the interest one of "status and its incidents." Id. at 494; see Conclusion iefra.
These observations have several implications for analyzing the nature of legally protected
family interests. For example, "the family" is not to be regarded (as it was in earlier centuries)
as a group entity consisting of husband and wife as one person (the husband) and their children as their chattels. Under modern concepts, the family consists of persons having important relational interests in their ties to one another, with those interests enforceable by
individual parties to the relationship. Thus, while the use of individual rights doctrines may
be clumsy in some family contexts, the use of those doctrines by no means signifies "changes in
the structure of American family life." L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 987. Moreover, an unmarried individual's personality right to sexual privacy or sexual gratification is not logically inferable from the protections the Court has confined to certain relational interests. Asserted rights
to adult companionships outside marriage may stand on a different footing because the nature
of the asserted right is relational; however, without marriage or kinship, the impermanent
nature of the relationship would still disqualify it. It is, therefore, not as puzzling as it may
seem that the Court has located a series of constitutionally protectable values "principally . . .
in the 'area' (at least the Court sees it as an area) of sex-marriage-childbearing-childrearing
. . . ," even though it may have appeared that "[t]he Court has offered little assistance to one's
understanding of what it is that makes all this a unit." Ely, The Supreme .Court, 1977 Term Foreword.· On /Jiscovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 11 & n.40 (1978). The
conceptual "unit" that binds these family-related decisions is the notion of a permanent, relational interest. Only interests relating to marriage and kinship comprise such a conceptual
unit.
349. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
350. See 428 U.S. 52.
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which the state itself'" does not possess, 351 because the liberty interest of biological kinship originates "not in state law, but in intrinsic
human rights" that are "entirely apart from the power of the
State."352 Justice Blackmun tells us further that "when the wife and
the husband disagree" about having an abortion, "the view of only
one of the two marriage partners can prevail."353 Yet if that same
unborn child were carried to term, both parents would have the authority to withhold consent to placing the child for adoption.
Neither would have a "veto power" over the interests of the other,
because each literally has a kinship interest. How is "potential life"
any different, when it has been created by the most equal of joint
ventures? The difference, we are told, is that "the woman . . . physically bears the child" and is "more directly and immediately affected
by the pregnancy."354 If the direct effects of pregnancy are the
source of her interest, it is difficult to see how those effects - except
in the case of a therapeutic abortion - could outweigh the traditional interest of the Constitution in family relationships and childrearing, an interest the father has and will continue to have if the
child is born and raised - no matter which parent then carries the
heavier physical burdens of childrearing.
The Court also tells us, on the one hand, that "the guiding role of
parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors," and that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of
the State."355 But, on the other hand, it tells us that the State "does
not have the constitutional authority" to delegate to a "third party"
(like a father and mother) the right to control their minor child's
decision about an abortion, because the State cannot give authority it
does not have.356 Elsewhere the Court destroys its own nondelegation argument by acknowledging that parental authority derives not
from the State, but from "intrinsic human rights." 357
In another context, the Court rejects the historic jurisprudential
concept for objectively determining mature capacity in favor of a
"mature minor'' rule it seems to have discovered, but which does not
351. 428 U.S. at 69 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375
(E.D. Mo. 1975)).
352. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER), 431
U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (footnote omitted).
353. 428 U.S. at 71.
354. 428 U.S. at 71.
355. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979) (plurality opinion).
356. 428 U.S. at 74.
357. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER), 431
U.S. 816, 845 (1977).
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exist in a common law tradition full of cases and standards for parental consent to medical treatments on minors. 358 Then, ironically,
the Court decides that if a minor woman is not mature enough to
make her own choice, she should look - not to her parents, for they
might have a bias - but to a trial judge (who is presumably without
biases) for a determination of whether an abortion is in her best interests. Thus the Court rejects still another fundamental principle of
family law, that parents should supervise the medical choices of minors lacking capacity, unless the parents are incompetent - then
and only then, the State should step in as parent.
In the contraception cases, it is one thing to respect the privacy,
the sexual intimacy, and the procreation choices of a married couple,
as Griswold does. It is one thing to protect permanent procreative
capacity, as Skinner does. But it is.quite another to speak of "procreation choices" for unmarried persons and promiscuous teenagers.
They do not live in recognized intimate relationships, nor do they
face the permanent deprivations of sterilization. If some single person is so concerned about not entering into a child-parent relationship, let her abstain from sexual relations - the State has not
foreclosed that alternative, nor does the Constitution prize her sexual
relations independent of childbearing issues. If teenagers threaten
themselves and each other with the risks of venereal disease and unwanted pregnancies, they need protection. Finding that protection is
a difficult issue of social policy; it is not necessarily the duty of a
constitutional right whose purpose is to sustain serious family relationships of a kind implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
Perhaps John Noonan is right in believing that the rationale of
Eisenstadt was created with Roe in mind, since Roe was argued
before Eisenstadt was handed down. 359 Perhaps he is even right that
these two cases can be read as implicitly rejecting the family unit so
carefully nourished through Meyer and Pierce and Griswold in favor
of "a society of isolated individuals." 360 The close timing between
Eisenstadt and Roe may tell us that the Court was simply committed
to invalidating state abortion laws because it was convinced they
were wrong, and Eisenstadt would broaden the theoretical base.
And perhaps it has all turned out to be the Supreme Court's own
kind of Vietnam. Somehow, with good intentions, the Justices may
have gotten mired into an abortion land war, carried away by the
358. See note 238 supra and accompanying text.
359. J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 21
(1979).
360. Id
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mysterious charisma of "privacy.'' Even if all that is true, they seem
now to have begun their disengagement before it is too late. The
experience since Roe shows a tendency to pull back, a desire to fix a
mistake by calling substantive due process what it is, and a determination not to cross into the never-never land of sexual privacy for
unmarried couples.
H. Sexual Privacy for the Unmarried?

Even though, as Thomas Grey correctly observed, "the Court has
given no support to the notion that the right of privacy protects sexual freedom," 361 many commentators362 and a few lower courts363
have assumed otherwise. The foregoing summary demonstrates that
a right of sexual freedom cannot reasonably be inferred from the
procreative rights recognized by the Court,3 64 nor has the Court developed a general right of personal privacy or autonomy broad
enough to include sex outside marriage.365 Still, some have read into
the cases a basis for sexual liberty on slightly different grounds.
One approach puts Stanley v. Georgia 366 together with Eisenstadt
and finds that the right of privacy protects "decisions" to "seek sexual gratification," - including gratification from ''what at least once
was commonly regarded as 'deviant' conduct"367 - made voluntarily by adults in a "noncommercial, private setting."368 Putting the
361. Grey, supra note 10, at 86.
362. See note 10 supra.
363. E.g., State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (sodomy statute unconstitutional
as applied to unmarried consenting heterosexual couple); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381
A.2d 333 (1977) (fornication statute violates right of privacy); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,
415 N.E.2d 936,434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980) (statute prohibiting consensual sodomy violates right
of privacy and equal protection), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio,
490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980) (statute prohibiting voluntary deviate sex between unmarried
persons has no rational basis and violates equal protection). Contra, State v. Bateman, 113
Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 864 (1976); State v. Elliot, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d
1352 (1976); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I., 1980). In general, "only a very few decisions
have led to the invalidation or narrowing" of criminal sex laws, partly because "most courts
[have] managed to circumvent the issue." Note, supra note 32, at 720. For a summary of these
cases, see id; see also Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 636 (1974).
364. See Part II G supra.
365. See Part II F supra.
366. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Any reliance on Stanley's libertarian overtones - even among
"consenting adults" -is probably misplaced since Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973). See text at notes 251-58 supra.
367. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
368. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). The "private settings" in Onofre included "an automobile parked on a street in the City of Buffalo in the early morning hours," and a "truck
parked on a street in a residential area of the city about 1:30 a.m." 51 N.Y.2d at 484, 415
N.E.2d at 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
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right of sexual freedom in "gratification" terms gives rise to an important issue about the whole theory of determining what is meant
by "liberty" in the due process clause. An analogy to the relationship between obscenity and the first amendment will make the point.
Since the question first arose in 1942, the Court has regarded obscenity as expression outside of first amendment protection. 369 The
basis for this categorization has been the Court's view that obscenity
has not "the slightest redeeming social importance" because its only
purpose is to appeal "to prurient interest." 370 In Miller v. Cal!fornia,311 the Court's most recent attempt to state a comprehensive test
for defining obscenity, the Court reiterated the basis for distinguishing between protected and obscene speech:
[T]o equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate
with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand
conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom . . . . The First Amendment protects works
which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a majority of the
people approve of the ideas these works represent. "The protection
given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people," . . . But the public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial gain, is a different matter. 372

Free speech has thus enjoyed a preferred constitutional status in
large part because of the relationship of unrestrained discourse to the
underlying political theory of democracy. Some social interest or
public good has been served by the first amendment - it does not
exist solely to protect immediate individual liberty without regard to
larger interests. As the obscenity category illustrates, "[t]he scope of
First Amendment protection is determined by the rationale underlying freedom of speech."373 Similarly, the scope of privacy as part of
due process liberty should be determined by the rationale that underlies its protected status.374
369. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
370. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 487 (1957).
371. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
372. 413 U.S. at 34-35 (citations omitted). Consider also Justice Stevens's illustration:
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise
what is said, every school child can understand why our duty to defend the right to speak
remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theatre of our
choice.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
373. Schauer, supra note 298, at 909.
374. See Part III infra.

540

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:463

With this background, a comparison of obscenity and "gratification" will lead to a comparison of the proper analytical approaches
to both free speech and privacy. Frederick Schauer has written that
the key to understanding the Court's treatment of hard-core pornography as nonspeech (for first amendment purposes) is in realizing
that the primary purpose of pornography is to produce sexual excitement - it does not intend to communicate intellectual content.
"The pornographic item is in a real sense a sexual surrogate. It takes
pictorial or linguistic form only because some individuals achieve
sexual gratification by those means."375 Thus, "[t]he concept fundamental to the Miller test is that material appealing to the prurient
interest is sex, and not merely describing or advocating sex."376 But
if one now, in the name of privacy, extends constitutional protection
to the right to seek sexual gratification, there would obviously be a
right to pursue anything that responds only to the prurient interest.
A fortiori, the Court would be forced to change its entire approach to
obscenity - not because of new light on the first amendment, but
because under this approach, privacy includes the pure gratification
that speech excludes. In addition, problems nearly as vexing as defining obscenity could arise in attempting to define a "noncommercial, private setting."377
If obscenity "demeans the grand conception of the first amendment and its high purposes in the struggle for freedom," mere gratification, apart from any reference to relationships or procreation (let
alone marriage or kinship), 378 is likely to demean the grand conception of due process liberty and its high purposes. That proposition
can best be tested by reference to the conceptual origins and the purposes of the family privacy cases. When that is done, 379 it is not
difficult to see that a gratification test for constitutional liberty is just
as demeaning when applied to the fourteenth amendment as it is
375. Schauer, supra note 298, at 922.
376. Id at 928.
377. The New York Court of Appeals considered vehicles parked on residential streets to
be "private" settings. See note 368 supra. As for defining "commercial," consider State v.
Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court found a
fornication statute to violate the "fundamental right of privacy" of two men who engaged in
sexual relations with two women in a parked car. The women, both of whom had been arrested in the past for prostitution, agreed to have sexual relations with the men in exchange for
"reefers." When the men admitted they had no reefers, the women "indignantly demanded
$10 for each act of sexual intercourse," which the men refused "and the argument became
more heated." 75 NJ. at 205, 381 A.2d at 335. Noncommercial? This entire misguided approach derives from the tendency to equate "privateness" with substantive values deserving
constitutional recognition. See notes 302-08 supra and accompanying text.
378. See note 348 supra.
379. See Part I supra.
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when applied to the first amendment.380
Another argued justification for extending sexual liberty to the
unmarried is the idea, derived from Eisenstadt's equal protection origins, that discrimination regarding private or intimate decisions on
the basis of marital status is impermissible.381
This equal protection theory offers little help to those seeking
protection for informal relationships. Amid the "nearly incomprehensible muddle"382 of the Eisenstadt opinion, it is clear that Justice
Brennan's opinion for the majority of four relied on the rational basis test, making no attempt to identify a fundamental right or to imply the need for any degree of heightened scrutiny with
classifications based on marital status.383 Moreover, since Eisenstadt, the Court has unanimously upheld a classification explicitly
based on marital status, even though the classification arguably impinged on the right to marry, 384 because "[c]lassification based on
marital status has been an accepted classification" in a large variety
of regulatory contexts.385 Indeed, the maintenance of legal discrimination between the married and the unmarried not only literally determines a state's ability to regulate marriage as a social institution,
but also governs important individual relational interests that have
long since inhered in the marriage relationship, from property interests to taxes and torts.
By going outside marriage to protect the rights of illegitimate
380. Even some who are persuaded by certain aspects of a proposed expansion of constitutionally protected "lifestyles" are "wary of creating, in the high name of constitutional right,
nothing more than a regime of self gratification and indulgence." Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection far Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 625 (1977).
381. This was an alternate basis for the decision in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 49192, 415 N.E.2d 936, 942-43, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 953 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
See notes 367-68 and accompanying text. It was also relied on by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in holding unconstitutional a statute that prohibited "deviate" sex between persons who
were not husband and wife. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 90, 98-99, 415 A.2d 47, 51-52
(1980). The defendants in the case were the owner and several employees of an adult theatre
in which the dancers engaged in acts prohibited by the statute with members of the audience
who had paid admission fees. 490 Pa. at 101,415 A.2d at 52 (Nix, J., dissenting). The Court
also quoted Mill's On Liberty at length, 490 Pa. at 96-98, 415 A.2d at 50-51, even though no
right of privacy was mentioned in the case, presumably because of the commercial setting.
Relying on state power to regulate liquor consumption under the twenty-first amendment, the
Supreme Court had upheld a regulation prohibiting almost identical conduct in a live entertainment bar. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
382. Grey, supra note 10, at 88. Dean Wellington observed that Eisenstadt "abandoned"
"any effort at analysis." Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional .Double Standards:
Some Notes on At(judication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 297 (1973).
383. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) ("The question for our determination in
this case is whether there is some ground of difference that rationally explains the different
treatment accorded married and unmarried persons . . . .").
384. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
385. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 403 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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children, the rights of unwed parents in their children, and the right
of unmarried women to prevent or terminate a pregnancy, the Court
has obviously established that marriage is not the sole criterion for
locating constitutional rights related to family interests. We have already seen, however, that the rights of illegitimate children do not
give constitutional sanction to the relation.ship between their parents.
The interests that have been recognized in the child-parent relationship outside marriage are based on the biological kinship tie that has
so long been acknowledged as a source of extraordinary protection.
There is no such tie between the parents of an illegitimate child, or
between other cohabiting couples. Only marriage creates a tie of
that character between unrelated adults. Similarly, rights to prevent
or terminate a pregnancy, as noted previously,386 arise from such
factors as the law's unwillingness to force the creation of an unwanted child-parent kinship tie - again out of respect for the
profound nature of kinship.
If these distinctions seem to quibble over metaphysical technicalities, a broader substantive justification emerges from the underlying
policies that have led to constitutional protection for the exclusive
"cluster of constitutionally protected choices" deliberately limited to
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationship, and child
rearing and education."387 These underlying policies, discussed previously,388 have no primary interest in sex per se. The Constitution
does not protect marriage simply because there is "gratification"
there, or because marriages exist in such "property" as a home, or
because the regulation of any intimacy is akin to an unreasonable
search and seizure.389 Rather, as Justice Harlan put it, marriage and
the home derive their preeminence from being "the seat offamily
/!fe. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that
it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of more
than one explicitly granted constitutional right." 390 The sexual relationship that is part of marriage is "necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the
State . . . always and in every age . . . has fostered and protected."391 Stated another way by Dean Harry Wellington:
Love and sexual gratification can and do exist outside of marriage and
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

See Part II G supra.
Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (citations omitted).
See Part I supra.
See Part II F supra.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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they can and do fail to exist in marriage, but this is not the point. The
point is that the state has undertaken to sponsor one institution that
has at its core the love-sex relationship. That relationship demands liberty in the practice of the sexual act.392
The sexual relationship alone, then, commands no protection outside
marriage.
This society's normative and legal tradition of maintaining laws
that "provide ... when the sexual powers may be used ... [and
confine] sexuality to lawful marriage" 393 is not a trivial basis for discrimination. It is, rather, in Justice Harlan's words, a very deliberate
"pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that
any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis."394 To extend constitutionally sanctioned sexual privacy beyond
marriage would not only depart from that pattern, it would seriously
undermine it. Indeed, "not to discriminate" between fornication and
sex within marriage ''would entirely misconceive" the point of giving
marriage a preferred constitutional status.395 We saw in Part I,
supra, some portion of the policy basis for the constitutional protection given to marriage. If, in deference to sexual liberty for unmarried persons, discrimination on the basis of marital status were
made, say, a suspect classification, we would put at risk the entire
foundation of those concepts. 396
There is at least a rational basis for distinguishing between sex
within marriage and sex outside marriage. More than that, there is
ample justification for the conclusion Justice Harlan said had been
reached by "every society in civilized times," for "confining sexuality
392. Wellington, supra note 382, at 292 (emphasis added). Karl Llewellyn has also noted
that the functions of marriage include
[r]egulation, then, of sex contacts; above all, an astounding reduction of conflict between
men over women. Without permanency of relation this seems difficult for our civilization
to achieve. An evening in a sailor's dive will prove persuasive . . . . A partner who can
leave at will is still in the market.
A proper sailor's prostitute can offer comfort but hardly such a foothold. Concubinate, that may be gone tomorrow, is more; it sometimes suffices; as an institution it is
not enough.
Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1288, 1294 n.31 (1932)
(citation omitted).
393. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
394. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
395. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
396. "Democracy began by freeing the desires, and whether it lives or dies depends on its
ability somehow to domesticate them; not to suppress them, but to so arrange matters as to
ensure that the freed desires are made compatible with civil society." W. BERNS, supra note
57, at 223. Berns derives some authority for his view from De Tocqueville's observation that,
''No free communities ever existed without morals . . . ." A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 233 (R. Heffner ed. 1956).
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to lawful marriage."397 Sexual privacy outside marriage is not warranted by an unlimited, grand view of personal autonomy; it is not
part of "procreative" freedom; "gratification" holds no special place
in the constitutional scheme; and discrimination between the married and the unmarried is not only supportable, but is essential to the
historical position of preference this society has so long assigned to
the institution of marriage.3 98
397. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
398. Others have also observed that it has been widely characteristic of modern civilization
to confine sexual expression to marriage. The social importance of this channeling process "is
a view that has been central to modern thought and far more widely accepted in our time than
contemporary versions of the liberalism of John Stuart Mill." Grey, supra note 10, at 91.
Thomas Grey has summarized the writings of Freud, Durkheim, and Weber, documenting
their shared judgment that "communal life, whether in the family or the larger society, depends directly on sexual repression." Id. at 91-93. Not only these writers, but "every thinker
of the great central tradition of the last century's social thought has seen repressed sexuality
and the authoritarian family structure as close to the core of our civilization. Conservative
theorists have defended repression as necessary; revolutionaries have urged that society would
have to be overthrown to free us from its tyranny." Id. at 92. Freud was concerned not only
with civilization's need to "use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive
instincts," s. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 59 (J. Strachey trans. 1961), but
also with occasional harm to the individual psyche by repression. Others, such as Max Weber
and some leading Marxist writers, linked sexual repression to the needs of capitalism, Some
capitalists have understood this link to be based upon the need to maintain order for the sake
of productivity. The Marxists, by contrast, have "argued that the humane goal of sexual liberation could only come with the destruction of capitalism." Grey, supra note 10, at 94.
Contemporary writers such as Christopher Lasch and George Gilder believe the traditional
American sexual ethic serves cultural needs that are more affirmative and far-reaching. For
Lasch, a value transmission system based on the authoritarian family structure has enormous
implications for the development of both individual conscience and public virtue - issues that
bear directly on the underlying purpose for the constitutional preference given to family life.
See C. LASCH, supra note 45; notes 52-63 supra and accompanying text. Gilder deals more
specifically with American sexual attitudes, finding that the country's recent interest in unconventional sexual arrangements promotes "a form of erotic suicide. For it is destroying the
cultural preconditions of profound love and sexuality: the durable heterosexual relationships
necessary to a community of emotional investments and continuities in which children can
find a secure place." G. GILDER, supra note 28, at 5. Gilder argues that female sexuality has a
way of contributing to - perhaps even controlling - the domesticating and civilizing aspects
of life, both for families and for society at large. This civilized domestic realm permits the
moral, aesthetic, religious, social, sexual, and other nurturing values of the community to take
root and flourish; and "(i]n these values consist the ultimate goals of human life." Id. at 245.
The relationship between all this and confining sex to marriage begins with a man's conscious or unconscious desire to identify and keep his offspring. To do this
[h]e must choose a particular woman and submit to her sexual rhythms if he is to have
offspring of his own. His love defines his choice. His need to choose evokes his love. His
sexual drive lends energy to his love and gives shape, meaning, and continuity to his
sexuality. When he selects a specific woman, he in essence defines himself both to himself
and in society. Every sex act thereafter celebrates that definition and social engagement,
Id. at 35.
However, when sexual expression becomes separated from the psychological commitments
of enduring love, it "leads to emotional fragmentation in time rather than to a sense of continuity with nature and society." Id. at 39. As a result, to view sexual experiences "as if they
were optional indulgences rather than the definitive processes of our lives," id. at 7, is to
threaten in a grave sense "a civilization dependent on long-term commitments and sexual
patterns." Id. at 41.
Consider also the observation of D.H. Lawrence:
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TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL TEST FOR FAMILY LIBERTY

A. .Due Process "Liberty," Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, and the
Burden of Proof
In adjudicating constitutionality, a major distinction exists between legislation that should be subjected to minimal judicial scrutiny and legislation that should be subjected to heightened
scrutiny.399 The Supreme Court generally defers to state legislative
judgments by giving them only minimal scrutiny, except when fundamental liberties or suspect classifications are involved. Prior to the
Great Depression, individual economic interests were sometimes
protected by heightened scrutiny as part of due process liberty under
the much debated doctrine of substantive due process.400 During
this same era, the Court, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 401 also recognized
the liberty of parents to direct the rearing of their children as a substantive due process liberty interest, perhaps in part because the
Constitution contains no explicit guarantee for freedoms related to
family interests.402 In 1937,403 the Court made its historic shift to the
present doctrine that legislation regulating economic interests will be
upheld under minimal scrutiny tests so long as the regulation bears
"a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose" and is
"neither arbitrary nor discriminatory."404 With this decline of substantive due process as an accepted source of authority, the Court
based some of its subsequent decisions dealing with protected family
interest on such other heightened scrutiny sources as the equal protection clause,405 the free exercise of religion,406 and the right of priThe instinct of fidelity is perhaps the deepest instinct in the great complex we call sex.
Where there is real sex there is the underlying passion for fidelity. And the prostitute
knows this, because she is up against it. She can only keep men who have no real sex, the
counterfeits: and these she despises. The men with real sex leave her inevitably, as unable to satisfy their real desire.
D. LAWRENCE, supra note 88, at 31.
399. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 236.
400. E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. l
(1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
401. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); accord, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
402. The reason for this omission may be attributable to the Constitution's original interest
in political legislation as distinguished from civil legislation. See Conclusion i'!fra.
403. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). However, it was 1955 before
the Court could state unanimously that "(t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought" Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
404. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
405. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
406. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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vacy. 407 In its most recent family cases, however, the Court has
candidly brought due process liberty out of mothballs. 408 This increasing reliance on substantive due process has been recognized in
one comprehensive survey as "t~e ultimate basis of protection" in
the family cases, which "itself is a constitutional development of major importance."409
Judicial recognition of a substantive due process liberty interest
gives extraordinary constitutional protection to the activity involved.
Such judicial recognition, however, differs substantially from legislative action to accomplish the same result, no matter how similar the
specific decrees may be. To put this difference in perspective, consider the distinctions between these categories of conduct:
(1) protected conduct (such as political speech), which is protected by
a preferred constitutional right;
(2) permitted conduct (such as driving a car), which is the subject
neither of constitutional protection nor of unusual prohibitions;
and
(3) prohibited conduct (such as robbery) which is forbidden by a
criminal sanction or by a classificatory scheme that (sometimes
.harshly) excludes persons in certain categories.

The law creates a natural spectrum with protected activity on one
extreme, prohibited activity on the other extreme, and a broad range
of permitted activity in the middle. We may say that sexual intimacy
between married persons is protected by a constitutional right which
recognizes not only a freedom of procreative choice, but recognizes
that the marriage relationship itself is protected as "intimate to the
degree of being sacred."410 State criminal laws against adultery and
fornication place sexual relationships between the unmarried in the
prohibited category. If a legislature removes such crimes from its
statutory scheme, however, as some states have done,411 sexual conduct between the unmarried moves from category (3) to category (2) .
- it becomes permitted, even though it is not yet protected. Simi407. See Part II F supra.
408. See Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
409. .Developments, supra note 10, at 1161-62. It would unduly broaden the scope of this

Article to plunge fully into the controversial thicket of substantive due process. For present
purposes, I will simply agree with Archibald Cox that:
The Court's persistent resort to notions of substantive due process for almost a century
attests the strength of our natural law inheritance in constitutional adjudication, and I
think it unwise as well as hopeless to resist it.
A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113 (1976).
410. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
411. See Grey, supra note 10, at 95; Note, Fornication, Cohabitation, and the Constitution,
77 MICH. L. REV. 252,254 (1978). ("[Fornication] remains a crime in [only] fifteen states and
the District of Columbia." (footnote omitted)).
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larly, in a custody proceeding, a trial judge may elect to place a child
in the custody of a parent living in unmarried cohabitation. The
judge's action gives the cohabitation a permitted status, but it does
not give it constitutional protection.
The practical difference between permitted and protected conduct is that the state may more easily interfere with permitted conduct than with protected conduct. For example, a cohabiting
custodial parent's moral conduct, considered along with the parent's
overall characteristics in comparison with the other parent's, could
reach levels suggesting that a child's best interests would be served
by a change in custody - and such could be accomplished without
ever implicating a constitutional right.
On the other hand, if a court finds a state's adultery and fornication laws unconstitutional, sexual conduct between consenting adults
takes on a protected status. As a result, the state's interest in promoting traditional sexual morality would be more difficult to sustain in
noncriminal contexts. For instance, New York's highest court recently struck down that state's anti-sodomy law on constitutional
privacy grounds. 412 Shortly thereafter, a lower New York court permitted one adult homosexual to adopt another adult homosexual.
The lower court noted that prior New York case law would have
barred such adoptions as being "against public policy," but that the
more recent privacy case was "dispositive of the public policy issue,"
conveying "eloquent pronouncements [having] considerable import
for the wider public policy consideration of public morality." 413
These cases illustrate that judicial action in removing criminal
penalties against sexual conduct can achieve a very different result
from legislative action toward the same end. Since the justification
for judicial action of this kind must ordinarily be grounded in a constitutional right, decriminalization decisions by the judiciary are
likely to move conduct from category (3) all the way across the spectrum to category (1 ). Legislative decisions to decriminalize are far
less significant, because they move a given kind of conduct only from
category (3) to category (2).
This characteristic of judicial action is often the result of a court's
use of heightened scrutiny in reviewing legislation. For instance, the
412. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,415 N.E.2d 936,434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
413. in re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 106 Misc. 2d 792, 798, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531
(1981). Contra in re Adoption of Adult Anonymous II, 111 Misc. 2d 320,443 N.Y.S.2d 1008
(1981) (Family court in different New York county from Adult Anonymous I disallows adoption between adult males because no child-parent relationship would be created).
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effect of locating a constitutional protection within the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment (as with finding that a constitutional right is "fundamental" for equal protection purposes) is to
place the liberty so recognized almost beyond the reach of legislative
regulation. This result follows from the analytical tests the Court
has applied when legislation invades interests classified among the
most basic of civil liberties. Thus, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,414 a
criminal statute providing for the involuntary sterilization of certain
recidivist offenders was subjected to "strict scrutiny" because the
power of procreation was held to be "one of the basic civil rights of
man," involving matters "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."415 Once such a right is recognized, the Court ordinarily requires the State to show something like a compelling state
interest before allowing the legislation to stand. This has proved in
most cases to be impossible; hence, a finding of unconstitutionality
has usually followed from a finding that strict scrutiny is required.
In Roe v. Wade ,416 the compelling state interest test previously used
only in equal protection cases was applied to state abortion legislation under a due process analysis that categorized "a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" within a right of
privacy protected by "the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty."417 Thus, the state's burden under either due process
or equal protection versions of heightened scrutiny may be much the
same.
Without delving into the various levels of higher judicial scrutiny
that have been required throughout the lore of equal protection and
substantive due process cases, it is sufficient to observe that most of
the Court's opinions recognizing constitutional rights in the adjudication of family interests have subjected the legislation involved to
more than minimal scrutiny. It is largely for that reason that these
rights can be described as protected to an unusual degree, rather
than being merely permitted when authorized by state or federal
law.
·
Before exploring the tests to be employed in determining whether
a particular interest should be classified in one of these highly protected categories, it is important to observe the procedural effect of
the classification, because that effect shifts the burden of proof.
Often, the burden of proof has thereby been shifted as a beginning
414.
415.
416.
. 417.

316
316
410
410

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

535 (1942).
at 541.
113 (1973) .
at 153.
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assumption prior to any serious analysis of the interests involved.
Roe v. Wade illustrates the effect of the heightened scrutiny tests on
difficult issues of social policy. An overriding issue in Roe was when
life begins. If fetal life were thought to begin in the early stages of
pregnancy, the obvious interests of an unborn child would have prevented the legalizing of nontherapeutic abortions. If, on the other
hand, life were thought to begin at some later stage, a pregnant woman's choice about abortion could be constitutionally protected.
Unfortunately, no one knew in 1973 and no one has since known at least not in any demonstrable, objective sense - exactly when life
begins. In the absence of empirical proof, an assumption had to be
made about the nature of life and when it begins. The state legislatures enacting the statutes at issue in Roe had obviously made their
own factual assumptions in favor of something close enough to life
to warrant the protection of criminal laws. Under traditional minimal scrutiny tests of constitutional law, the Supreme Court would
have deferred to this legislative finding of fact. In the abortion cases,
however, the Court began with the premise, that a pregnant woman
has a constitutional right of privacy. It also assumed that the compelling state interest test applied to privacy cases. In thus classifying
abortion as a privacy issue, the Court essentially shifted to the state
the burden of proving the fetus was alive.418 This the state could not
prove, just as opposing counsel could not prove the fetus was not
alive. The Court thereby made a factual assumption - in the absence of concrete evidence - that a fetus is not life. Ironically, the
Court's majority opinion modestly stated it was not determining
when life begins. This statement was technically correct. But letting
the compelling state interest test shift the burden of proof had precisely the same practical effect as if the Court had determined there
is in fact no life prior to the third trimester of pregnancy.
There are enormous implications in shifting the burden of proof
from those who challenge an existing factual assumption to those
who -y,rould sustain it. For one thing, it is simply not possible either
418. The Court did not expressly shift the burden to the State. An analysis of its reasoning, however, shows how such a shift took place. The Court recognized that if a fetus is a
person within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, "the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment."
410 U.S. at 156-57. Texas further contended that, even if the fourteenth amendment did not
specifically apply to fetuses, "(L]ife begins at conception ... and ... therefore, the State has
a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception." 410 U.S. at 159. The
Court dismissed the State's claim because of the ''wide divergence of thinking on this most
sensitive and difficult question." 410 U.S. at 160. Uncertainty could allow a woman's decision
to abort only if the burden to prove that life begins at conception fell upon the State. The
Court's recognition of the State's interest in protecting potential life, 410 U.S. at 162, does not
obscure the location of the burden to prove when life begins.
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to prove or to disprove conclusively the individual and social risks at
stake in many normative presuppositions that underlie our culture.419 As a result, the placing of the burden of proof in such cases
will usually determine the outcome. If that burden is placed on the
state in cases that effectively define the personal relationships receiving constitutional protection, the legal meaning of "family" can be
defined, just as "life" was defined in the abortion cases, not by evidence or even by analysis, but by a simple shift of theoretical assumptions that happens, somehow, automatically.
By shifting the burden of proof, the judiciary can change the
most fundamental patterns of our social character with no real proof
that the change will be for the better - or, in the long run, even
tolerable. Changes of this kind may not only fail to follow the standard due process test of drawing upon the traditions and collective
conscience of the people, but they also can completely overturn long
established traditions.
[W]henever any precept of traditional morality is simply challenged to
produce its credentials, as though the burden of proof lay on it, we
have taken the wrong position. The legitimate reformer endeavors to
show that the precept in question conflicts with some precept which its
defenders allow to be more fundamental, or that it does not really embody the judgement of value it professes to embody. The direct frontal
attack "Why?" - "What good does it do?" - "Who said so?" is never
permissible; not because it is harsh or offensive but because no values
at all can justify themselves on that level. If you persist in that kind of
trial you will destroy all values, and so destroy the bases,of your own
criticism as well as the thing criticized.420

A presumption in favor of traditional values at least ensures that
they will endure until demonstrably better alternatives can take their
place.
The civil rights era gave birth to an iconoclastic mind set which
419. For example, the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography reached the
general conclusion that the available data are simply inconclusive about the link between obscenity and criminal behavior. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 & n.8
(1973).
420. C. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 60-61 (1947) (emphasis in original). Similarly,
James Hitchcock has said:
A traditional way of life is one which takes its practical authority from custom itself, from
the instinctive sense of the rightness of things which a genuinely traditional community
inculcates in its members. The tree can grow because its roots are not being constantly
yanked out of the ground for examination. . . .
But this settled way of life is, because of the very conditions which make it possible,
highly vulnerable to attack. Skepticism ... can dissolve existing bonds with relative
ease, even when it is powerless to create new ones. . . . If objections to a novel position
(for example, homosexuality as merely an "alternative lifestyle") cannot be easily stated
and concretely demonstrated, then it is assumed that mere prejudice governs the
objectors.
Hitchcock, Is L!fe a Spec/a/or Sport, 33 NATL. REV. 96 (1981).
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demands the abandonment of traditional practices as mere prejudice
unless specifiable justification is forthcoming. This attitude was expanded by the anti-authoritarianism of the late 1960's. It has found
its greatest expression in the courts, because basic constitutional theory permits the judiciary to discard majoritarian traditions reflected
in legislation when they threaten basic civil rights.
Given the current egalitarian momentum, the Supreme Court
could, though it has thus far declined to do so,421 adopt John Stuart
Mill's principle that the state may not regulate individual conduct
unless the state carries the burden of showing the conduct is demonstrably harmful. A few state courts have already done just that,
often in the name of "privacy."422 In that event, laws discriminating
between married and unmarried persons, or laws restricting the sexual privacy of adults, could become unconstitutional simply because
compelling evidence that moral permissiveness is either beneficial or
harmful is so difficult to adduce. Thus, the a priori decision of where
to place the burden of proof- not the level of evidence or even the
level of theoretical analysis - will determine the outcome.
If I were to illustrate my point by drawing a cartoon, I would
show a bloody and tattered lawyer standing in rags before a judge
whose desk and chambers were a pile of rubble. Holding up a few
shreds of paper, the lawyer would say, "Now I think I can show,
your Honor, that those practices were harmful to society."
Of course, if our elected representatives were to change our legally defined norms through the democratic process, that would be
quite another matter. The issues of proof would be no less difficult
before a legislative committee than before a court. But at least the
normative assumptions expressed through the legal system would be
considered by a deliberative process that inherently leaves the burden of proof with those challenging the status quo. In addition, legislative change can move prohibited conduct to a permitted status
without moving it all the way to a protected status. For example, a
state legislature could decriminalize private fornication without giving it the hallowed status of a constitutional protection. In declaring
a criminal fornication statute unconstitutional, by contrast, a court
would probably rely on the right of privacy. Judicial action is, for
this reason, more likely than legislative action to blur the distinction
between the married and the unmarried statuses - and, hence, to
blur society's definition of the family.
421. See notes 254-61 supra and accompanying text.
422. See note 305 supra and accompanying text.

552

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:463

This tendency of interventionist judicial action to sidestep both
traditional values and normal processes of proof is a major risk in
the position some take, that the judiciary should intervene when the
moral consensus of society is in flux in order to permit a new moral
consensus to evolve,423 or to act as the determiner of "conventional
morality."424 It may be more than judicial flattery (though not much
more) to argue that "[t]he Supreme Court is insulated from the bartering and pressures of the legislative process," which gives it the
ability "to look beyond the demands of self-interested minority lobbies in an effort to discern the attitudes . . . of the moral culture at
large";425 or that "[w]hat distinguishes courts and makes judicial
protection indispensable is an institutional commitment to consistency, reason, and principle . . . ."426
But these assessments are as dangerous as they are naive. First of
all, they assign to the Court the role of a majoritarian institution,
which simply reflects the contemporary tendency to see the Court
not as a "remembering or conserving" or even as a countermajoritarian institution, but as "an innovator or pathfinder. Litigants representing today's fashionable causes know this very well indeed, which is why they are litigants in the courts rather than
lobbyists before the legislatures."427 Furthermore, seeing the Court
too easily in this role merely sings once again the sad substantive due
process song of Lochner v. New York, 428 because it forgets the stirring caution of Justice Holmes that
the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it
can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that
the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law. 429

It is, therefore, not the place of the Court - especially when there is

no constitutional text to guide it - to be constantly seeking a 'judgmental balance of shifting evidence or values"; rather, it must proceed from ''virtually absolute and enduring principle[s],"430 that are
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
423. See Tribe, Structural .Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975).
424. Perry,supra note 255, at 417; Perry,Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power:
The Ethical Function of Substantive .Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Perry, Abortion].
425. Perry, Abortion, supra note 424, at 728.
426. .Developments, supra note 10, at 1176.
427. W. BERNS, supra note 57, at 233.
428. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
429. 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
430. A. Cox, supra note 409, at 114.
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ranked as fundamental." 431 In that way, the Court is the guardian of
tradition, not its enemy. The following section considers criteria useful in identifying - as due process "liberty" - when such fundamental and enduring principles are truly at stake.
B. Defining "Liberty'~· Balancing the Individual
and Social Interests

As noted at the outset of this Article, the central conflict in the
constitutional family cases occurs between individual and social interests in intimate relationships. A balance must be struck between
these two sets of interests if we are to reach sound decisions in this
area. Once heightened scrutiny is invoked, however, the analysis of_
compelling or other state or social interests is not very meaningful as
a practical matter. The procedural consequences of heightened scrutiny in effect "decide the question in advance in our very way of
putting it."432 Thus a far more crucial stage of analysis is involved in
the process of determining what individual interests should be included within such conceptual sanctuaries as liberty or privacy.
Several approaches have been suggested in addressing this task.
Justice Black's "total incorporation" view433 was never adopted by a
majority of the Justices. The approach of Justice Douglas to privacy,
first espoused in Griswold v. Connecticut ,434 which rejected substantive due process in favor of an even more vague notion of unenumerated rights, was replaced within a few years by approaches to privacy
essentially synonymous with the due process liberty approach. The
term "right of privacy" has nonetheless lingered, despite the similarity of its present contours to "liberty."435
The Court has seldom been explicit about the tests it uses in defining the limits of privacy or liberty, nor has it provided many comprehensive and consistent statements that would identify a
supporting rationale for the interests it has included in the protected
sphere. This mixture of silence and ambiguity is due, in part, to the
Court's reluctance to resurrect earlier criticisms of substantive due
process.436 It is also due, unfortunately, to a decline, ever since Gris431. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
432. Pound, supra note 23, at 2.
433. Black maintained that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporated all of the Bill of Rights, but only those rights. For a full expression of this theory, see
Adamson v. California, 32 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
434. 381 us. 479 (1965).
435. See Part II F supra.
436. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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wold, in the Court's felt need to justify its reliance on unenumerated
constitutional rights. The Griswold opinions, including Justice
Harlan's respected dissent in the related case of Poe v. Ullman ,437
showed the Court struggling through a vivid demonstration of judicial restraint and painstaking analysis. In Roe v. Wade, by contrast,
the Court's failure to articulate a reasoned justification for its resort
to substantive due process unleashed a barrage of criticism - even
from scholars who personally favored the results of the abortion
cases - from which the Court may yet be reeling. 438 By now, however, existing bits of reasoning can be pulled together to reach the
conclusion that "[i]n the family cases, the Court has consistently
turned to tradition as a source of previously unrecognized aspects of
the liberty protected by the due process clauses."439 This is, essentially, the Cardozo-Frankfurter-Harlan approach to substantive due
process. It has also been common for the Court's more recent cases
to speak in terms of a "cluster of constitutionally protected choices"
related to marriage and childrearing440 that seems to draw its justification from the similarity of this subject matter to the "family" due
process cases of the 1920's.
Justice Harlan formulated the best known statement of the tradition test in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman .441 A recent student analysis
437. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Though Harlan was dissenting, his
view of the statute in question was adopted by a majority a few years later in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
438. Much of the commentary is summarized in J. NooNAN, supra note 359 at 20-32,
439. .Developments, supra note 10, at 1177 (footnote omitted).
440. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
441. Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined
by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this
Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates
of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has
of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt
free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak
is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition
is a living t,hlng. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long
survive, wliile a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), after quoting Justice Harlan's language, Justice Powell added, "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our
most cherished values, moral and cultural." 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(footnotes omitted). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Chief Justice Burger wrote:
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a stroni; tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This pnmary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.
406 U.S. at 232. One of the most widely cited earlier tests for defining "liberty" came from the
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of the test illustrates some of the problems of interpreting it.442 The
analysis suggests, for instance, that "the Court will not recognize . . .
traditional values" the continued viability of which "has been seriously questioned."443 The contemporary attitude of "seriously questioning" virtually all traditional values is sufficiently widespread that
this qualification should not be taken too seriously until it has been
identified, much less relied upon, by the Court. The notion of continued viability does point _to the limitations of a tradition-oriented
approach, however, since the Court is not likely to find ultimate values in a tradition as objectionable as, say, racial prejudice.
There are also inherent difficulties in knowing just what is traditional about a tradition. One commentator has said that: "The
Court must determine what characteristics of a traditional value
render it of constitutional import; it may then adopt a functional approach to the right letting its rationale dictate its scope."444 This
description leaves considerable latitude, however, for defining both
"value" and "functional" approaches. One might conclude from the
marriage and family cases, for instance, that intimate human association is the traditional value, and that such functional equivalents445
as cohabitation or communal marriage should therefore be protected. Illustrating further, many would today assume that the core
value protected by the Constitution and our traditions is individual
autonomy. Thus, any infringement on personal autonomy could be
viewed as invading a traditionally protected value. The obvious
weakness of this approach is that it neglects the need to weigh social
or other competing interests - even if they have also been traditionally recognized - until a nearly irrebuttable presumption has already been created against any interest competing with individual
autonomy.
Louis Henkin identified the glaring need for the privacy cases to
adopt a test that weighs "the public goods that compete with 'pridebates on whether the fourteenth amendment incorporated all, or only the most preferred, of
the Bill of Rights guarantees. Defending the "selective incorporation" approach, Justice Cardozo said that "liberty" should include only those safeguards that are
of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish them is . . . to violate a
"principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusells, [291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)] . . . .
• . . If the fourteenth amendment has absorbed [these liberties], the process of absorption has had its source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (citations omitted).
442. See .Developments, supra note 10, at 1177-87.
443. Id. at 1179, ·1180 & n.134.
444. Id. at 1181 (footnotes omitted).
445. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
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vacy' in these cases."446 This is the same analytical step sought by
P.ound's attempt to place the individual and social interests on "the
same plane" during at least some stage of the inquiry. 447 Such a
weighing process
has never received refined scrutiny . . . in applying the Bill of Rights;
in the Privacy cases, it has had hardly any scrutiny at all. . . .
Especially now that we have added a new, expandable zone of autonomy, fundamental but not absolute, a jurisprudence of balancing of
rights and goods cries for thinking about public goods.448

While such comparisons may prove difficult, this difficulty does not
justify ignoring the public goods that compete with privacy. The
Court's primary business, after all, is making difficult choices between conflicting values.
Indeed, the Court's work in such other contexts as the Bill of
Rights has developed a sufficient methodology to weigh individual
and social interests that the analogy to those cases produces an extremely helpful insight in understanding the unarticulated analytical
premises for defining "liberty" in the Court's family cases. For example, in determining which elements of the Bill of Rights should be
binding on the states by incorporation into the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the Court has in recent years "displayed
a preference for justifying its actions in terms of explicit provisions
of the Constitution or plain implications of a democratic form ofgovernment ."449 Thus, in Duncan v. Louisiana,450 the right of trial by
jury in criminal cases was held to be within the meaning of due process "liberty" because it is among those "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions";451 but more specifically, trial by jury contributes to the
ends of a free society because peer determinations "prevent oppression by the Government."452 If a judge has "plenary power," governmental authority is "unchecked."453
The history of first amendment adjudication also makes it very
clear that more is at stake in identifying the root policies of preferred
constitutional freedoms than merely minimizing governmental inter446. Henkin, supra note 306, at 1430.
447. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
448. Henkin, supra note 306, at 1430.
449. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 71, at 781 (emphasis added).
450. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
451. 391 U.S. at 148 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Herbert
v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))).
452. 391 U.S. at 155 (footnote omitted).
453. 391 U.S. at 156.
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ference with individual autonomy. Free speech has enjoyed a special status in large part because of the relationship of unrestrained
discourse to the underlying political theory of democracy. Some significant aggregate end in an open society is preserved by making the
boundaries of permissible speech and association in the ideological
marketplace as wide as possible. For example, the freedom of association is important enough to be binding on the states through the
fourteenth amendment in part because association is important to
effective advocacy of public and private points of view, whether
political, economic, religious, or cultural.454 Justice Stewart has also
noted that the exalted status of freedom of association was designed
only to protect such "ideological freedom" as "the promotion of
speech, assembly, the press, or religion";455 it was never intended to
protect associations based on "no interest other than the gratification, convenience, and economy of sharing the same residence."456
An even more vivid illustration may be found in the Court's well
established approach to obscenity, which has not been entitled to
first amendment protection because obscenity does not contribute to
the ultimate ends of a democratic society, despite its obvious character as a form of speech. "[T)o equate the free and robust exchange of
ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene
material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and
its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom." 457 To say that
obscenity has not "the slightest redeeming social importance"458 is,
therefore, not only a way oftrying to define obscenity; perhaps more
importantly, it is a way of saying that extraordinary constitutional
freedoms are preferred in no small part because they promote matters of social value as well as promoting individual liberty.
The elimination of racial discrimination has taken on the highest
possible priority not only because discriminatory laws have the effect
of reducing individual liberty, but also because an overall pattern of
racial discrimination impairs full participation by disadvantaged
classes in the nation's economic, social, and political processes. The
Court's historic concern with school desegregation, for example, reflected a strongly held belief about the relationship between educa;.
454. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
455. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 535 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
456. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 536 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
457. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973). See also notes 369-80 supra and accompanying text, which address the relationship between the Court's rejection of first amendment
protection for obscenity and the Court's failure to extend the right of privacy to sex outside
marriage.
458. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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tion and participation in American society.459 A democratic society
seeks equality among its citizens as the standard in providing opportunity for economic and political participation, social contribution,
and individual growth. Those affirmative opportunities go well beyond a concern with negative restrictions on personal autonomy. Indeed, the constitutionally approved remedies often restrict autonomy
as severely as did the discriminatory practice itself.
The relationship between the individual and social interests is reflected in Roscoe Pound's view that:
When the legal system recognizes certain individual rights, it does so
because it has been decided that society as a whole will benefit by satisfying the individual claims in question; for example, when the legal
system guarantees the individual freedom of speech, it advances society's interest in facilitating social, political, and cultural progress. This
interest . . . is more important than society's interest in preserving existing institutions.460

This same relationship underlies Louis Henkin's concern that in the
privacy cases, the balance between private rights and public goods
"has had hardly any scrutiny at all."461 The Court's failure explicitly
to articulate this balance in its analysis of the family cases is unfortunate, because only in thoughtful.Jy assessing "the public goods that
compete with 'privacy' in these cases" will the Court find any
rational way of distinguishing which private conduct should be
within and which should be beyond the reach of constitutional
protection.462
This Article submits that the "family" relationships deserving
constitutional protection as substantive liberty interests under the
due process clause may be identified by the same view of social interest as that used in the doctrine of selective incorporation, in defining
the scope of first amendment freedoms in obscenity cases, and in
other siplilar contexts: the extent to which protection of the interest
furthers the ends of a democratic society. It is assumed, of course,
that a highly significant individual liberty interest would also be
459. Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern•
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru•
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
460. Auerbach, supra note 24, at 208.
461. Henkin, supra note 306, at 1430.
462. See id. at 1429-33. For a discussion of misconceptions that have arisen from viewing
"privacy" in a broad sense as a source of constitutional rights in a day of space-age technology,
see notes 302-07 supra and accompanying text.
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identified. When the legal system thus protects such relationships as
kinship and formal marriage, it advances not only the immediate
individual interests involved, but society's interest in social and
political structures that sustain long-term individual liberty. As developed more fully in Part I, supra, the structure of marriage and
kinship responds to that social interest by maximizing the interest of
children and society in a stable family environment; by ensuring a
socialization process and an attitude toward personal obligation that
maximizes democracy's interest in the voluntary "public virtue" of
its citizens; by maintaining marriage and kinship as legally recognizable structures that mediate between the individual and the State,
thereby limiting governmental power; and by maintaining sources of
objective jurisprudence that will ensure stable personal expectations
and encourage generality of laws, thereby minimizing the arbitrary
power of the State. In these ways, the structure of formal family life
emphasizes that sense of "ordered liberty"463 necessary to achieve
individual liberty as a long-range objective. Anarchy maximizes individual liberty in the extreme, but only in the short run. It has been
correctly observed that "the greatest failure of the individualistic approach to human rights has been the inability to recognize how an
ardent concern for freedom, understood in a particular way, can itself contribute in the long run, to the undermining of freedom." 464
The formal family aids our quest for long-run liberty. That is why
the Constitution does, and should, protect it.
The extent to which an asserted legal interest may further the
ends of a democratic society should be weighed, in the process of
constitutional analysis, at the time the Court is determining whether
the nature of the interest qualifies it for the protection of heightened
scrutiny. At this stage, the Court is neither deferring to nor doubting
a legislative judgment; rather, it seeks only to identify the nature of
the interest at stake. Once that step has been taken, and if heightened scrutiny is thereby invoked, consideration can then be given the
State's interest in regulating the protected interest in the manner employed by the legislative enactment in question. That process of reasoning has underlain the Court's approach to defining the scope of
first amendment protection and the scope of the incorporation doctrine under the fourteenth amendment. The Court's approach to defining privacy as part of due process liberty (or, preferably, leaving
463. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

464. Hitchcock, Beyond 1984: Big Brother Versus the Family, HUM.
1980, at 54, 56.
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aside confusing references to privacy465 and speaking simply of liberty interests in the family) should follow the same pattern. When
this is done, the individual and social interests can initially be compared "on the same plane" so that the very decision to categorize one
claim as "individual" and the other as "social" or as a "state interest" does not cause the Court to "decide the question in advance" by
its "very way of putting it."4 66
This method of analysis is dictated not only by analogy to other
contexts of constitutional adjudication, but also by the inherent process of defining due process liberty. Thus, Justice Harlan's understanding of the "purposes" and "traditions" behind the preferred
legal status of marriage led him to include marriage within due process liberty just as that same understanding led him to exclude
"adultery, homosexuality, [and] fornication ... however privately
practiced."467 This analytical step was taken in defining the nature
of "liberty" interests. The next analytical step would consider
whether the specific State interest at issue in the case justifies any
invasion of the preferred form of "liberty."
C. Policies That Compete with Family Liberty: A Perspective on
"Protected" and "Permitted" Interests

Explicit use of the analytical model suggested in the preceding
section would not have altered the outcome of most of the Supreme
Court's family cases. For the most part, the Court has reacted intuitively to the limits on personal autonomy naturally intimated by
deeply rooted social interests. Still, more explicit analysis is vital to
the articulation of a coherent rationale that will guide future cases
and lower courts. The number of cases in which social and individual interests conflict in family-related cases is likely to increase,
given the existing social and legal momentum.
Many courts and legislatures have begun to recognize compelling
claims that would once have been denied by rigid policies that favored formal marriage above all competing interests. These developments are not generally the result of deliberate antipathy toward
marriage or family values. Rather, in each circumstance, decisions
have been made to advance important policy interests deserving legal protection, despite the conflict between those interests and the
policy favoring formal family ties. As recognition of such interests
465. See notes 307-08 supra and accompanying text.
466. Pound, supra note 23, at 2.
467. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
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has increased, the policy preference for marriage has inevitably appeared to diminish and even "wither."468 Marriage cannot realistically be expected to take such priority that all competing interests
must forever go unrecognized, even though the law continues to recognize marriage as the "foundation of society." Thus, many of the
recent developments may be long overdue.
At the same time, a proper perspective is needed to make clear
that even as other interests make relative gains, the interest in marriage and kinship can have its own ultimate priority as represented
by constitutional protection. To develop such a perspective, consider
once again the distinctions between "protected," "permitted," and
"prohibited" conduct.469 Uncertainty about the meaning of the constitutionally protected category is created when claims in the middle
category of permitted conduct must be balanced against claims in
the protected category. Increasingly common - and increasingly
important - cases of this kind arise when permitted rights such as
welfare entitlements or employment rights are affected by policies
that express the state's preferred desire to support formal marriage.
If the protected status of marriage were always given preference,
many just claims would remain unsatisfied. Ignoring compelling
claims can be understandably troublesome, when, for example, the
state has tried indirectly to prohibit extramarital sexual behavior using methods that have only a tenuous relationship (or less) to the
state objective.470 As a result of such trade-offs, without any direct
change in the constitutional status of either marriage or material entitlements, "both marriage and the legitimacy of parentage have declined in importance as determinates of material benefits."471
468. Glendon, supra note 119, at 663. Such changes in legal policy in the United States in
many cases reflect "a long historical process" throughout the Western democracies "that has
effected a fundamental alteration in the relative social and economic importance of family,
work and government as determinants of wealth, standing, self-esteem and economic security." M. GLENDON, supra note 77, at 2.
469. See text at notes 409-10 supra.
470. A court decidine; that private sexual behavior is constitutionally protected might
hold a sex law unconstitutional but condone discriminatory hiring practices, or vice versa,
because different ranges of government interests are involved. The court might find, for
example, that there is a legitimate and sufficient state interest in promoting marriage or
discouraging immorality to justify a law criminalizing private sexual behavior. But if that
court viewed a refusal to hire a homosexual as nothing but a punishment for the same
behavior, the court might conclude that the civil disability was not sufficiently related to
the state's goal, since that goal is adequately and more directly served by the criminal law.
Conversely, the court might hold the criminal law unconstitutional as not sufficiently related to any legitimate state interest but condone a refusal to hire a homosexual as a
teacher, since the state's interest in the latter context could be viewed as permissible and
more substantial.
Note, supra note 32, at 727.
471. Karst, supra note 11, at 648. See generally Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage:
A .D!!ferent Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125 (1981); Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns
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A number of permitted interests may cause courts to limit the
protection traditionally afforded to the formal family. It is instructive to observe the effects of this phenomenon in situations where a
particular legal policy has demanded - and sometimes taken something from the status of marriage as the price for upholding its
own valid interest. In the illegitimacy cases, for example, the Court
has tended to find that children born out of wedlock should not be
punished by state policies designed to discourage illicit sex - not
because such policies are beyond the state's authority, but because
the punishment of innocent children is both an ineffective and unfair
means of pursuing the state policy. The interests of illegitimate children have been deemed significant enough in these cases to rise to
the status of their own specially protected constitutional position.472
For reasons also related to the economic welfare of illegitimate
children, the Court has - without giving protected constitutional
status to the right to receive welfare aid - invalidated state regulations that denied welfare assistance to the children of cohabiting parents.473 In response to state claims that regulations of this kind were
justified by an interest in discouraging illicit sexual relationships and
illegitimate births, the Court acknowledged that the state could regulate illicit sex and illegitimacy, but not by the device of absolutely
disqualifying needy children. The Court found that protection of
dependent children was the paramount goal of the welfare assistance, accepting as inevitable the reality that "there is no existing
means by which Alabama can assist the children while ensuring that
the mother does not benefit."474 The Supreme Court's intervention
in these cases has clearly resulted from its concern about the urgent
economic dependency of illegitimate children in poverty-class
households, not from judicial indifference to marital status.
There has been a growing policy interest in tort law in compensating the victims of tortiously caused injuries. This interest competes both with the common law's historic fear of unlimited liability
and with the law's traditional preference for protecting only the closest relational interests. The restricting of many tort claims to persons
related by marriage or kinship has been one important way of
resolving the policy tensions. However, at least one federal court has
of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 275; Glendon, supra
note 119.
472. See Part II A supra.
473. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). Both cases were decided by using the rational basis test.
474. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 335 n.4 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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recently expanded the action for loss of consortium to include the
claim of an unmarried cohabitant,475 even though similar consortium claims have not been allowed elsewhere,476 nor have the courts
generally recognized the claims of nonmarital partners in wrongful
death actions. 477 The court was moved by its acceptance of an overriding policy of extending tort actions to compensate injured parties,
and was not deterred by the subjectivity of evaluating the nature of a
consortium interest between unmarried cohabitants.478
The celebrated Marvin v. Marvin case479 is the result of emphasizing the contractual rights of cohabiting couples, not of equating
cohabitation with marriage. Michelle Marvin was held to enjoy
none of the rights of marital partners under California community
property laws, because the court did not regard Lee and Michelle as
a "family" within the meaning of California's Family Law Act. The
Marvin court took pains to point out that, "Lest we be misunderstood, . . . the structure of society itself largely depends upon the
institution of marriage, and nothing we have said . . . should be
taken to derogate from that institution."480 Moreover, the court may
well have intended to encourage formal marriage by removing the
financial incentives for cohabiting without marriage. 481 Other courts
have reached an even more cautious conclusion about Marvin-like
fact situations, not because they believe the policy preference for
marriage prevents cohabitants from entering into any contracts,482
but because they believe a strong (category 1) preference for marriage could be undermined if the courts allow implied contractual
claims (category 2) to arise from merely living together. 483 The
question of allocating policy priorities between upholding the insti475. Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980); see also Comment, Extending Consortium Rights lo Unmarried Cohabitants, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 911 (1981); Comment, Loss of Consortium and the Unmarried Cohabitant, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 437.
476. See, e.g., Chiesa v. Rowe, 486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413
A.2d 165 (Me. 1980).
477. See, e.g., Vogel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
478. See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980). The facts were especially compelling- the couple had been previously married and divorced. They had intended
to remarry, but believed they could not do so in view of the injury which became the subject of
the lawsuit. Ordinarily, the very lack of a long-term commitment that characterizes cohabitation would make the valuation of a loss of consortium claim impossible to fix.
479. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977), modified, 122 Cal. App. 3d
871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981) (deleting rehabilitative award to plaintiff).
480. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122.
481. See Beck, Nontraditional L!festyles and the Law, 17 J. FAM. L. 685, 690 (1978-79).
482. Contracts are generally permitted when they concern "independent" matters and sexual relations are not part of the consideration. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 587, 597
(1932); 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1476 (1962).
483. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 58, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (1979) ("Of substantially
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tution of marriage and recognizing freedom of contract is - as with
so many other policy conflicts - a judgment question. As the Marvin case illustrates, the contemporary climate has allowed contractual interests to gain somewhat in that process.484 It is not accurate
to infer, however, that, as a result, cohabitation has moved from a
"permitted" to a "protected" status by the recognition of contractual
rights.
The law of evidence has also established, over the years, certain
rules designed to protect and uphold the confidential relationship of
husband and wife. Competing against that interest has been an interest in securing all relevant testimony in litigation. Both interests
were recently weighed by the Supreme Court in reaching the conclusion that a spousal privilege should not bar the voluntary testimony
of one spouse against the other concerning non.confidential matters.485 The broad sweep of the prior testimony rule (requiring both
spouses to consent and covering non.confidential subjects)486 was
narrowed on the grounds that it impinged unnecessarily on the public's "right to every man's evidence"487 and that the ancient idea justifying the privilege (notions of self-incrimination arising from the
common law's view of legal unity between husband and wife) was
long since outmoded. The court did stress the importance of "marriage, home, and family relationships - already subject to much
erosion in our day,"488 but concluded that no other testimonial privilege covers non.confidential communication and that "when one
spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding
. . . there is. probably little in the way of marital harmony for the
privilege to preserve."489 Predictably, even before this case, the current climate had provoked consideration of whether the spousal evigreater importance than the rights of the immediate parties is the impact of such recognition
upon our society and the institution of marriage.").
484. A federal district court recently held that, because a Marvin-type suit between unmarried cohabitants was strictly a contract action, federal jurisdiction over the suit was not barred
by the recognized domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction. Anastasi v,
Anastasi, 532 F. Supp. 720, 725 (D.N.J. 1982). On the other hand, the California Supreme
Court is not willing to allow a prison inmate to receive overnight visits from a woman not
recognized as his lawful wife, because the state law authorizing such visits by persons related
through blood, marriage, or adoption intends only to preserve "family unity." In re Cummings, 30 Cal. 3d 870, 873, 640 P.2d 1101, 1102, 180 Cal. Rptr. 826, 827 (1982).
485. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
486. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
487. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980).
488. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980).
489. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980). However, the purpose of the privilege is to protect confidentiality at the time of the conversation, when there may be more to
preserve than at the time of the testimony.
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dentiary privilege should be extended to unmarried cohabitants.490
The whole range of divorce-related issues, such as alimony, property settlement, and child custody presents another fertile field for
conflict over the legal preference that should be given to formal marriage. The conflict has arisen most pointedly when the custodial
spouse is found to be cohabiting with another person, sometimes
homosexually. The issue also arises when one spouse claims the
other should no longer receive alimony because the other spouse is
cohabiting with another person.491 The movement in recent years
has been away from rigid assumptions and toward a more pragmatic
approach that does not automatically equate cohabitation with either
marriage or "immoral" conduct. As in the illegitimacy cases, legal
and social policy would obviously prefer that the custody of children
could always be assigned to two stable, married parents. Support for
the marital institution would dictate a similar preference. However,
the choices more frequently focus on the "least detrimental available
altemative"492 among two or more unattractive possibilities. Under
those circumstances, cohabitation is only one of a number of factors.
Some courts have judged its relative importance to be very high,493
while others have declined to adjust custody on "moral climate"
grounds without clear proof of harm to the children.494
Society's current interest in sex discrimination has also led to
considerable reexamination of statutes and common law rules based
on sex-role stereotypes. Even the changes that have occurred, however, do not warrant the uncritical assumption that all sex-discrimination legislation is designed to remove all distinctions based on
marital status. Some judges have missed that point. For example,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held recently that a federal equal
credit opportunity law gave an engaged - but unmarried - couple
490. See Comment, The Husband-Wife Evidentiary Privilege: Is Marriage Really Necessary?, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411.
491. E.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1142-43 (Me. 1980); Myhre v. Myhre, 296
N.S.2d 905, 907-09 (S.D. 1980).
492. The phrase is from J. GOLDSTEIN, A. SOLNIT & A. FREUD, supra ~ote 39, at 53.
493. E.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979) (cohabiting divorcee loses
custody because of potential injury to moral well-being and development of children), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980); S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1980) (potential-not actual-harm
to child from mother's lesbianism sufficient to warrant change of custody), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 911 (1981); MJ.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 968-69 (Okla. 1982) (psychiatrist's testimony
that child in custody of cohabiting lesbian mother would face inevitable and serious trauma
persuaded court to change custody to father). See generally Case Note, Modffication of Child
Custody Predicated on Cohabitation ofthe Custodial Parent, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 169 (analysis
of the Jarrell case.)
494. See In re Burrell, 58 Ohio St. 2d 37, 388 N.E.2d 738 (1979); Schuster v. Schuster, 90
Wash. 2d 626, 585 P.2d 130 (1978).
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the right to aggregate their incomes in determining creditworthiness
in a joint mortgage application. 495 By basing its decision on the notion that the subject federal law forbade any discrimination on the
basis of marital status, the court may have established a precedent
for requiring financial institutions to aggregate the claims of all unmarried couples, whether communal, homosexual, or otherwise. It
has been observed that if the two plaintiffs in the case had been married - but not to each other - the defendant firm would still have
refused to aggregate their incomes, because there was no marital relationship between the two ofthem.496 The legislative history reveals
that the law's entire intent was only to remove discrimination against
individual women in obtaining credit.497 Logic also suggests that the
likely duration of a relationship should be a factor in determining
the creditworthiness of an association between two people. The
court ignored both of these factors, and also failed to see in its decision any implications for the institution of marriage. This case illustrates that concerns with sex discrimination can be uncritically
translated into a broad mandate for equating the statuses of married
and unmarried couples - a problem very different from sex discrimination. When Congress or state legislatures wish to begin treating
unmarried couples as a disadvantaged class for purposes peculiar to
that class, that will be soon enough to challenge the protected status
of marriage. In the meantime, the potent legal weapons of anti-sex
discrimination laws are best reserved for their intended purposes.
There is also a large category of problems that would fit under
such headings as decriminalization and victimless crimes. Without
attempting to address that large subject, it should at least be noted in
passing that in the last fifteen years, twenty-one states have altogether repealed their laws prohibiting homosexual activity by consenting adults. Another thirteen states have reduced the crime from
a felony to a misdemeanor.498 Fornication is a crime today in only
fifteen states and the District of Columbia.499 Of equal importance,
even the states that have fornication laws rarely enforce them. At
the same time, some states have "fiercely resisted" decriminalization
and "stringent penalties for sodomy are the rule rather than the ex495. Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
496. Note, Protection of Unmarried Couples Against Discrimination in Lending Under l/1e
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 93 HARV. L. REV. 430 (1979).
497. See kl. at 434.
498. Grey, supra note 10, at 95 n.67; H. CHASE & C. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRE·
TATION 1156 (1979),
499. The statutes are summarized in Note, supra note 411, at 254.
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ception" when enforcement is undertaken. 500 In general, much of
the support for decriminalization of sex crimes "has been based on
practical concerns" relating to enforcement difficulties, "not on any
notion that sexual freedom is a human right." 501 Thus, relaxed attitudes toward the enforcement of sex crimes do not mean that sexual
privacy outside marriage is in a protected position. And even if legislative decriminalization were to take place on a larger scale, that
would only move nonmarital sex to a permitted category, not a protected one.
Other movements in the law have also tended to diminish the
place of formal marriage as the price of upholding other competing
interests.502 For instance, the divorce reform movement, which began by distinguishing between' personal fault and actual breakdown
of a marriage, has now created in some states the practical right of
unilateral marriage termination. In unilateral action, the interests of
the marital partner and the interests of children are likely to receive
reduced levels of consideration.
This abbreviated sketch has summarized a number of important
legal policies that have been the subjects of increased judicial, and
sometimes legislative, attention in recent years: policies favoring
welfare entitlements for the needy - especially children; the interest
of tort law in compensating the victims of actual losses; the interest
of contract law in maximizing freedom of contract; the policy favoring maximum information in evidentiary rules; the preserving of existing child-parent relationships in deciding between imperfect
custodial parents; increased emphasis in eradicating sex discrimination; movements to decriminalize sex crimes; and the divorce reform
movement. It is significant that, except for the equal protection issue
in the illegitimacy cases, none of the policy interests mentioned here
draws its strength from a position of preferred constitutional status.
500. Note, supra note 32, at 738.
501. Grey, supra note 10, at 95. Lord Patrick Devlin, one of the best-known defenders of
society's right to enforce its collective moral judgments, is inclined to agree: ','Adultery of the
sort that breaks up marriage seems to me to be just as harmful to the social fabric as homosexuality or bigamy. The only ground for putting it outside the criminal law is that a law which
made it a crime would be too difficult to enforce; it is too generally regarded as a human
weakness not suitably punished by imprisonment." P. DEVLIN, supra note 194, at 22. The
privacy concerns affecting enforcement of sex crimes are discussed more fully in Part II F
supra.
The repeal of an anti-sodomy statute while a teacher dismissal case was still pending was
held not to "relieve the conduct of its immoral status" in Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No.
10, 88 Wash. 2d 286,297,559 P.2d 1340, 1346, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). The existence
of sex crime statutes has generally not been a prerequisite to the dismissal of public school
teachers for lewd or immoral conduct. See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 19 (1977).
502. See generally Glendon, supra note 119.

568

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:463

Similarly, few of these interests are in the "prohibited" category.
Most are simply "permitted" interests that compete in an infinite variety of circumstances with other interests. The constitutionally
"protected" status of marriage and kinship still remains in a
uniquely favored position. As has been demonstrated, the preservation of that protected status is based on policies applicable to formal
family interests that do not apply to other interests, even though for
more limited "permitted" purposes such other interests may be valid.
Nevertheless, the recent growth of interests that compete with
marriage may be regarded as a threat to the continued existence of
marriage as a preferred status. The policies of social interest that
seek to uphold formal family ties are having increasing difficulty defending themselves against an emerging set of legal concepts whose
most potent powers are now reserved for the enforcement of equal
individual rights. Furthermore, the legal system has always had difficulty enforcing affirmative duties, the discharge of which is vital to
the maintenance of family relationships. Thus the formal family's
chief source of protection may be the willingness of the judiciary to
restrain itself in creating even more exceptions to the policies that
support a general sense of obligation in family relationships. There
is otherwise no single institution in our system responsible to determine when the cumulative effect of so many exceptions to a protected marriage preference policy finally becomes so dominant that
the marriage policy is, for most practical purposes, overwhelmed.
When the law relaxes enough indirect supports for the formal family, formally based family life is left unprotected and vulnerable to
the eroding momentum of an incessant individualism. When that
happens, even those sympathetic to the removal of arbitrary limits
on personal liberty register concern:
U.S. law, from its beginnings, has favored the traditional family for its
critical role in the nurture of future generations. Even those who oppose discrimination against homosexuals may question the wisdom of
giving gay families the same support.503

The Supreme Court's extension of constitutional protection to marriage and kinship, while denying that protection to sexual privacy
among the unmarried, is consistent with a general posture of support
for the formal family. A clearer understanding of that position and
the policies that sustain it, as suggested in Parts I and II, could clarify the meaning of family ties and the social purposes served by
them. Such understanding might encourage the judicial self-restraint necessary to sustain marriage as the "foundation of society."
503. And Now Gay Family Rights'!

TIME,

Dec. 13, 1982, at 74.
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CONCLUSION

The individual tradition and the family tradition, both historically at the heart of American culture, are the products of two very
different heritages, both conceptually and historically. In the past,
the two traditions have been mutually reinforcing; now, however,
they may be on such a collision course as to become mutually exclusive. A comment on the origins and intentions of the two traditions
may provide some perspective in seeking to restore the necessary
compatibility between them.
Sir Henry Maine's celebrated generalization about the long
sweep of history from Status to Contract offers one way of comparing the roots of the two traditions. Reaching back to the earliest
stirrings of recorded history, Maine wrote that the family antedated
the individual as the primary unit of which both the law and society
took account:
[S]ociety in primitive times was not what it is assumed to be at present,
a collection of individuals. In fact, and in the view of the men who
composed it, it was an aggregation offamilies. The contrast may be
most forcibly expressed by saying that the unit of an ancient society
was the Family, of a modem society the Individual.504

Since that time, "The movement of the progressive societies has . .
been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency
and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The individual
is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws
take account." And as the law has reflected this development, the tie
which replaces the "reciprocity in rights and duties" of the family
has come to be "Contract." Hence, "we may say that the movement
of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract." 505
Nevertheless, some vestiges of the ancient concept of Status have
continued, as both the law and society still assume that people who
enter "the order of matrimony" or become mothers and fathers take
upon themselves a form of Status that confers a set of rights and
obligations having an almost timeless kind of meaning.506 Nobody
needed to explain to the worldwide television audience just what
Prince Charles and Lady Diana were doing in 1981 on that summer
day at St. Paul's, exchanging vows in a ritual older than their royal
504. H. MAINE, supra note 52 (emphasis in original).
505. Id at 163-65 (emphasis omitted).
506. For a discussion of marriage as a status construct, in the context of various interpretations, see Hunter, An Essay on Contract and Status: Race, Marriage, and the Meretricious
Spouse, 64 VA. L. REV. 1039, 1067-76 (1978).
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pedigree. Nobody needed to explain, or hire a lawyer to draft a
careful agreement to cover the details, when a dying man said to his
mother while gesturing to his friend, "Woman, behold thy son;" and
to his friend, "Behold thy Mother." The ancient concept of Status
told them what to do. "And from that hour," the friend "took her
unto his own home."507
Because Status, with its origins in the Family, predated the Revolutionary Era, it is not surprising that local American laws governing
the family "predated not only the writing of the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence," but also predated the statement of
the "new political principles" by the likes of Locke and Hobbes on
which our constitutional theory was based. 508 Those "new political
principles" were, of course, grounded fully in concepts of Contract,
including the right of revolution for "breach of contract" and the
right of society to enter into yet a new Social Contract in the form of
a Constitution.
At the time the Constitution was created, there was a clear distinction between the individual tradition and the family tradition.
Drawing on terms first used by De Tocqueville, Walter Berns has
written that the individual tradition was in the realm of "political
legislation," which was embodied in the Constitution and was informed by the democratic political rights expressed in the Declaration of Independence. Political legislation stressed the natural
equality of all men "so far as political right is concerned." 509 Thus,
the new political principles rejected centuries of abuse of aristocratic
Status as a political and economic construct. In this state of individualistic equality, it was assumed that men would be "calculating,
fear-motivated ... individuals, not directed toward others . . . ." 510
"Vigorous pursuit of individual self-interest turned out to be the
"'guiding and energizing principles of the community." 511
Meanwhile, however, the domestic realm had not been included
in the political legislation. It remained, rather, in what De Tocqueville called the "civil legislation," which comprised the law enforced in state courts, including the laws governing the family.
These laws, which predated the creation of the Constitution, continued to regulate the duty of family members to support one another;
507. John 19:26-27.
508. Address by Walter Berns to the Philadelphia Society 12 (Apr. 11, 1981) (on file with
the Michigan Law Review).
509. Id at 11.
510. Id at 13 (quoting Alan Bloom).
511. Horwitz, supra note 54, at 133.

January 1983)

Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy

571

the right of a father to an action against one who, by debauching his
daughter, brought disgrace upon the family; and the rule providing
that one spouse could not testify against the other, in the interest of
domestic harmony. 512 Many of the duties imposed by the civil law
upon family members derived from a "law of morality," which also
had obvious links to a social interest that sought to provide for the
protection of dependent persons, and to secure "to all individuals a
moral and social life" as well as to ensure the "rearing and training
of sound ... citizens for the future." 513 Clearly, the family law doctrines that evolved through custom and the common law, prior to the
Constitution both in time and in theory, were concerned with marriage not only as "the most important relation in life," but also as
"the foundation of the family and of society."514 Hence, society's
right to concern itself with the social interest in marriage may be
among the most obvious and the most important of the rights and
powers retained by "the people" and "the States" under the ninth
and tenth amendments. The silence of the Constitution on the entire
subject of the family does not tell us that marriage and family were
unimportant to the founders; it tells us, rather, that the Founders
consciously accepted the regulation of family life embodied in the
civil legislation. They did not view individual rights arising from
family relationships - though there were many - as political liberties needing protection by the Bill of Rights.
The customary and common law, traditions of Status on which
domestic relations law rested did not derive from the same premises
of self-interest inherent in the natural rights doctrines that fueled the
political and economic individualism of the nineteenth century.
Rather, in abrupt contrast, the civil legislation reflected an "anxious
solicitude of the law for domestic tranquility." It sought to protect
"the family as the place oflove," based not on the ruthless self-interest of the political legislation, but on "self-forgetting" and the "capacity to care for another which produces a willingness to care for
others." 515 The great strength of Status in the civil legislation was
that it maintained the inseparable link between liberty and duty, developing in children and other family members the public virtue that
made the family tradition an essential prerequisite not only of the
512. See generally T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME (3d ed. 1862), quoted in
Address by Walter Berns to the Philadelphia Society, supra note 508, at 12.
513. Pound, supra note 21, at 182.
514. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888).
515. Address by Walter Berns to the Philadelphia Society, supra note 508, at 12-13.
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individual tradition, but of a stable democratic society.516 Thus it
could be said by the Supreme Court in 1979: "Properly understood,
then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our
tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic
presuppositions of the latter."517
When the Court in 1923 first recognized that the right of parents
to direct the upbringing of their children was part of the substantive
liberty protected by the due process clause, 518 it did not create a new
legal right out of whole constitutional cloth. It merely acknowledged
in constitutional language the traditions of Status and the civil legislation that predated the Constitution.519 In that sense, Meyer v. Nebraska520 is a clear example of substantive due process as a search
only for "fundamental principles as they have been understood by
the traditions of our people and our law." 521
But somehow, in the last twenty years, our concepts have become
all confused. Perhaps the confusion began with the passion and the
power of the Civil Rights movement, which arose from such bitter
ashes that jt understandably looked to the potent individualistic constitutional doctrines of the political legislation to resolve problems
that were at least as much social as they were political, economic,
and governmental. Then the feminist movement, with equal fervor,
sought economic and other forms of equality for women in ways that
had never been considered by previous women's rights movements
in the United States: by pursuing not only economic and political
rights per se, but also by going "right to the heart of the matter,
which is the historic nature of the role of the sexes."522 These movements were joined by an endless variety of other social revolutions so
all-encompassing that they had a way of politicizing everything.
Each movement sought to discard some objectionable aspect of our
traditions. Each viewed with disdain any doctrine which would limit
the definition of due process liberty to the very traditions they sought
to change.
Amid such turmoil, our settled concepts have become hazy: not
abandoned, just hazy. It could be that the traditions of Status and
516. See Part I B supra.
517. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion).
518. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
519. For a summary of the common law development of parental rights, see Hafen, supra
note 49, at 613-19.
520. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
52.1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
522. R. NISBET, supra note 42, at 83 (emphasis in original).
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the civil legislation, based on self-forgetting and a link between duty
and liberty, have now been thrown out as so much archaic baggage.
If so, marriage, kinship, and the domestic relations should arguably
be understood as having joined the individual tradition and Contract, and thus rest upon self-interest, political power, and a concept
of liberty that will accept duty only when the power of the State can
enforce it.
If all that is true, it is also ironic. The doctrine of economic selfinterest, once so much at the center of the individual tradition, has
been forthrightly transferred from the protected position of substantive due process to a merely permitted constitutional category.523
The result is that economic self-interest is now enormously moderated by a potent social interest in the economic welfare of society.
Conversely, the family tradition, once so wisely protected from the
corrosive influences of self-centered individualism, has been dragged
into conceptual alliance with the most politically based individual
liberties. One wonders if it has all been done consciously.
The opinions of the Supreme Court discussed earlier suggest that
despite all the individual rights rhetoric, most of the Justices still tacitly believe they are maintaining a family tradition based on kinship
and marriage, designed to contribute ultimately to a productive, but
separate, individual tradition. Whether the historic relationship between the two traditions can continue to be mutually productive is a
more open question now than it has ever been before. The enormous influence of the judiciary on the resolution of that question
depends, among other things, on its ability to recognize and remain
conscious of the very different conceptual and historical purposes of
the two traditions, on its ability to use a constitutional test that permits a weighing of the social and the individual interests before shifting the burden of proof, and on its ability to keep watch over the
law's general preference for marriage in the face of increasing pressures to ignore it in favor of some specific competing inequity.
In the meantime, we must avoid the naive expectation that the
law will magically deliver to individuals an "autonomy that social
conditions make it increasingly difficult for them to achieve."524 The
search for autonomy, divorced as it now is in the public mind from a
search for commitment and duty, is a search that will compound our
sense of alienation, not eliminate it. Nietzsche knew the feeling:
" 'Where is - my home?' For it do I ask and seek, and have sought,
523. See notes 400-04 supra.
524. C. LASCH, supra note 45, at 150.
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but have not found it. 0 eternal everywhere, 0 eternal nowhere, 0
eternal - in-vain." 525 De Tocqueville also understood it: "[N]ot
only does [the self-interest of] democracy make every man forget his
ancestors, but it hides his descendants and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back forever upon himself alone, and
threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his
own heart."526 To divorce liberty from duty is to impair the search
for freedom, no matter which extreme we pursue. The totalitarian
state has divorced the two, as duty to the collective has become
everything. The anarchistic libertarian would divorce the two, as the
unrestrained and se!(-fulfilling pursuit of personal liberty becomes
everything.
The reality is that liberty and duty are two poles on a single construct. Neither is meaningful without the other. When the link between them is severed, alienation is the only result, whether through
the oppression of the State or of existential despair. One of the most
productive sources of maintaining the dynamic link between liberty
and duty in our own culture has been our understanding of mutual
reciprocity between the family tradition and the individual tradition,
between Status and Contract. In the long run, the maintenance of
that reciprocal link is a critical need for those who seek to "establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, ... and secure the Blessings of
Liberty" not only "to ourselves," but also to "our Posterity."

525. F. NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA 306 (T. Common trans. 1951).
526. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 396, at 194.

